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SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY UNDER
SECTION 1001: THE TAXABLE EVENT, AMOUNT REALIZED
AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF BASIS*
Louis A. DEL COTTO**
PREFACE
T wo fundamental problems of a system that taxes apprecia-
tion1 of property are (1) when to tax the appreciation, and (2)
how to measure it. Although section 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code authorizes taxation of "all income from whatever source
derived," and appreciation in property could arguably be con-
sidered "income" even before a change in ownership,2 section
1001 (a) of the Code taxes such appreciation only upon a "sale
or other disposition" of the property. Part I of this article deals
with the question of what is a taxable event-that is, a "sale or
other disposition"-under this section. The difficulty of answering
this question is discussed in the context of bequests,3 divorce
property settlements,4 and conveyances of less than an entire
interest in property.5
The settled rule in the context of bequests is that satisfac-
tion with appreciated property of a legatee's claim to a fixed
value of property constitutes a sale by the estate.6 Conversely,
satisfaction of a claim to specific property with that property is
*Copyright @ 1977, Louis A. Del Cotto. All rights reserved.
0* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence. Pace University School of Law, J.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1951; LL.M., Columbia University, 1961.
1. I.R.C. § 1001 (b), of course, defines gain for tax purposes as the excess of the
amount realized over the taxpayer's basis, and "appreciation" is used in this sense. If a
taxpayer has a basis other than cost, "gain" under section 1001 (b) may differ from the
market appreciation during his ownership.
2. Cf. I.R.C. § 551 (taxation of stockholder on undistributed income of a foreign
personal holding company); I.R.C. § 951 (taxation of stockholder on undistributed in-
come of "controlled" foreign corporation). See also B. BIraaR & L. STONE, FEDERAL IN-
COME, EsTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 74-75 (4th ed. 1972); Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary
Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
3. See notes 50-120 infra & accompanying text.
4. See notes 121-268 infra & accompanying text.
5. See notes 269-345 infra & accompanying text.
6. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), afJ'd per curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 573 (1936) ; see notes 50-59 infra & accompanying text.
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not a taxable event to the estate because the estate had no stake in
any increase or decrease in the property's value.7 This article
discusses various efforts of estate planners to avoid taxation to
the estate of bequests falling somewhere between these two ex-
amples by bringing them within the second principle.
A similar problem is presented by divorce settlements. If a
wife has during the marriage an interest, which will vest upon
divorce, in the marital property, then division of the property
upon divorce is not a "sale" of half the property by the husband
in exchange for release of her dower and support rights.8 If, how-
ever, a wife has no such rights, then when the couple divides the
marital property, the husband has engaged in a sale.' In these
situations, state courts, rather than planners, have responded to
the challenge of fitting transactions into one rule rather than the
other.'0
"Sales" in which payment of the purchase price can come
only from income produced by the property sold" and sales of
income interests in property12 present somewhat different issues.
The general rule established by the Supreme Court is that prop-
erty is not sold if the risk of its failure to produce income is not
shifted.'3 Congress has intervened in this complex area to reverse,
in narrowly defined circumstances, 14 what would be the result
under principles governing similar circumstances. Also discussed
in Part I are problems of basis in sales or other dispositions, and
the implications of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Part II takes up the problem of measuring the amount to be
taxed in a sale or disposition. Although it might be possible
directly to tax at the time of sale the appreciation in the prop-
7. Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 C.B. 233; see notes 60-62 infra 9- accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969), discussed in
text accompanying notes 178-84 infra.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 168-227 infra.
10. See Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, vacated, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), on
remand, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290
(Okla. 1968).
11. See, e.g., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 272-75 infra.
12. See, e.g., Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 197),
discussed in text accompanying notes 831-35 infra.
13. Compare Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937), with Anderson v. Helvering,
310 U.S. 404 (1940). Perkins and Anderson are discussed in text accompanying notes
269-75 infra.
14. I.R.C. § 656(b), discussed in text accompanying notes 805-10 infra; I.R.C.
§ 636 (a), discussed in text accompanying notes 337-38 infra.
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PART I-THE TAXABLE EVENT
erty sold, section 1001 (b) of the Code instead provides that the
amount realized by the transferor is the sum of any cash plus the
fair market value of any property he receives.5 The theory
selected by the Code may cause problems where there is no ap-
parent receipt of money or other property, such as in an abandon-
ment'6 or other disposition 7 of mortgaged property, or a gift of
property that has a value greater than the gift tax assumed by the
donee.'8 The last situation also presents difficult and unresolved
problems of allocation of basis between the property sold and
that given.'9 The last three sections of this article discuss the law
governing taxation of exchanges of property for an obligation to
pay money in the future.20 These include sales involving con-
tingent obligations2' and private annuities. 2 -
15. In an arm's length exchange, the value of the property sold ordinarily will
equal the value of the property received. A presumption of equality was established in
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes
158.64 infra. See also Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp.
184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
16. See notes 365-89 infra & accompanying text.
17. See text accompanying notes 365-86 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 390-98, 419-80 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 399-418, 481-87 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 560-606 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 607-30 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 631-84 infra.
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PART I
THE TAXABLE EVENT-"SALE OR OTHER DISPOSITION"
I. INTRODUCTION
S ection 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
gain or loss from the "sale or other disposition" of property is
the difference between the amount realized and the adjusted basis.
This method of calculating gain or loss was first codified in sec-
tion 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 192423 and has not been
changed since then. The legislative purpose of the enactment was
"to show clearly the method of determining the amount of gain
or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. '24 No
change in the law was intended, however. The committee re-
ports state that "[s]ubdivision (a) of this section . . . merely
embodies in the law the present construction by the Department
and the courts of the existing law."2
Prior to the enactment of section 202(a) of the 1924 Act,
both the Treasury Department and the courts had included gain
from the sale of assets within the meaning of the word "income"
in the predecessors of what is now section 61 .Y In Merchants' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Smietanka27 the taxpayer argued that gain from the
sale of securities could not be taxed without apportionment since
such gain is not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. The Court held that such gain is sixteenth amend-
ment income under the definition provided by Eisner v. Macom-
23. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 202, 43 Stat. 255.
24. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 241, 250; S. RiEP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1
(Part 2) C.B. 266, 275.
25. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 241, 250; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1
(Part 2) C.B. 266, 275.
26. The earliest predecessor of section 61 is in the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
§ II, B, G, 38 Stat. 167, 172. Early cases are discussed in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921); the Treasury position is contained in Treas. Reg. 31
(1909), issued Dec. 3, 1909, extracted in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 186 n.l
(1918), and is summarized in the argument of the Solicitor General in Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 513-14. Cf. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918);
Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872) (both cases are distinguished in Mer-
chants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 521). See also Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d
S58 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927).
27. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
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ber 8: "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or both combined, provided it be understood to
include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets."29 Thus, the gain was realized within the meaning of
Macomber and was taxable as income under the predecessor of
section 61.30
In historical perspective, the provisions of section 1001 make
explicit the more general language of section 61, which includes
in gross income "all income from whatever source derived, in-
cluding... [g]ains derived from dealings in property.... "31 The
"sale or other disposition" requirement of section 1001(a), how-
ever, seems to go beyond section 61 to prevent taxation of gain
prior to the ending of one's investment in an asset. This require-
ment that gain be "realized" before it can be treated as income
respects the holding of Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smie-
tanka, and also reflects the congressional desire not to tax appre-
ciation in a person's property while his ownership of it continues.8 2
II. RECOGNITION OF GAIN
A necessary ingredient of a "taxable event" is that any gain
or loss realized from a sale or other disposition be recognized.
Section 1001(c) provides for recognition, but only for gains and
losses arising from a "sale or exchange" of property, rather than
"sale or other disposition" gains and losses. This leaves an ap-
parent gap in the recognition provisions for gains and losses from
''sales and other dispositions" that are not "sales or exchanges."
The legislative history of the predecessors of section 1001(c)
shows, however, that such a gap was apparently unintended, and
that all "sale or other disposition" gains and losses are within the
recognition provisions. In the Revenue Act of 1924, when section
202(a) (now section 1001(a)) was enacted, there was also enacted
section 202(c) 33 (now section 1001(b)) and sections 202(d)34 and
28. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
29. 255 U.S. at 518 (emphasis added).
30. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2 (a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.
31. 255 U.S. at 516.
32. For instances of deviation by Congress from the policy of not taxing unrealized
appreciation, and for literature on the subject of taxing unrealized appreciation (includ-
ing constitutional problems), see B. BrrTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND
GiFT TAXATION 439 (4th ed. 1972).
33. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202 (c), 43 Stat. 256.
34. Id. § 202 (d).
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203(a)35 (now section 1001(c)). Section 202(c) provided, as does
section 1001(b), that the amount realized on a sale or other dis-
position of property was the sum of money received and the fair
market value of other property received.30 Prior to 1924, this sec-
tion had provided that on an exchange of property no gain or
loss would be recognized "unless the property received in the
exchange has a readily realizable market value." 37 The Senate
Finance Committee Report explains the 1924 change in section
202(c) as follows:
Great difficulty has been experienced in administering this provi-
sion. The question whether, in a given case, the property received
in exchange has a readily realizable fair market value is a most
difficult one, and the rulings on this question in given cases have
been far from satisfactory. Furthermore, the construction placed
upon the term by the department has restricted it to such an ex-
tent that the limitation contained therein has been applied in
comparatively few cases. The provision can not be applied with
accuracy or consistency. 38
The 1924 change (now section 1001b)) was said to embody
"what is the correct construction of the existing law; that is, that
where income is realized in the form of property, the measure of
the income is the fair market value of the property at the date of
its receipt."39 Along with section 202(c), sections 202(d) and
203(a) (now section 1001(c)) were passed to provide for recogni-
tion of gain on the sale or exchange of property.40 Thus, section
202(c) clarified the method for calculating gains and losses on
sales or other dispositions, but the recognition provisions of
sections 202(d) and 203(a) applied to sales or exchanges. The
reason for this is obscure, but it may well have been an oversight,
caused by congressional concern for reversing the pre-1924 law
of section 202(c) which came close to being a non-recognition
provision for exchanges of property for property. Thus, the recog-
nition provisions of sections 202(d) and 203(a) focused on ex-
35. Id. §203 (a).
36. Id. §202(c).
37. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202 (c), 42 Stat. 230.
38. S. RaP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-41 (1924), reprinted in 1939.1 (Part 2)
C.B. 266, 275.
39. See H.R. RFP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939.1
(Part 2) C.B. 241, 250. See also S. REP,. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924), reprinted
in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 266, 275.
40. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 202 (c), 203, 43 Stat. 255.
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change rather than disposition.4' This conclusion is somewhat re-
inforced by the language in sections 202(d) and 203(a) (now
section 1001(c)), which required recognition of the gain or loss
"determined under" section 202(a) (now section 1001(a)).
In all events, a realized gain arising from a disposition of
property, though there is no sale or exchange, will be recognized
under the broad language of section 61(a). This proposition
would seem to be handled by the language of Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietanka2 where gain realized from the sale of
assets was held to be taxable income simply because it was realized
and hence had to be recognized.43 In Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co.44 the Court reiterated its position that the language of
section 61(a) is to be given a "liberal construction ... in recogni-
tion of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those spe-
cifically exempted. ' 4 Thus, even though collection of a debt by
a creditor is not a sale or exchange within the capital gain and
loss provisions of the Code,46 it is nevertheless a "disposition"
within section 1001(a) so as to constitute a taxable event. In
Helvering v. Roth48 the relinquishment of notes on collection
was stated to be a taxable disposition of the notes. In any event,
held the court, the gain from the collection was taxable under the
language of section 61(a): "The general intent of the statute was
to tax all realized gains and the only possible question is whether
the language was so inept as to let such a case escape through its
meshes. We can see no reason for so restricting its scope." 49
Clearly then, the "sale or other disposition" language of section
1001(a) merely identifies a taxable event that is also within the
broad sweep of section 61(a), and that is not dependent on section
41. See Kilbourn, Puzzling Problems in Property Settlements-The Tax Anatomy
of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. Rv. 354, 381 (1962).
42. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
43. Id. at 520.
44. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
45. Id. at 430.
46. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. United States, 806 U.S. 436 (1939); Pounds v. United
States, 372 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1967), and cases discussed therein.
47. See, e.g., Hatch v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1951); Parker v. De-
laney, 186 F.2d 455 (lst Cir. 1950); Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756 (3d
Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1940); Estate of Bary v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) 1790 (1965), affid per curiam, 368 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1966). See
generally MERTENS, LA,% OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.98 (1973).
48. 115 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1940).
49. Id. at 241; accord, Hatch v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1951); Herbert's
Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1943).
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1001(c) in order for gain or loss from such event to be recog-
nized.
III. SATISFACTION OF A CLAIM AS A "SALE OR OTHER
DISPOSITION"
A. The "Fixed Amount" or "Specific Asset" Claim
Where a debtor transfers property in satisfaction of a fixed
money claim against him, or transfers an asset in satisfaction of a
claim for an asset other than the one transferred, the transferor
will have engaged in a taxable disposition of the property trans-
ferred. In Suisman v. Eaton" the trustee of a testamentary trust
transferred appreciated securities in satisfaction of an obligation
to pay a $50,000 legacy. The court held the transfer to be a "sale
or other disposition" of the securities, resulting in a taxable gain
to the trust of the difference between the amount realized (the
"fair market value of the property (other than money) received,"
which was $50,000, the amount of liability cancelled) and the
basis of the trust in the securities. 1 The court noted that the
legatee had by the will acquired no interest or claim against any
specific assets of the trust.5 2
In Kenan v. Commissioner3 trustees were authorized to pay
a legacy of $5 million either in cash or in marketable securities of
like value. The legacy was paid partly in cash and partly in appre-
ciated securities, and the trustees contended there had been no
taxable "disposition" of the securities. On exercise of the power to
satisfy the legacy with securities, argued the trustees, the legacy
should be considered as a bequest of the securities themselves, as
if the cash alternative had not been provided.5 4 The legatee then
would take the securities as a non-taxable receipt of property ac-
quired from the decedent," with a basis to be determined by
reference to the fair market value of the securities at the date of
50. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936).
51. 115 F. Supp. at 115.
52. Id.
53. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
54. Id. at 219.
55. I.R.C. § 102(a); Rev. Rul. 68-49, 1968-1 C.B. 304. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (1973).
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decedent's death. 6 The court held that the legatee acquired no
interest in any specific securities, but rather had a dollar claim for
$5 million subject to the power of the trustees to satisfy the claim
in cash or in kind. On payment in kind, the trust benefitted from
the appreciation in the securities since, but for the appreciation,
the trust would have had to part with cash or other property.57
Thus, the trust engaged in a sale or other disposition requiring
recognition of gain in the amount of the appreciation in the
securities. Likewise, the legatee had a cost basis in the securities
equal to their value since she acquired the securities by purchase-
by releasing her claim for $5 million-rather than by bequest or
inheritance.5
The rule of Kenan and Suisman was followed by the Treasury
in Revenue Ruling 66-207.r 9
A distribution by the trust of the securities in satisfaction of
a specific bequest of the securities themselves would not have
been a taxable disposition, and would not have been a taxable
event for either the trust or the legatee. 60 In such case, the legatee
is the beneficial owner of the securities themselves, having ac-
quired the securities by a "bequest" exempt under section 102(a).
It is the legatee, therefore, who takes the entire risk of apprecia-
tion or depreciation in value of the securities. The trust is merely
a conduit for transmission of the securities to the legatee and can-
not itself benefit or lose from such fluctuations in value. Hence,
delivery of the securities to the legatee is merely a conveyance of
what the legatee already owns, and neither the trust nor the
legatee engages in a sale or other disposition.61
In Kenan and Suisman, the legatee has, of course, also en-
gaged in a disposition of his money claim but will have no gain
or loss because his basis equals the amount of the claim.62
56. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113 (a) (5), 53 Stat. 41 (now I.R.C. § 1014 (a)).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (a) (2) (1957).
57. 114 F.2d at 219-20.
58. Id. at 220.
59. 1966-2 C.B. 243.
60. Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 C.B. 233; O.D. 667, 3 C.B. 52 (1920); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1014-4 (a) (2) (1957). Even when the legatee has no claim to a specific asset, a dis-
tribution in kind is not a taxable sale or other disposition by the trust if it is a dis-
cretionary distribution, since it satisfies no dollar claim. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (1) (1)
(1973); M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES
AND BENEFICIARIES 525 (1970).
61. See Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and
Income Tax Considerations, 63 Mirc. L. REv. 809, 862-63 (1965).
62. I.R.C. § 1014. It should be noted that the legatee in Suisman was bequeathed
the right to receive $50,000 when she attained age 25, and that four years elapsed be-
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A distribution of property in satisfaction of a right to specific
property other than that distributed is similarly treated as a tax-
able event,63 unless the fiduciary lacks the power to exercise such
discretion. Thus, in Revenue Ruling 69-486,64 a trust had made a
final distribution of trust corpus to two legatees, C and X, each of
whom was entitled to one-half of the corpus on termination of the
trust. The trust corpus consisted of two assets, notes and common
stock, each having a value of $300X. At the request of the bene-
ficiaries, the trust distributed all of the notes to one and all of the
stock to the other. The ruling held that:
Since the trustee was not authorized to make a non-pro rata dis-
tribution of property in kind but did so as a result of the mutual
agreement between C and X, the non-pro rata distribution by the
trustee to C and X is equivalent to a distribution to C and X of
the notes and common stock pro rata... followed by an exchange
between C and X of C's pro rata share of common stock for X's
pro rata share of notes.65
Thus, each beneficiary realized gain on the appreciation in the
asset he exchanged, while the trust did not engage in a taxable
exchange.
The principle of Kenan and Suisman applies generally to any
transfer of property that satisfies a fixed money claim, or a claim for
property other than that transferred. Section 1040, enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 197666 (effective for persons dying
after December 31, 1976), limits the operation of this principle,
however, for gain realized by an estate or trust on satisfaction of
a money claim with "appreciated carryover basis property.0 17
This term is defined in section 1023(f)(5) as carryover basis prop-
erty under section 1023 that had a fair market value at decedent's
death in excess of his adjusted basis therein. On satisfaction of a
right to a pecuniary bequest with such property, the transferor's
gain is limited, generally, to the appreciation occurring from the
date of decedent's death to the date of the distribution.
tween the death of the testator and payment of the legacy. The Commissioner appar-
ently did not attempt to tax as gain to the legatee the difference betiveen $50,000 re-
ceived and the date-of-death value of the inherited right to receive the $50,000, which
value would equal $50,000 less the amount of the interest discount for four years. A like
result obtained on similar facts in Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (1) (1973).
64. 1969-2 C.B. 159.
65. Id.
66. Pub. L. No. 94-955, § 2005 (b), 90 Stat. 1877.
67. I.R.C. § 1023 (t (5).
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Specifically, this limitation prevents taxation to the estate or
trust of the gain attributable to the difference between the trans-
feror's carryover basis in the property, as computed under section
1023, and its fair market value for estate tax purposes. 68 The net
effect is to preserve the pre-1977 result for such transfers by limit-
ing the gain taxed to only the appreciation in the property trans-
ferred that occurred after the valuation for estate tax purposes.
Thus, taxation of the appreciation in the property prior to estate
tax valuation is not taxed to the transferor, in effect continuing
for the estate or trust the basis "step-up" allowed by section
1014(a) prior to its modification by the carryover basis provisions
of section 1023 of the 1976 act.
The gain avoided by the estate or trust is, however, preserved
for future taxation by section 1014(c), which gives to the trans-
feree of the property a basis of carryover, increased by the amount
of gain recognized by the transferor.
The operation of section 1040 can be illustrated by a simple
example. Suppose an estate owns property with a carryover basis
of $100,000, a present value of $160,000, and a value for estate tax
purposes of $150,000. The property is distributed in payment of a
pecuniary bequest of $160,000. The gain to the estate is $10,000
(not $60,000) and the transferee acquires a basis of $110,000.
If the property had a distribution-date value of $140,000, then
no gain is taxed under section 1040, since there is no post-death
appreciation in the property. Thus, no gain is recognized. Nor is
there a recognized loss to the estate because its basis for loss is
the carryover basis of $100,000, which is unaffected by section
1040. The basis of the distributee apparently is a carryover basis
of $100,000 by virtue of a literal application of section 1040(c):
The basis of property acquired in an exchange with respect to
which gain realized is not recognized by reason of subsection (a)
or (b) shall be the basis of such property immediately before the
exchange, increased by the amount of gain recognized to the estate
or trust on the exchange.
Because $40,000 of realized gain was not recognized by reason of
section 1040(a), the distributee acquires a carryover basis.
Nor does it appear that the distributee will be entitled to a
loss deduction for the difference between his basis in his pecuniary
68. For valuation of property for estate tax purposes, see I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032;
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031, 20.2032.
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claim, which is its full amount, and the lower carryover basis in
the property acquired. First, under section 1001(a), there is no
excess of basis over amount realized, since the property received
is equal in value to the distributee's basis in his pecuniary claim.
Second, there may be no "transaction entered into for profit" as
required for a loss deduction under section 165(c)(2). Most im-
portant, to allow a loss deduction for the loss of basis would
frustrate the apparent purpose of section 1040(c), which is to tax
to the distributee the estate's non-recognized gain. Allowance of
a loss in the same amount would wash the eventual recognition of
this gain and have the net effect of taxing the gain to no one.
It should also be noted that section 1040 has no application
where appreciated property is not used to satisfy a pecuniary
bequest. Thus, where it is used to satisfy a claim to property other
than that transferred, there is a fully taxable exchange on both
sides in accordance with the principles discussed above.
Section 1040 does not apply where the property transferred
was not appreciated at decedent's death. Thus, if estate property
has a carryover basis of $150,000 and an estate tax value of $100,-
000, and is transferred in satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest of
$100,000, the loss of $50,000 will be recognized to the estate. The
loss will be disallowed, however, under section 267(a) where the
transfer is between a trustee and a beneficiary of the trust.
B. The Marital Deduction Bequest
Where the claim satisfied by a transfer of property is for a
specific number of dollars or for an asset other than the one trans-
ferred,6 9 it is easy to see a taxable sale or disposition under the
principle of Kenan and Suisman. In both situations, the trans-
feror will have had the risk of any appreciation or depreciation
in the asset transferred and will therefore receive the benefit of
such appreciation (or suffer the loss of depreciation) in discharg-
ing the claim. Similarly, the transferee of property who receives
it in cancellation of a claim to other property also engages in a
taxable disposition of his claim and realizes any gain or loss in-
herent in his claim.
Where, however, the transferee's claim is to something other
than a specific sum of money or a specific asset (or fractional share
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (t) (1) (1973).
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of specific assets), difficulties arise in applying the above princi-
ples. A common example is the claim created by a bequest in-
tended to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction.7 0 The de-
duction is limited generally to the greater of $250,000 or one-half
of the "adjusted gross estate ' 71 (the gross estate less estate tax de-
ductions for funeral and administration expenses, claims against
the estate and losses).72 Since neither the gross estate nor the
amount of deductible expenses, claims and losses can be deter-
mined with any degree of certainty before death, the marital de-
duction grant in the decedent's will generally is not phrased solely
as a specific dollar bequest, but rather is likely to be a bequest in
terms of "the greater of $250,000 or an amount equal to one-half
of the adjusted gross estate," or "the greater of $250,000 or an
amount equal to the maximum amount of the marital deduction
allowable to my estate for federal estate tax purposes." 73 Where
one-half of the adjusted gross estate exceeds $250,000, the dollar
claim of the surviving spouse becomes "fixed" only after the testa-
tor's death and after the amount of the estate tax deductions rele-
vant to finding the adjusted gross estate are known.74 Once the
amount of the claim is determined, however, it is a "fixed dollar
claim," which is a charge against all of the estate assets, and which
will not vary with fluctuation in value of estate assets. 5
This is true despite the fact that the bequest is not of a "spe-
cific sum of money" under section 663, as interpreted by the
Treasury Regulations.78 Thus, even though there is no fixed dol-
lar claim at the date of decedent's death, there is nevertheless such
a claim when the adjusted gross estate is finally determined. Ac-
cordingly, for decedents dying prior to 1977, gain or loss is realized
by the transferor (estate or trust) of property in satisfaction of the
70. See I.R.C. § 2056.
71. I.R.C. § 2056 (c) (1).
72. I.R.C. § 2056 (c) (2) (A).
73. See Polasky, supra note 61, at 813.
74. The amount of the marital deduction is affected not only by the amount of
expenses, claims and losses, but also by certain elections exercisable by the executor (to
choose the alternate valuation date in valuing the gross estate, I.R.C. § 2032, and to take
administrative expenses and section 2054 losses as deductions against either the federal
estate tax or the estate's income tax). See I.R.C. § 642 (g).
75. See Polasky, supra note 61, at 859-60.
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.663 (a) -1 (b) (1) (1956). Under this regulation, distribution
by the estate of the amount of the marital bequest is not within the "specific sum of
money or of specific property" exemption of section 663 (a) (1). The distribution may,
therefore, be includable as income to the surviving spouse to the extent the distributable
net income of the estate is allocable to it under section 662 (a). See generally Polasky,
supra note 61, at 860-61.
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marital bequest,7" and the transferee acquires the property by pur-
chase and has a cost basis therein equal to the dollar amount of
her claim .7  For estates of decedents dying after 1976, the recog-
nized gain is limited by section 1040, discussed above,70 and the
distributee acquires a carryover basis, increased by the gain recog-
nized to the transferor.80
C. The "Variable Amount" Cash Bequest
To be distinguished from the fixed dollar claim is the claim
which varies with the value of the fund from which it is payable,
or with the amount of income that the fund produces. The latter
situation has been held to be governed by the principle of Kenan
and Suisman.81 In Revenue Ruling 67-7482 the beneficiary of a
trust agreed to take appreciated stock from the trustee in satisfac-
tion of his claim to all the income of the trust for the year. The
trustee was held to have sold the stock at its fair market value
(equal to the trust income for the year), and the beneficiary was
held to have acquired the stock by purchase. For estates and trusts
of post-1976 decedents the gain and basis results are affected by
section 1040.83
What of the first situation, a dollar claim that varies with the
value of the fund from which it is payable? We have seen that
where the bequest is of a specific asset, or of a fractional share in
all assets which fraction will not vary with fluctuations in value of
the assets, there is no taxable event when the bequest is satis-
fied by distribution of the specific asset or by distribution of the
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014.4 (a) (3) (1957); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Rev.
Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 C.B. 325. The loss of a trust, however, is not recognized because of
I.R.C. § 267 (a), (b) (6).
78. Although the amount of the marital bequest is not fixed at decedent's death,
for transfers from estates of decedents dying prior to 1977, the legatee is nevertheless
allowed a basis equal to the number of dollars eventually fixed for the marital share
under section 1.10144 (a) (3) (1957) of the Regulations. See also Kenan v. Commissioner,
114 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1940); Lindsay C. Howard, 23 T.C. 962 (1955); Sherman
Ewing, 40 B.T.A. 912 (1939).
79. See notes 66-69 supra & accompanying text.
80. If any part of the distribution is includable to the surviving spouse under
§ 662 (a), presumably the carryover basis will be increased by the amount of such in-
come, up to the fair market value of the property, under Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (3)
(1957).
81. See Lindsay C. Howard, 23 T.C. 962 (1955); Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B. 194.
82. 1967-1 C.B. 194.
83. See notes 66-69 supra & accompanying text.
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beneficiary's fractional interest in each of the assets.8 4 In these
situations, the value of the claim fully reflects fluctuations in value
of the underlying asset and it is only the owner of the claim who
can benefit or lose from such fluctuations. The estate or trust has
no interest in either appreciation or depreciation of the asset. Ac-
cordingly, there is no taxable event to either party when the legacy
is satisfied with the property bequeathed.85 But suppose now that
the bequest is of a dollar amount equal to the distribution-date
value of a specific estate asset, or of a fractional portion of assets.
The issue presented is essentially the same as the one decided in
Commissioner v. Brinckerh off, 6 where the will of the testatrix
directed that certain real property be sold when deemed advisable
by her executors, and that the proceeds of the sale be divided
among certain legatees. After the property had appreciated to a
value of $15,000, the executors conveyed it to a corporation that
issued to each of the legatees equal amounts of the corporate
stock, and, in consideration of receiving the stock, the legatees re-
leased the executors from any liability arising from failure to sell
the property and distribute the proceeds. Upon liquidation of the
corporation and receipt by each legatee of a ratable share of the
real property-still worth $135,000-the Commissioner argued that
there was a taxable gain to each legatee because the basis of each
in the corporate stock was his ratable portion of the value of the
real estate at testatrix's death.8 7 The Commissioner apparently
viewed the corporate shares, received by the estate in a section
851 exchange, as received by the legatees by bequest under the
will. 8 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, seemingly viewed
the issue as whether the will had given the legatees a specific
bequest of a fractional share of the real estate. A conveyance of
a fractional share to each legatee would have resulted in no tax-
able event and the legatees would have acquired a basis equal to
that of the estate. 9 The Second Circuit held, however, that under
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (1) (1) (1973) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (a) (3)
(1957).
85. If, however, the beneficiary receives an asset other than the asset (or fractional
interest in assets) bequeathed, then both the transferor and the beneficiary-transferee
have engaged in a taxable exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (1) (1973). See also
Polasky, supra note 61, at 863-65.
86. 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948).
87. Id. at 438.
88. Id. at 439.
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (a) (2) (1957); Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 (Part 1)
C. 682.
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Anderson v. Wilson 0 the legatees acquired under local law a
money claim only and therefore had no interest in the real prop-
erty other than to compel performance of the trust." The court
held accordingly that under Kenan and Suisman v. Eaton
[a] tax liability.. . arose against the executors when the stock was
transferred to the taxpayers in exchange for a release of their
claims as legatee-beneficiaries to the cash proceeds which the ex-
ecutors would have realized had they instead exercised the manda-
tory power of sale given them under the will.02
The court then cited Kenan and Suisman for the proposition
that a transfer of property in satisfaction of a legatee's claim for
a "cash payment"0 3 is a taxable event for the estate. 4 The court
noted and rebutted the argument that Kenan and Suisman did not
apply
because they involved only cash legacies of fixed amounts and the
executor in such cases had control of the general estate which
fluctuated in value in his hands while the legatee was unaffected
in the amount of his recovery by the fluctuations. But the facts
here involve no legal distinction since the taxpayers had no in-
terest in the real estate during the period of its increase in value
but only in such cash as they might receive from the exercise of
the executors' power of sale. The real estate itself belonged to
the executors in trust who retained the title until it was disposed
of .... The present case is therefore to be distinguished not from
other legacies which are of a fixed amount in cash but from gifts
under a will of property which belongs as such to the legatee.
The fact that the ultimate value realized by the taxpayers in the
present case depends upon the fluctuating value of the property
devised to the executors does not affect our conclusion .... 05
This holding should be compared with that of Revenue Rul-
ing 55-117,6 where a trust was formed from the residue of an
90. 289 U.S. 20 (1933).
91. 168 F.2d at 439.
92. Id. at 440.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added). In accord with the result in Brincherhoff is W. Hamil-
ton Spedden, 8 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 62-39 (1939), where the decedent's will directed the
executor to sell the property in the residuary estate and pay the proceeds to his widow.
The widow agreed with the executor to take the property in kind. The transfer of the
property was held to be a sale at its market value, having the same effect as a sale to
the widow for cash and a distribution of the cash to the widow as residuary legatee.
With respect to distributions in kind in satisfaction of "unitrust" shares of a charitable
remainder trust, see Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1 (d) (5) (1972). See generally Del Cotto P_ Joyce,
Taxation of the Trust Annuity: The Unitrust Under the Constitution and the Internal
Revenue Code, 23 TAX L. Rav. 257, 262, 291-96 (1968).
96. 1955-1 C.B. 233.
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estate and the will directed that when the trust beneficiary reached
a specified age, she be paid one-fourth of the trust principal as
valued at that time. The remaining principal was to be paid to
the beneficiary five years later; the trustee had the power to make
either distribution in cash or in kind. At the time of the first dis-
tribution, one-fourth of the trust principal was worth $60X. The
trustees proposed to transfer to the beneficiary 20 shares of stock,
value $15X, in which the trust had a basis of $7X. The proposed
distribution was held to be a non-taxable event to both the trust
and the beneficiary, and the beneficiary acquired a basis equal to
that of the trust, $7X. Kenan and Suisman were distinguished, as
the proposed distribution was "not in satisfaction of an obligation
of the trust for a definite amount of cash or equivalent value in
securities, but [was] rather in the nature of a partial distribution
of a share of the trust principal. Accordingly, there [was] no sale
or exchange involved. 9
7
Brinckerhoff, then, is distinguishable from a specific bequest
or a bequest of a fractional share in specific assets because under
local law the beneficiary has a right only to cash proceeds from a
sale of certain assets. Although this view may accurately depict the
rights of the beneficiary under local law, its holding that the estate-
transferor has engaged in a sale or other disposition is question-
able. For the estate to have gain from the sale of an asset, it must
receive the benefit of the appreciation in such asset. Where the
beneficiary has a dollar claim equal to the full value of a particular
asset, including any appreciation therein, which claim fluctuates
with the value of the asset, it is essentially no different, for tax
97. Id. at 234. The view of Revenue Ruling 55-117 appears to be that the bene-
ficiary had a right to the specific assets distributed so that the trust received no benefit
from the appreciation in those assets. This view is justified under the facts presented,
since the beneficiary was eventually to receive all of the assets held by the trust. But
suppose the beneficiary had a right only to trust assets worth $15X and the balance of
the assets had been bequeathed to someone else. In such case, has the trust not bene-
fitted from the $6X of the appreciation in the assets distributed (not the entire $8X of
the appreciation, since the beneficiary had a right to $2X of the appreciation because of
his 25 percent interest in all trust assets) ? Certainly the appreciation has prevented a de-
pletion of other trust assets, and accordingly there would appear to be a taxable event to
the trust. On the other hand, since the bequest was of trust property rather than cash,
Brinckerhoff does not literally apply and there would seem to be a non-taxable distribu-
tion of "a share of the trust principal" within the language of Revenue Ruling 55-117.
This view is supported by section 1.661 (a) -2 (f (1) (1973) of the Regulations, which
provides that a distribution of property by a trust is not a taxable event unless it is in
satisfaction of a claim for a specific dollar amount or for specific property other than
that distributed. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1 (d) (5) (1972), which holds that there
is a taxable event when property is distributed in satisfaction of an annuity or unitrust
amount payable in cash or other property.
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purposes, from a bequest of the asset itself. It is difficult to see how
the estate can benefit from any value in the asset. The beneficiary
is more properly viewed for federal tax purposes as owning the
asset directly, and any sale thereof for cash is the sale only by the
beneficiary, not by the estate.98
Viewing the beneficiary as directly inheriting the particular
asset establishes his basis in his claim to the asset. For estates of
pre-1977 decedents, the beneficiary's basis is the value of the asset
determined under section 1014, which, of course, was the position
taken by the Commissioner in Brinckerhoff. Under the holding
of Brinckerhoff, however, the beneficiary had no claim for the
asset itself, but only a claim for the cash proceeds derived from
the sale of the asset. Because of the peculiar facts of the case, the
court did not have to reach the issue of the beneficiary's basis in
the money claim. Presumably, such basis, determined under sec-
tion 1014, would be equal to the fair market value of the real
estate because the claim was for the proceeds arising from sale of the
real estate. Therefore, upon exchanging the claim for the corpo-
rate stock, not only would the executors have engaged in a taxable
event under the Brinckerhoff reasoning, but the beneficiary also
would have disposed of his money claim for the stock, and would
have recognized gain due to the excess value of the stock over his
basis. The stock would have been acquired by purchase and have
a cost basis, as held in Brinckerhoff, but the purchase would itself
have been a taxable event to the beneficiary. Thus we have the
strange result of two taxable events when property is exchanged
for release of a money claim. As Brinckerhoff holds, under Kenan
98. See Rev. Rul. 68-666, 1968-2 C.B. 283, involving an estate which sold securities
at the request of legatees to whom the securities had been specifically bequeathed. The
executor's compliance with the request was held to be the equivalent of a distribution
of the securities to the legatees, who then returned them to the executor to sell on their
behalf. The gain was realized and received by the beneficiaries and not by the estate.
Compare Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 410 F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
But see Rev. Rul. 66-207, 1966-2 C.B. 243, which deals with a slightly different form of
the Brinckerhoif problem. A cash bequest of $250X was payable from the residue of the
estate and the residue included property having a value of $200X and a basis of $15OX.
A transfer of the assets to the pecuniary legatee was held a taxable event to the estate.
The fact that the legatee of the pecuniary bequest was entitled to the full cash value of
all the remaining estate assets did "not transform that bequest into a bequest of the
residue of the estate." Id. at 244. Thus, gain would be recognized to the estate although
the appreciation in the property would in no way free any assets for the benefit of other
beneficiaries.
The problem raised by Brinckerhoff-the bequest of a dollar amount, satisfied by a
distribution of property in kind-apparently can be finessed by a specific bequest of
property with a power of sale to the estate. See Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 C.B. 233, at 234.
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and Suisman the estate engages in a taxable event. But in Brinch-
erhoff the money claim fluctuated with the value of the property
received in the exchange, and therefore presumably also gave rise
to gain or loss to the beneficiary when exchanged for the property.
The Brinckerhoff problem remains even for estates, trusts and
beneficiaries of post-1976 decedents, as modified, of course, by the
provisions of section 1040.
D. Revenue Procedure 64-19
Aside from a bequest of specific assets, or a fractional share
therein, is there a method of giving a pecuniary legacy, satisfiable
in kind, that does not risk producing a taxable event to the estate?
Draftsmen of marital deduction pecuniary bequests devised a
clause to allow the marital bequest to be satisfied in cash or in
kind, but any non-cash assets so used were to be valued at estate
tax values.9 9 The intended income tax effects of a distribution of
assets in satisfaction of such a bequest were (1) no gain or loss
realized by the estate, because it is satisfying no fixed dollar claim
and because the overall basis of the estate in the assets distributed
equals the amount of the pecuniary legacy; and (2) no gain or loss
realized by the beneficiary because his claim is not to a fixed num-
ber of dollars, but rather to dollars or assets equal to the estate's
basis. 00
The key to the income tax success of such a clause does not
appear to be the matching of the estate's basis to the amount of
the pecuniary bequest. The assets distributed could still have a
value above or below such basis and, accordingly, gain or loss
would still be realized by the estate if the assets discharged a fixed
dollar claim of the legatee. It is the second feature of such a be-
quest-lack of a fixed dollar claim-that prevents a taxable event.
The bequest gives to the surviving spouse no claim for an amount,
either in cash or property value, that can be "fixed" at any time.
The estate can satisfy the spouse's claim either with cash, or with
assets having a value ranging from zero to any amount, and, absent
some contrary provision of local law, the legatee has a claim for no
more in value than is distributed.
The possibility of the estate distributing to the legatee assets
with a value on the distribution date of less than the claimed
99. See Polasky, supra note 61, at 816.
100. Id. at 867.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
amount of the marital deduction-one-half the adjusted gross
estate-proved disturbing to the Internal Revenue Service,' and
eventually Revenue Procedure 64-19102 was promulgated to deal
with the problem. This Revenue Procedure in effect holds that
where a pecuniary bequest can be satisfied in kind at estate tax
values, the property passing to the surviving spouse is not ascer-
tainable as of the date of death, and presumably the marital de-
duction will be disallowed, unless the terms of the will or of local
law require the distribution of assets having a value on the dis-
tribution date of no less than the dollar amount of the pecuniary
bequest, or unless there is a requirement that any assets distributed
fairly represent appreciation or depreciation in the value of the
entire property of the estate. 3
Revenue Procedure 64-19 is concerned solely with the issue
of qualification of certain pecuniary bequests for the federal estate
tax marital deduction and does not address the income tax prob-
lems arising from its requirements. 0 4 Nevertheless, coupling a
pecuniary bequest (satisfiable in kind at estate tax values) with
either a "minimum value" or a "ratable sharing" requirement
(whether imposed by the will or by local law) does raise difficult
problems of sale or other disposition for both the estate and the
legatee.
If under the will or local law the executor must distribute
assets having an aggregate distribution-date value of no less than
the amount of the pecuniary bequest,105 when will there be a sale
or other disposition by either of the parties? Suppose that the
pecuniary marital bequest is finally fixed at $1 OX and in satisfac-
tion of the bequest the executor distributes securities having a
value of $200X and a basis to the estate of $100X. Has the legatee
received assets in discharge of a "fixed dollar claim"? Arguably
not, because, although the legatee is entitled to a minimum dollar
value of $100X, she may in fact receive assets with a greater value;
the excess value is not part of her claim.0 6 It is suggested, however,
that the legatee has inherited a claim for at least $100X, payable
101. Id. at 818.
102. 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 682.
103. Id. at 683.
104. The only case thus far decided under Revenue Procedure 64-19 is Estate of
Abraham Hamelsky, 58 T.C. 741 (1972), which dealt only with the marital deduction
and not with any income tax issue raised by the revenue procedure.
105. See, e.g., N.Y. Esr., PowERs & TRusTs LAw § 2-1.9 (b) (2) (McKinney 1967).
106. See Polasky, supra note 61, at 867-68.
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in cash or assets; that she also has a claim for assets having an
estate tax basis of at least $1OOX; and that her overall basis in
these claims is $10OX, their minimum fair market value at the
date of decedent's death.07 Accordingly, the transfer by the estate
of the property worth $200X does satisfy the fixed dollar claim
for at least $100X in cash or assets. Thus, one-half of the value of
the property distributed has been sold by the executor, and the
other one-half has been distributed to meet the requirement that
the property distributed have an estate tax basis of $100X. As to
the one-half sold, the estate has a taxable event and the only ques-
tion would seem to be the amount of basis offset to which the
estate is entitled. Is the estate entitled to use its entire basis of
$10OX (resulting in no gain or loss on the sale), or must it use
only the basis allocable to the property sold-that is, one-half the
basis? By analogy to the "part sale-part gift" regulations, the estate
would be entitled to use the full $100X of basis to avoid gain on
the sale, 8 giving to the legatee an overall basis in the asset of
$10OX. 0 9 The allocated basis approach would allow the estate to
use only one-half of its basis, $50X, on the sale for the $100X
claim, resulting in a gain to the estate of $50X. The legatee's over-
all basis in the asset would then be $150X-$100X of cost and
$50X carryover from the estate for the one-half interest not ac-
quired by sale." 0 The limited authority in the area indicates that
the allocated basis approach is the one to be used for estate dis-
tributions that are a sale only in part." In all events, assuming no
distributable net income is chargeable to the distribution, no gain
or loss is recognized to the legatee; she has purchased one-half the
asset for her claim of $10OX in which she has a basis of $10OX;
the balance of the property has not been received in satisfaction
of any claim for either dollars or any specific asset. 12
107. I.R.C. § 1014. Although, as we have seen, the amount of the marital bequest
is not fixed at the date of decedent's death, the Treasury Regulations apparently allow
the legatee a basis of the number of dollars eventually fixed for the marital share. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (a) (3) (1957).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e) (2), Ex. (3) (1972).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(b), Ex. (1) (1972).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a) -2(f) (3) (1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (1957). The
portion of the property not sold, valued at $10OX, is not used in satisfaction of a be-
quest of money or specific property and thus would appear to be treated as if it were
a discretionary distribution of estate corpus. See generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND &
R. STEPHENS, supra note 60, at 525, 528. See also M.L. Long, 35 B.T.A. 95 (1936).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a)-2(f) (3) (1973). See generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREE-
LAND & R. STEPmNS, supra note 60, at 529-30. Compare I.R.C. § 1011 (b).
112. See note 110 supra.
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For estates and trusts of post-1976 decedents, section 1040
does not change the result for the estate. For the one-half of the
property sold in discharge of the pecuniary legacy of $10OX, the
gain is limited to $50X, the difference between the estate tax value
of $50X for one-half the property and its distribution-date value
of $10OX. The legatee, however, is limited to a carryover basis,
increased by the $50X gain recognized by the estate. Thus, if the
entire property had a carryover basis of $50X prior to the distribu-
tion, the legatee's basis would be $IOOX ($25X plus $50X gain for
the one-half received in discharge of the pecuniary bequest; $25X
for the other half).113
To use an easier example, suppose the estate distributes two
assets: stock (estate tax value $50X, distribution date value $75X,
carryover basis $25X) and real estate (estate tax value $50X, dis-
tribution-date value $25X, carryover basis $50X) in satisfaction
of the minimum dollar claim for $10OX. For estates of pre-1977
decedents it would appear clear that the estate has realized a $25X
gain on the stock and a $25X loss on the real estate,114 and that the
legatee has a $10OX cost basis without any gain or loss. For estates
of post-1976 decedents the results will be the same for the estate,
but the legatee's basis in the stock will be reduced from $75X,
"cost" under pre-1977 law, to $50X, carryover of $25X increased
by the $25X of gain recognized by the estate.""
If, in order to comply with Revenue Procedure 64-19, the
executor is required to distribute assets having a value fairly rep-
resentative of the value of all property available for distribution,
will the legatee have a fixed dollar claim? Probably not, since the
legatee's claim is in no way fixed at a number of dollars, but rather
will fluctuate with the value of the estate assets. The legatee may
demand only a "representative" value, not a fixed value. Nor does
the legatee have a claim to any particular estate asset, since the
executor has discretion to satisfy the claim with any assets having
a value representative of appreciation or depreciation in all assets.
Accordingly, satisfaction of such a claim with appreciated or de-
preciated property should not give rise to a sale or disposition by
either the estate or the legatee"- and the legatee should take a
basis equal to that of the estate."17
113. See note 80 supra for the effect of I.R.C. § 662 (a) on the carryover basis.
114. Cf. I.R.C. § 267 (a), (b) (6).
115. See note 113 supra.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (1) (1973).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (3) (1973).
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An argument has been made that such a "ratable-sharing"
provision could create a fixed dollar claim in the legatee as of the
distribution date because of the need to value all estate assets in
order to distribute to the legatee assets representative of such
value.1" And it has further been suggested that such a problem
possibly could be avoided by distributing to the legatee a frac-
tional share of each estate asset." 9 This danger appears somewhat
remote. Indeed, the fact situation involved is identical in substance
to that in Revenue Ruling 55-117,120 where the trustee had to value
the trust corpus in order to distribute 25 percent of it to a bene-
ficiary. The value of the entire principal was $60X, entitling the
beneficiary to property with a value of $15X. A proposed distribu-
tion of appreciated stock worth $15X was held to be a non-taxable
event to both the trust and the beneficiary. 2'
E. Satisfaction of a Claim for an Undetermined Amount as a
"Sale or Other Disposition"
This problem has arisen in a variety of settings where the
claim satisfied is unliquidated, or indeed in the legal sense may
not be a claim at all because of the lack of any enforceable obliga-
tion of the transferor. The authorities in this area also discuss such
issues as non-taxable "divisions" of property, amount realized, and
basis of property in the hands of the transferee. Although these
latter issues will be discussed at length in later sections of this
article, they will also be discussed here to the extent they bear
upon the problem of "sale or other disposition."
The early litigation on this issue occurred in the area of di-
vorce property settlements. In L.W. Mesta,22 taxpayer during the
pendency of a divorce action transferred to his wife appreciated
stock and she released all her rights to support and maintenance
and to share in his property at his death. Similarly, in Walter S.
Halliwell,'23 taxpayer transferred appreciated securities to his wife
in consideration of her surrender of all rights of support for her-
self and their minor child. In both cases the Board of Tax Appeals
118. See Polasky, supra note 61, at 869-70.
119. See id. at 870.
120. 1955-1 C.B. 233.
121. See text accompanying notes 96 & 97 supra. See also note 97 supra (discussion
of Revenue Ruling 55-117).
122. 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940).
123. 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941).
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(now the Tax Court) held on two separate grounds that the tax-
payer did not realize any taxable gain: (1) it was impossible to
value the rights surrendered in consideration of the transfer, thus
preventing the computation of an "amount realized"; and (2) the
transaction was merely a division of property and taxpayer realized
no taxable gain . 24 Both Mesta12 and Halliwell20 were reversed on
appeal. In Mesta, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
the transferor's amount realized to be the fair market value of the
stock transferred, stating that in an "arms-length" transfer "[w]e
think that we may make the practical assumption that a man who
spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an unliquidated
claim is getting his money's worth.' 27 The court further held,
without explanation, that the transfer could not be treated as a
division of property.:2 In Halliwell, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit followed the holding of Mesta in the Third Cir-
cuit, rejecting the taxpayer's argument that, unlike Mesta, the
transfer involved was effected by the divorce decree and therefore
was a non-taxable division of property. 2 9 The court held that the
transferee's statutory rights to support and inheritance gave her
no interest in the specific securities conveyed.8 0 Accordingly, in
both cases there was a taxable "sale or other disposition" to the
transferor.
In International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner,'8 ' tax-
payer, although under no legal obligation to do so, transferred
appreciated stock to its employees and deducted the value of the
stock as compensation paid for services rendered during the pre-
ceding year. The deduction was allowed, but the delivery of the
stock was held to constitute a taxable disposition for full consid-
eration, despite lack of any legal obligation to pay additional com-
pensation:
Since the bonuses would be invalid to the extent that what was
delivered to the employees exceeded what the services of the em-
124. Walter S. Halliwell, 44 B.TA. 740, 747, 749 (1941); L.W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A.
933, 941 (1940).
125. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
695 (1942).
126. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943).
127. 123 F.2d at 988.
128. Id.
129. 131 F.2d 642, 643.
130. Id.
131. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
[Vol. 26
PART I-THE TAXABLE EVENT
ployees were worth, it follows that the consideration received by
the taxpayer from the employees must be deemed to be equal at
least to the value of the shares . . Here then, as there was no
gift but a disposition of shares for a valid consideration equal at
least to the value of the shares .... Here then, as there was no
a taxable gain equal to the difference between the cost of the
shares and that market value. . . . Literally, where there is a dis-
position of stock for services, no "property" or "money" is re-
ceived . . But, in similar circumstances, it has been held that
"money's worth" is received .... See Commissioner v. Mesta... ;
cf. Commissioner v. Halliwell... ; Kenan v. Commissioner... .182
Thus the principles of Kenan and Mesta were extended to
voluntary transfers that discharge no legal obligation, but involve
no element of gift, so that the transferor is presumed to have re-
ceived consideration in the full value of the property transferred.
In Commissioner v. Marshman,113 however, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to follow the appellate holdings of Mesta
and Halliwell, and agreed with the reasoning of the Board of Tax
Appeals in Mesta that in a marital property settlement the rights
surrendered by a wife in exchange for her husband's property are
incapable of valuation. Section 1001(b), reasoned the court,
requires that the capital gain be measured by "the fair market
value of the property ... received" (emphasis added) by the tax-
payer, not by the fair market value of the property transferred by
the taxpayer in exchange for the property received. To say that
the fair market value of the property received is the same as the
fair market value of the property given up not only ignores reali-
ties, but is the use of a formula which is radically different from
the well established and well recognized formula approved by the
courts . . . . [flair market value is the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell .... A single
transaction between a husband and wife made under the emotion,
tension and practical necessities involved in a divorce proceeding
does not comply with this rule. 3 4
The court went on to suggest that this was not a holding of no
"sale or other disposition" under section 1001(a), but rather that
whatever "economic gain" had been realized could not be taxed
because it could not be measured for purposes of section 100 1(b).135
132. Id. at 313-14.
133. 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960).
134. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 32-33.
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A few months after its decision in Marshman, the Sixth Cir-
cuit decided .United States v. General Shoe Corp.,180 involving
a taxpayer who had made voluntary contributions of appreci-
ated real estate to an employee retirement trust and deducted the
fair market value of the property in computing its taxable income.
Such transfers, held the court, constitute a taxable sale or other
disposition, the amount realized being the fair market value of the
real estate. This result, said the court, was dictated by the rationale
of International Freighting Corp.:
When the taxpayer here made the contributions to the trust it
was entitled to take, and did take deductions for such contribu-
tions as "ordinary and necessary" expenses. When the taxpayer
evaluated the contributions on the basis of the then current mar-
ket value and used those figures for its deductions, it then realized
capital gain to the extent that such values exceeded its basis ....
The taxpayer realized exactly the same gain here ... as it would
have had it sold the real estate for the fair market (or appraised)
value and contributed the funds to the trust 3 7
Marshman was distinguishable, said the court, as involving a prop-
erty settlement in a divorce action. Although gain may have been
realized, it could not be taxed because it could not be valued.
General Shoe, on the other hand, involved no emotional factors,
so the amount realized was properly measured by the property's
fair market value. 3 "
The holdings of General Shoe and International Freighting
have been followed uniformly in cases involving similar fact
situations.1 39 Thus the lack of a legal obligation to the trans-
feree has not been held to prevent treatment of a transfer as a
taxable disposition by the transferor.140 Although the Supreme
Court has yet to pass directly on this principle, in United States
v. Davis'4' it cited both International Freighting and General Shoe
with approval,' 42 and also resolved two issues left open by Gen-
136. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 13.
139. See Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969); Tasty Baking Co. V.
United States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d
831 (Ct. Cl. 1966); F.C. McDougal, 62 T.C. 720 (1974); J.K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86 (1967);
Robert K. Stephens, 38 T.C. 345 (1962); Rev. Rul. 75-498, 1975-47 I.R.B. 7.
140. Compare Riley v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1964), aff'g per
curiam John D. Riley, 37 T.C. 932 (1962); Montana Power Co. v. United States, 171
F. Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (transfers discharged an obligation owed to the transferee).
141. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
142. Id. at 72.
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eral Shoe. Davis first of all overruled the Marshman principle that
the amount realized by a transferor of property as part of a divorce
property settlement could not be valued. The Court found that the
transaction was a taxable event rather than a non-taxable division
of property between co-owners, and, while recognizing the validity
of the Marshman observation that the transfer is not at arm's
length, nevertheless reasoned that "once it is recognized that the
transfer was a taxable event, it is more consistent with the general
purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a rough approxi-
mation of the gain realized thereby than to ignore altogether its
tax consequences. 143
The Davis holding, although it did not address the issue, also
seems to have denied any implication from the language of Gen-
eral Shoe that finding a taxable event to the transferor of property
depends upon the availability of a deduction to the transferor for
the value of the property transferred. Such a deduction was, of
course, not allowable in the Davis situation.'44 This issue was
raised directly by the taxpayer in Tasty Baking Co. v. United
States.45 The Commissioner had determined that taxpayer realized
a capital gain upon a voluntary transfer of appreciated property
to an employees' retirement plan. Taxpayer argued that its amount
realized must be limited to the tax saving resulting from the de-
duction of the contribution, 52 percent of the value of the prop-
erty, rather than its full value. But, the court reasoned, it was not
the tax deduction that was the consideration for the transfer;
rather, it was "the employees' past and present services, with the
quid pro quo being those services, plus the expectation of con-
tinued services in the future. The value of those services has been
held to be presumably equal to the fair market value of the prop-
erty contributed.' ' 4 This holding, said the court, was compelled
by the Davis Court's citation with approval of International
Freighting and General Shoe.47 It should be noted, however, that
Tasty Baking Co. extends the doctrine of these cases to transfers
made for future services. 48
143. Id. at 72, 73.
144. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) ; cf. I.R.C. § 215.
145. 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
146. Id. at 994.
147. Id. at 995.
148. Accord, Rev. Rul. 75-498, 1975-47 I.R.B. 7.
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F. Davis: Some Unanswered Questions-Taxation of the Wife;
Valuation of the Relinquished Rights; Date of Transfer
In Davis, the husband was held to be taxable on the transfer
to his wife of appreciated securities. Did not the wife similarly
engage in a taxable sale or other disposition of her marital rights
in exchange for the securities? This issue was not present in Davis,
but the Court alluded to "difficulties" of so taxing her and stated
that "[u]nder the present administrative practice, the release of
marital rights in exchange for property or other consideration is
not considered a taxable event as to the wife.' 49 The references
cited by the Court indicate that it perceived the "difficulty" to be
the determination of the wife's basis in her marital rights." ° Yet
these very references conclude that a wife has a zero basis in her
rights, a view which appears compelled because she neither pays
cash for them nor includes in her income the value of her marital
services."5 Accordingly, upon receipt of the securities in exchange
for her marital rights, the wife realizes a gain equal to the full
value of the securities. And, since she acquires by purchase, her
basis in the securities is her "cost," the fair market value of the
securities. Davis so states. 52
That the wife would not be taxed upon her realized gain was
conceded by the Treasury in Revenue Ruling 67-221,153 which
states in its entirety:
Under the terms of a divorce decree and in accordance with a
property settlement agreement, which was incorporated in the
divorce decree, the husband transferred his interest in an apart-
ment building to his former wife in consideration for and in dis-
charge of her dower rights. The marital rights the former wife
relinquished are equal in value to the value of the property she
agreed to accept in exchange for those rights. Held, there is no
gain or loss to the wife on the transfer and the basis of the prop-
erty to the wife is its fair market value on the date of the transfer.
149. 370 U.S. at 73.
150. See id. (citing Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agree-
ments, 7 TAx L. Rav. 19, 30 (1951)); Comment, The Lump Sum Divorce Settlement as
a Taxable Exchange, 8 U.C.L.A. Ir'rA. L. REv. 593, 601-02 (1961). See also Mullock,
Divorce & Taxes: Rev. Rul. 67-221, 23 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 736, 742 (1969).
151. See Mullock, supra note 150, at 744-45.
152. 370 U.S. at 73; accord, Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1969); Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Philadelphia
Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954); cf. Commis-
sioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
153. 1967-2 C.B. 63.
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The result of Revenue Ruling 67-221 accords with the dictum
in Davis that there is no taxable event to the wife and that her
basis is the full value of the property received. The reasoning,
however, is questionable. In stating that the wife has no gain on the
transfer, the ruling appears to be comparing value given with
value received. The comparison required by section 1001, how-
ever, is between basis given and value received. Thus, although
the wife had no economic gain, she certainly did have tax gain.
Nevertheless, this gain is not taxed to the wife. The reasons
for this result have not been articulated by the courts or the
Treasury, 5 4 although one court has stated that amounts received
for dower rights are not taxable as income. 55 This suggests that
amounts received on account of rights to take by inheritance or
bequest are sheltered by the section 102 exclusion from gross in-
come5 and that amounts received in release of support obliga-
tions are similarly non-taxable. 57 Allowing a wife a fair market
value basis in the property is necessary to prevent gain to her on
sale of the property-that is, to give permanent exclusion, rather
than mere deferral, to the value received for marital rights. This
accords with normal treatment of amounts received for support
during the marriage. It also is in keeping with the provisions of
section 1014(a) governing property acquired in lieu of inheritance
prior to 1977. The effect of sections 1023 and 1040 for property
acquired in post-1976 transfers is unclear. Symmetry of treatment
with inherited amounts would require a carryover basis, increased
by the transferor's recognized gain.
Another loose end concerns the Davis principle of value
equivalence, which is said by the Court to be only a "rough ap-
proximation" of the amount realized by the transferor. 5 "It must
be assumed," said the Court, "that the parties acted at arm's length
and that they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the
property for which they were exchanged. There was no evidence
to the contrary here."'51 9 It has been suggested that this language
154. See Mullock, supra note 150, at 746.
155. See Howard v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971).
156. I.R.C. § 102 excludes amounts actually received by gift, bequest, devise or
inheritance.
157. Henry C. Smith, 40 B.TA. 1038 (1939) (dictum); Rosa E. Burkhart, 11
B.T.A. 275 (1928). See generally Comment, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-
Taxable Event?, 17 STAN. L. REv. 478, 480-82 (1965).
158. 370 U.S. at 72.
159. Id.
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allows the parties at least to engage in a reasonable valuation of
the rights, thus placing a maximum value on the marital rights
and correspondingly reducing the amount realized by the husband
to some amount less than the fair market value of the property
transferred.160 If such valuation is accepted, then presumably the
wife has made a bargain purchase of the property transferred, with
both the husband's amount realized and the wife's basis pegged at
the value adopted.'6'
The Commissioner has argued that the relinquished marital
rights are virtually incapable of being valued properly and that
any such valuation should be disregarded in favor of the fair mar-
ket value of the property received by the wife. 6 2 Some courts,
however, have upheld the agreed-upon value where it was nego-
tiated at arm's length and where there was no question about the
bona fides of the transaction.' 63 In a later case, where the agreed
value was greater than fair market value, the Commissioner's argu-
ment for the agreed value was rejected because the stock received
by the wife was publicly traded and hence more accurately valued
by its market value on the date of the transfer. 64 This, of course,
is the very argument made by the Commissioner in the earlier
cases and rejected by the courts.
A related problem, not dealt with in Davis, is how to measure
the amount realized when the value of the property transferred fluc-
tuates between the time of the property settlement agreement and
the time of delivery. The issue was raised in Davis, the taxpayer
contending that the transfer took place on the date of either the
160. See Walther, Can Advance Tax Planning Avoid Harshness of Davis Rule
on Appreciated Property7, 17 J. TAX. 301 (1962).
161. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184
(Ct. Cl. 1954). Such a transfer would contain no element of gift unless the test of
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), were met ("detached and disin-
terested generosity'), and the Davis opinion recognized this point in a footnote to the
opinion. 370 U.S. at 69 n.6. "Gift," of course, is being used in the income tax sense
rather than the gift tax sense. See id. For a discussion of the interaction between Davis
and Duberstein, see Mathews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
162. See, e.g., Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947). See generally Comment, supra note
150, at 596-600.
163. Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1950); Alcda N.
Hall, 9 T.C. 53, 55 (1947).
164. Richard E. Wiles, 60 T.C. 56 (1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
See also Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970), where an
insolvent debtor transferred certain land in discharge of notes upon which $118,000 was
due. Rejecting the Commissioner's position that the amount realized from the sale
was the debt discharged, the transferor was allowed to offer proof of the value of the
land transferred.
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property settlement agreement or the decree, rather than on the
later delivery date 65 (the shares having appreciated in value after
the earlier dates). The Court did not pass on this issue, apparently
because it was not raised below. 6 6 Properly considered, however,
the date of transfer should be the date of a binding agreement
rather than the delivery date if on the earlier date the wife acquires
beneficial ownership of the property. It was so held by the Tax
Court in Richard E. Wiles 6 Such a holding accords with the
Davis principle of assumed equivalence in value by bringing the
valuation date back to the time when the parties ended negotia-
tions with respect to the value to be given for release of the marital
rights.
IV. Davis: SALE OR DIVISION?
In Davis, the taxpayer's threshold argument was that the prop-
erty transfer under the settlement agreement was more comparable
to a non-taxable division of property between co-owners, such as a
division of community property, than it was to an exchange for the
release of an independent legal obligation, such as a support obli-
gation. The Court replied:
The taxpayer's analogy . . . stumbles on its own premise, for the
inchoate rights granted to a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-owner-
ship. The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the man-
agement or disposition of her husband's personal property. Her
rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to share in
his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage she shares
in the property only to such extent as the court deems "reason-
able." . . . What is "reasonable" might be ascertained independ-
ently of the extent of the husband's property by such criteria as the
wife's financial condition, her needs in relation to her accustomed
station in life, her age and health, the number of children and
their ages, and the earning capacity of the husband. ... Delaware
seems only to place a burden on the husband's property rather
165. Brief for Respondents at 22, United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
166. 370 U.S. at 74 n.9.
167. 60 T.C. 56 (1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974); accord, Commis-
sioner v. CA. Sporl & Co., 118 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1941); Ted F. Merrill, 40 T.C. 66
(1963); W. F. Marsh, 12 T.C. 1083 (1949); I.C. Bradbury, 23 B.T.A. 1352 (1931),
afJ'd, 78 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1935). See generally Barton, Tax Aspects of Divorce and
Property Settlement Agreements-The Davis, Gilmore and Patrick Cases, 16 U. So. CAL.
1964 TAx INST. 421, 431-35.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
terest of the wife.... Although admittedly such a view may per-
mit different tax treatment among the several States, this Court
in the past has not ignored the differing effects on the federal tax-
ing scheme of substantive differences between community property
than to make the wife a part owner thereof.... [T]he rights of
succession and reasonable share do not differ significantly from the
husband's obligation of support and alimony. They all partake
more of a personal liability of the husband than a property in-
and common-law systems.' 6 s
Accordingly, the Court held that the transfer of appreciated
property was a taxable event to the husband. The wife's claim was
too dependent on such matters as survival, needs, and age to be
more than a money claim against her husband, the amount of
which would depend on what the local court found to be "rea-
sonable.' ' 69
The Davis rationale seems to draw a bright line between the
tax effect of property settlements in common law states, such as
Delaware, and in community property states. Following Davis,
Pulliam v. Commissioner70 held that a husband's transfer was a
taxable event under Colorado's non-community property law.1 '
No argument was made by the taxpayer with respect to any differ-
ences between Delaware and Colorado law, despite the fact that
the Colorado statute allowed the local court to decree a "division"
of property. The taxpayer argued that Davis did not apply because
here, unlike Davis, there was no voluntary property settlement and
the transfer was made pursuant to court order. 2 Without a volun-
tary property settlement, argued the taxpayer, there could be no
fair market value arrived at between a willing buyer and seller,
and hence the amount realized could not be determined.17 The
168. 370 U.S. at 70-71 (emphasis added).
169. The pertinent statute, 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 (a) (1953), provided:
When a divorce shall be decreed for the aggression of the husband, the com-
plainant shall be restored to all her real estate, and allowed, out of her
husband's real and personal estate, such share as the court thinks reasonable,
but if the divorce be for the wife's aggression, the court may restore the whole
or a part of her real estate, and also such share of her husband's personal
property as seems reasonable.
170. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964).
171. The pertinent Colorado statute was 3 COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5
(1953), which provided:
When a divorce has been granted the court may make such order and decree
providing for the payment of alimony and maintenance of the wife and minor
children or either of them as may be reasonable and just .... or may decree
a division of property.
172. 329 F.2d at 98.
173. Id. at 98-99.
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Tenth Circuit rejected the argument under the Davis test of value
substitution, and found a taxable exchange with an amount re-
alized equal to the fair market value of the property transferred.17 4
The Tenth Circuit was again asked to review the issue in
Collins v. Commissioner,75 where the applicable local law was that
of Oklahoma. Taxpayer treated the transfer of appreciated prop-
erty to his wife in a divorce property settlement as a non-taxable
division of property under the pertinent Oklahoma statute. 6 The
Tenth Circuit noted that Oklahoma is not a community property
state, but that the statute had been interpreted to require a divi-
sion of "jointly acquired" property on divorce based not, as in
Delaware, on need, but on the efforts of the parties during mar-
riage. Nevertheless, reasoned the court, a wife's right thus to share
in the marital property is similar to a wife's right under the
Colorado statute involved in Pulliam. Also, under Oklahoma law
a wife does not acquire the traditional indicia of ownership such
as descendible interest, right of control and disposition, and vested
interest. Therefore the transfer was a taxable event under Davis 7
Shortly thereafter, in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n.,78
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided that the transfer was
not a taxable event under the state income tax law. The Oklahoma
court concluded that under the Oklahoma statute a wife has a
vested interest in jointly acquired property of the marital com-
munity, "similar in conception to community property of com-
munity states."' 79 The statute "is not permissive," said the court,
"but lays a mandatory duty upon the trial court" to divide the
marital property according to the wife's "industry, economy and
business ability."'180 The fact that a wife's right matures only upon
174. Id. at 99.
175. 388 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1968).
176. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1976-1977) provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired
by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in
either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between the
parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the
property in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties, and
requiring the other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper to
effect a fair and just division thereof.
177. 888 F.2d at 857-58.
178. 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
179. Id. at 295.
180. Id.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a divorce proceeding makes no difference. Absence of a descendi-
ble interest and lack of title and control during the marriage do
not prevent the wife's interest from vesting at the time of di-
vorce.181 Hence, Davis was distinguishable because the wife's in-
terest under Oklahoma law is more than a "burden" upon the
husband's property; also distinguishable was Pulliam, because
under Colorado law a wife's right to a "division" depends upon
certain factors, such as need and earning ability, and, unlike the
rights of the Oklahoma wife, is dependent on the discretion of the
trial court.18 2
On appeal of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Collins, the
Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of the
Oklahoma opinion.8 3 On remand, the Tenth Circuit bowed to
the Oklahoma opinion and found the transfer to be a "nontaxable
division of property between co-owners."' 84
The Collins result was rejected where Iowa 8 5 and Kansas'80
local laws applied, on the ground that those laws were more like
the Delaware statute in Davis than the Oklahoma statute. The
Kansas decision, Wiles, is worthy of more comment because the
Oklahoma law was based on the Kansas law.187 In the Tax Court, 88
the Kansas statute 89 was held to be outside of Collins and within
Davis, the Tax Court reasoning that:
181. Id. at 297.
182. Id. at 296-97.
183. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
184. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969). In an ironic twist
on Collins, in Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971), af'g 54 T.C. 608
(1970), the husband was denied a deduction for installment payments to his former
wife, since they were in respect of a division of his property under the Oklahoma statute
and hence not deductible as alimony under I.R.C. § 215. See also United States v. Mills,
372 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1966), on remand, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,870 (N.D. Okla. 1967)
(wife need not include the payments as alimony under I.R.C. § 71).
185. See Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971).
186. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1974).
187. 499 F.2d at 258; Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla.
1968).
188. Richard E. Wiles, 60 T.C. 56 (1973).
189. KAN. STAT. § 60-1610 (b) (Supp. 1971):
Division of property. The decree shall divide the real and personal property
of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by
either spouse in his or her own right after marriage, or acquired by theirjoint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either by a division of the
property in kind, or by setting the same or a part thereof over to one of the
spouses and requiring either to pay such sum as may be just and proper, or by
ordering a sale of the same under such conditions as the court may prescribe
and dividing the proceeds of such sale.
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For all we know, the determination of what is in the terms of the
statute a just and reasonable division of property may depend on
criteria such as the wife's age and health, her independent wealth
and living style at the time of divorce. Notwithstanding section
60-1610(b), it is still the law in Kansas that a wife must survive
her partner in order to share in his intestate estate .... Absent a
Kansas decision flatly stating that a property settlement in Kansas
is a division of property between co-owners, we are unwilling to so
hold today.190
In much stronger language, the Tax Court stated its dis-
agreement with the Collins result by reaffirming the pro-govern-
ment position taken on the initial decision in that case, 91- and
indicated that even with a Collins-type state court decision, it
would "not necessarily be bound by the mere 'tags' of State law"
in cases appealable to a court of appeals outside the Tenth Cir-
cuit.19 2 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Goffe argued that the Kansas
statutory and case law in 1963 was no different from that of the
Oklahoma law under which Collins was eventually decided in
favor of the taxpayer.9 3 Accordingly, the wife had a vested interest
in jointly acquired property, described by the Supreme Court of
Kansas in Garver v. Garve 94 as follows:
We are of the opinion that alimony and property division are
completely separate and that a wife who prevails in a divorce ac-
tion is entitled to both alimony and division of property. The
right to alimony is separate and distinct from the right to division
of the property jointly acquired by the parties during the marriage.
The doctrine of alimony is based upon the common law obliga-
tion of the husband to support his wife, which obligation is not
removed by her obtaining a divorce for his misconduct. Division
of property, on the other hand, has for its basis the wife's right
to a just and equitable share of that property which has been ac-
cumulated by the parties as a result of their joint efforts during
the years of the marriage to serve their mutual needs. In this
sense, the marital relationship is somewhat analogous to a part-
nership, and when the relationship is dissolved the jointly acquired
property must be divided, regardless of which party has been at
190. 60 T.C. at 61-62.
191. Id. at 63.
192. Id. at 63 n.4.
193. Id. at 68. The statutory change effective in 1964, which allowed the court to
divide all of the property owned by the parties regardless of the source or manner of
acquisition, see note 189 supra, was, according to Judge Goffe's interpretation of
Kansas decisional law, made to enlarge the trial court's power and in no way limited
a wife's rights in jointly acquired property. 60 T.C. at 68.
194. 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959) .
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fault .... The distinction between alimony and property division
has long been recognized in this jurisdiction.10 5
The majority opinion of the Tax Court was nevertheless
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, 9 6 which held that the wife had no
vested co-ownership in the husband's property during marriage, 97
a factor that was also present in Collins under Oklahoma law.'
The court of appeals also noted, however, that under Kansas law,
the division of property was wholly within the discretion of the trial
court and depended upon such factors as fault, needs, age, and
contribution of each party. These factors were held inconsistent
with the notion of co-owned property and so the transfer was con-
trolled by Davis'99
The distinction drawn by the above cases between the law
of Oklahoma and that of other common law states appears to
turn upon whether a divorce court is required to make a division
based on efforts of a spouse during marriage, without regard to the
need for alimony or support payments, or to fault of the parties.
Oklahoma was joined by Colorado in Imel v. United States,'0
where the Colorado law was again put in issue. The district court
there certified to the Colorado Supreme Court the question of
whether the property transfer in question was a taxable event for
purposes of federal income taxation. The Colorado court re-
sponded:
We answer in the affirmative that, under Colorado law, the trans-
fer involved here was a recognition of a "species of common
ownership" of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division
of property between co-owners. We answer in the negative whether
the transfer more closely resembles a conveyance by the husband
for the release of an independent obligation owed by him to the
wife.201
In support of this holding, the court noted that the wife's right
to a division of jointly acquired property did not depend on
her need (or lack of need) for alimony for future support.02 The
195. Id. at 147, 334 P.2d at 410 (citations omitted).
196. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974).
197. Id. at 259.
198. See Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 296 (Okla. 1968).
199. 499 F.2d at 257-58.
200. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
201. In re Questions Submitted By the United States Dist. Ct. For the Dist. of
Colo. Concerning Imel v. United States, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334-35. (Colo. 1974).
202. Id. at 1335-36.
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court also noted that the "ownership" right vested only upon the
filing of the divorce action, that there was no joint or common
ownership during the marriage,20 3 and that in spite of the broad
language of the Oklahoma Collins opinion, the law of that state
was the same on this point?°4 and would be followed by the
Colorado court.20 5
The federal district court held for the taxpayer, declining
to follow Pulliam on two grounds:
First, Pulliam was decided under the 1953 Colorado statute,
whereas the Imel facts were controlled by the 1963 version of that
statute, which substituted the language "as may be fair and equi-
table" for "as may be reasonable. 2 06 Conceding that the Colorado
statute nevertheless continued to use the word "may" while the
Oklahoma statute used "shall," the district court said the statute
"closely approximates" the Oklahoma statute when read in light of
Colorado decisions. 207 The court also noted that the 1971 amend-
ment to the Colorado statute makes the property division manda-
tory, which was said to be "nothing more than a legislative recog-
nition of pre-existing Colorado law." 208
Second, the Colorado court in effect stated the Colorado law
to be the same as that of Oklahoma, so the second opinion of the
court of appeals in Collins must be followed.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government argued that
under Davis taxability depends on the wife's rights during the
marriage rather than at the time of divorce.20 9 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that the Davis opinion
did not define when the wife's rights had to vest, and that the
Supreme Court referred to the interest of the wife at the time
of dissolution of the marriage.2 0 The court accepted the Colorado
decision and held there was no taxable event to the transferor.21'
203. Id. at 1333, 1335.
204. Id. at 1334.
205. Id.
206. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (D. Colo. 1974).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1113 n.11.
209. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1975).
210. Id. (citing 870 U.S. at 70).
211. Id. at 857. The Tenth Circuit also refused to follow its apparently contrary
decision in Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974), which held that
Colorado law did not establish co-ownership, since the amount the wife could receive
was within the discretion of the divorce court. 508 F.2d at 469; cf. McCombs v. Com-
missioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
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The district court in Imel admitted having "difficulty defin-
ing the exact nature of a Colorado wife's interest in the marital
property.12 12 Certainly the notion of "jointly acquired property"
does not fall into one of the relatively clear categories of co-owner-
ship, such as jointly held property, tenancy in common, tenancy
by the entirety, or even tenancy in partnership, since all of these
categories give to each tenant vested rights (and obligations, such
as income tax liability) prior to the dissolution of the underlying
relationship or partition or disposition of the property. Nor is
such property to be equated with community property prior to
the time title vests because of a divorce proceeding.2 3
Further difficulties with the concept of co-ownership were
pointed out by the Tax Court in the Collins case. Any interest of
the wife that "vests" on divorce may in fact be satisfied under
Oklahoma law by cash or the husband's separate property, rather
than by a "splitting up of the jointly acquired property. '214 Even
the transfer to the wife of shares of Liberty Glass Company
stock, pointed out the Tax Court, "was not a division of jointly
owned stock as might have been the situation in a community
property State . . . or the situation existing when the spouses are
legally joint owners of the property divided," since the wife had
no specific interest in the stock she received. 215 The wife's claim
was for a portion of the jointly acquired property by way of
division, or payment therefor in cash, and this claim, said the
court, is only a "burden" on all of the jointly acquired property
rather than an interest in any specific asset.218 Indeed, the Tax
Court apparently viewed only jointly owned property (including
community property) as capable of "division. 211 7 Nevertheless,
the Tax Court did state that the "independent legal obligation
which was satisfied by ... transfer of the Liberty stock . . . was
different from that satisfied by the taxpayer in the Davis case
when he transferred property to his wife."' 1 8 This difference is
explained by the fact that the wife's claim is not dependent on
such factors as need and is measured by her contribution to the
212. 375 F. Supp. at 1115.
213. See generally 3 MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ch. 19
(1972 ed.).
214. George F. Collins, 46 T.C. 461, 474 (1966).
215. Id. at 474-75.
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acquisition of the property. The wife can therefore acquire an
interest in the property, or a claim for part of the value thereof,
during marriage, with vesting of the right contingent upon a
divorce proceeding.
In support of the holding of Collins and Imel, the wife's
interest could be analogized to that of contingent remainderman
in a will who, if his interest eventually vests, would take by bequest
(that is, by "division," because his title related back to testator's
death)29 rather than by purchase from the trust. Under the Tax
Court's interpretation of Oklahoma law, however, such a remain-
derman could be paid either in cash or property, in the discretion
of the trustee, so as to invoke the principle of Kenan that receipt
of property is a taxable sale or other disposition by the trust. Also,
the reasoning of Brinckerhoff would apply Kenan despite the
fact that the wife's claim fluctuates with the value of the jointly
acquired property that measures her interest.220
Even if one takes the view that the wife does acquire a
fractional vested interest in all property jointly acquired during
the marriage, there is the further question of whether receipt of
one of many such assets constitutes a non-taxable division, or is in
fact a sale or other disposition by the husband of his interest in the
asset transferred in exchange for her interest in the assets retained
by the husband.22'
The "jointly acquired property" form of co-ownership, at
least under Oklahoma law, has been acknowledged by the Trea-
sury as a form of co-ownership in Revenue Ruling 74-347.2 The
Treasury thus views the transferor-husband in Collins as engaging
in a non-taxable division of property where the property is trans-
ferred as the wife's share of "co-owned" property, rather than for
strictly "marital rights," such as support.
But what of the wife? The holding of non-taxable division as
to the transferor-husband would seem to require an identical
result for the transferee-wife. If he has not sold, she has not pur-
chased. However, the rationale of "jointly acquired" property is
that by performing services during the marriage, the wife acquires
a contingent interest in property acquired by the marital com-
munity. Such acquired value presumably will not be taxed to the
219. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (a) (2) (1976).
220. See text accompanying notes 84-95 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 228-68 infra.
222. 1974-2 C.B. 26.
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wife during the marriage, even to the extent it exceeds her right
to support, because she may never in fact receive any such prop-
erty.213 When, however, she does receive a share of the property
pursuant to a divorce settlement or decree, should that not be
a taxable event to her? Under the rationale of both Oklahoma and
Colorado law the property is received for past efforts, independent
of any right to support and, presumably, inheritance. To the
extent that that the value received is for past services and is not
attributable to support, should not the full amount be taxed to
the recipient as compensation for services rendered? It does not
appear that the wife is protected by the Davis dictum that the
release of "marital rights" in exchange for property is not a tax-
able event to the wife.22  Nor is Revenue Ruling 67-221 appli-
cable, since by its terms non-taxability of the wife in that ruling
was predicated upon her release of marital rights in the form of
dower rights. No case has yet considered this problem, since the
Commissioner apparently has not yet raised the issue in Okla-
homa or Colorado. The assumption now appears to be that the
Oklahoma wife will be treated like her counterpart in com-
munity property states. She will have no taxable event in a "divi-
sion," and will acquire a basis in the property received equal to
that of the community. 25
Where, as in Wiles22 6 the wife's interest is "jointly acquired"
under local law, but the transfer to her is nevertheless treated as
a taxable event to the husband under Davis, there is no "division"
idea present and therefore she is not protected from tax on receipt
of the transferred property. Nor, as noted above, does she appear
to fall within the protection of Revenue Ruling 67-221 and the
Davis dictum. But no attempt has been made to tax her receipt as
compensation for past services. 27
223. The notion of "substantial risk of forfeiture" would prevent taxation during
the marriage. See I.R.C. § 83; Rev. Rul. 31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
224. 370 U.S. at 73 n.7.
225. See John H. Schacht, 47 T.C. 552 (1967), acq. 1968-1 C.B. 2; Ann Y. Oliver,
8 T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1949). See also United States v. Mills, 372 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.
1966), on remand, 67-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 84,870 (N.D. Okla. 1967), holding that install-
ment payments received by an Oklahoma wife were not alimony, but not considering
the taxable event issue. Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971), denied
an alimony (I.R.C. § 215) deduction to the transferor-husband.
226. See text accompanying notes 188-99 supra.
227. The problem of taxing the wife may be obviated by the splitting of income
between husband and wife caused by the filing of joint income tax returns, so that the
wife will already have been taxed on one-half of her husband's income, the source of
"jointly acquired" property. The basis in such property will also reflect such tax-paid
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V. CHARACTERISTICS OF A NON-TAXABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY
Assume that husband and wife own two parcels of real prop-
erty, Blackacre and Whiteacre, holding title as joint tenants with
right of survivorship (or as community property under local law).
In a divorce settlement, they agree that each shall take an un-
divided one-half interest as tenants in common in each parcel; or
they may agree that there shall be a partition of both parcels so that
each will thereafter own one-half of each parcel separately. In
Revenue Ruling 56-437,228 a similar situation, the Treasury held:
The conversion, for the purpose of eliminating a survivorship
feature, of a joint tenancy in capital stock of a corporation into a
tenancy in common is a nontaxable transaction for Federal income
tax purposes. Likewise, the severance of a joint tenancy in stock of
a corporation, under a partition action . . . , compelling partition
and the issuance of two separate stock certificates in the names of
each of the joint tenants, is a non-taxable transaction. In each case
there was no sale or exchange and the taxpayers neither realized
a taxable gain nor sustained a deductible loss.
The thrust of the ruling is that in a severance of a joint tenancy
into a tenancy in common, or in a partition into separate owner-
ship, each party merely retains his former ownership in the same
asset, and there is no sale or disposition of one asset for a different
one. In both cases, however, each tenant appears to have lost a right
to take the entire fee by survivorship since neither a tenancy in
common nor separate ownership includes a survivorship right.
The answer to this seems to be that under local law, generally,
each party's right of survivorship is severable at will by the other
acting unilaterally (by conveyance to a third party or by action
for partition)229 Accordingly, a joint-survivorship tenancy is in-
dollars, which would justify giving to the wife only such original basis for any
property she receives.
On the other hand, if separate returns have been filed by the spouses during the
marriage, then, in retrospect, the husband will have been taxed on his wife's income,
but she will not, creating an undertaxing of the wife and yet giving her a basis in
property reflecting the tax paid by her husband. Cf. McCombs v. Commisioner, 897
F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968), a decision arising out of Colorado law prior to Iael, where
the court held installment payments to the wife were not alimony but due to a
"division" under Colorado law, based on the parties' "joint efforts" during marriage.
The presence of a taxable event to the wife was neither in issue nor discussed.
228. 1956-2 C.B. 507.
229. See, e.g., Yeshivah University v. Edelman, 16 Misc. 2d 931, 176 N.Y.S2d 534,
afJ'd mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 649(22), 181 N.Y.S.2d 180(4) (1958); N.Y. R.AL PROP.
Acrs. LAiw § 901 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). See also Rev. Rul. 55-77, 1955-1 C.B.
339; Rev. Rul. 55-179, 1955-1 C.B. 840.
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herently-that is, at the will of either tenant acting independently
-a tenancy in common, and partition into such a tenancy effects
no conveyance of rights by either party.230
The ruling raises two other questions, which are somewhat
related. In a conversion of a tenancy in common into estates in
severalty, each tenant loses an undivided interest in the whole of
the property and receives an exclusive interest in one-half the
property. Also, if the property is not fungible-as in our example
of husband and wife each taking one-half of both Blackacre and
Whiteacre-then the exclusive right to one-half can be essentially
different from an undivided one-half interest in both properties.
For example, one spouse may settle for the grazing portion of farm
land while the other takes the portion devoted to truck farming.
These issues, as we shall see, have been pretty much resolved in
favor of a non-taxable event.
To be contrasted with a division of each specific asset which
is co-owned, is a division by value of the co-owned assets. If hus-
band and wife own Blackacre and Whiteacre jointly and they effect
a property settlement whereby one takes Blackacre and the other
Whiteacre, each property being of equal value, it would appear
that there is a realization event to both parties since each has
sold a one-half interest in one asset for the other's one-half interest
in the asset received. Assume each property has a value of $50,000
and a joint basis of $10,000 and that the husband takes sole title to
Blackacre and the wife sole title to Whiteacre. The husband has
engaged in a sale or other disposition of his one-half interest in
Whiteacre for his wife's one-half interest in Blackacre.81 The
section 1001(a) computation is
Amount realized (value of Blackacre) $25,000
Less: Basis in /2 Whiteacre 5,000
Gain $20,000
Such gain will be recognized under section 1001(c) and the
husband's basis in Blackacre will be $30,000 ($25,000 for the
one-half purchased and $5,000, his allocable share of the joint
basis in Blackacre, for the one-half interest retained). The trans-
230. That the right of survivorship is not considered to be of value to either
tenant is confirmed in the gift tax regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (h) (5)
(1976).
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (1) (1956).
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action, of course, will have the same tax consequences for the wife
with respect to her sale of one-half of Blackacre.
This result was reached in Rouse v. Commissioner .2 3 Hus-
band and wife were residents of a community property state and
owned community property worth $90,000. The wife also owned
separate property worth $30,000. Incident to a divorce action,
the parties agreed to a division of their property whereby the wife
received $30,000 of the community property together with her
husband's promissory note for $30,000, while the husband took
$60,000 of the community property together with the separate
property of the wife. As to the community property, each took
different assets rather than a one-half interest in each community
asset. The issue was the husband's basis in the properties for
the purpose of computing his gain on re-sale. The taxpayer
argued, on the theory of a non-taxable division, that his basis was
the cost to the community. The Commissioner asserted that a
taxable exchange had taken place between husband and wife, giv-
ing the taxpayer an overall basis of cost for the $30,000 worth of
community property received from his wife, his original basis
for the interest in the $30,000 of community property that he
retained, and cost for the property purchased for the $30,000
note. The Fifth Circuit upheld the Commissioner, finding that the
wife's interest in the property was purchased for $60,000: $30,000
allocable to the separate property and $30,000 allocable to the
wife's interest in the community property.233
The Tax Court in Rouse noted:
If there were simply a division of the community estate . . . the
property would have been equally divided, or at least an attempt
would have been made in good faith to achieve an equal division.
In that event, where, in exchange for a vested undivided one-half
interest in the whole, each party receives a vested interest in the
232. 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947), af'g 6 T.C. 908 (1946).
233. The husband was treated as having received all of his wife's interests in the
various properties, value $75,000 ($45,000 in the $90,000 of community property and
$30,000 value of her separate property) in exchange for $60,000 in value. 159 F.2d at 707.
This appears to be a questionable calculation since the wife did not convey her one-
half interest in the $30,000 of the community property she retained; nor did the
husband convey that value to her. Hence the husband's amount realized was only
$60,000 ($30,000, the value of wife's one-half interest in the community property, plus
$30,000 of her separate property), for which he gave $45,000 of value ($80,000 note
plus the $15,000 value of his one-half interest in community property retained by
his former wife).
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whole of one-half, obviously there would be no resulting taxable
gain, and no change in the basis of any of the property .... 234
The Tax Court then distinguished Frances R. Walz,2 3 "where
there was admittedly an equal division of the property. ' 20  In
Walz, however, the division of community property was a divi-
sion in value rather than a division of each specific asset. Never-
theless, the Board of Tax Appeals held the transaction to be a
non-taxable event. This leads one to speculate that the Rouse
result was due to the failure of the parties to allocate the cash paid
by the husband to the purchase of the wife's separate property,
so that there would have been a Walz type "division" with respect
to the community property.
In all events, divisions by value of community property,
where no separate property changes hands, have been held to be
non-taxable under Walz.2 '3  The same result has been reached in
divisions by value of property held jointly by husband and wife 38
and of property acquired as tenants by the entirety.20 Consistent
with the theory of "division," the basis of each spouse in the prop-
erty received is the co-owners' original basis prior to the transfer.240
The basis issue will be further explored below.
The Walz result was explained in Vern G. Conner24" ' as fol-
lows:
The parties recognize that under Texas law, each spouse owns
a vested, undivided one-half interest in the community assets....
In the event of divorce each spouse is entitled to one-half of each
asset comprising the community estate. Since it would be imprac-
ticable to distribute one-half of each asset to each spouse, the com-
munity property may be divided in kind with each spouse receiv-
234. C.C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908, 913-14 (1946).
235. 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
236. 6 T.C. at 914.
237. See John H. Schacht, 47 T.C. 552 (1967); Clifford H. Wren, 24 T.C.M.
(CC) 290 (1965); Osceola H. Davenport, 12 T.C.M.(CC) 856 (1953); Ann Y
Oliver, 8 T.C.M. (CCB) 403 (1949). The Rouse case was distinguished in Davenport,
supra, as involving both separate and community property. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 858.
238. See Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962); Rev Rul. 74-347,
1974-2 C.B. 26. With respect to partnership interests, see Annie L. Crawford, 39 B.T.A.
521 (1939), and I.T. 2010, II-1 C.B. 46 (1924). Since 1954, partnership distributions
have been controlled by I.R.C. § 701-71. See especially §§ 731-32.
239. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd
mein., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973).
240. Id. at 1192; John H. Schacht, 47 T.C. 552, 559 (1967); Clifford H. Wren, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 290, 294 (1965) ; Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 403, 430 (1949).
241. 34 T.C.M. (CCB) 1043 (1975).
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ing assets of approximately equal total value or the community
property may be liquidated and the proceeds distributed equally.
Each spouse thus receives property equal to his one-half interest in
the community. Since each spouse receives only what is already
his, such an equal division of the community property is not a
taxable event.242
The non-taxable result of Walz thus is viewed as a practical,
judge-made exception to the stricter view of Rouse, and seems to
be an exception that is confined to divisions by value of co-owned
property. But where one co-owner receives less than his share
of such property, receiving the other's separately owned cash or
other property in exchange, there is a taxable sale or other disposi-
tion.2 4 The relationship between sale and division treatment, and
the method of computing the taxable gain, were not fully articu-
lated, however, until the decision of the Tax Court in Jean C.
Carrieres.2 44 A California divorce decree had divided the com-
munity property of taxpayer and her husband, George. George was
awarded all of the stock in a family corporation (value $241,000),
and was required to compensate the taxpayer for her interest in
the stock (value $120,500) with his share of community assets
(value $43,991.65) and with $76,508.35 of his separately owned
cash. The Commissioner contended that taxpayer was required
to recognize the entire gain realized from the sale of her interest
in the stock for $120,500. The Tax Court held, however, that:
[P]etitioner made a taxable exchange of her community interest
in the ... stock to the extent that she received George's separate
property cash therefor, namely $76,508.35. Therefore, of the
$120,500 of assets she received for her interest in the stock,
$76,508.35 represented a sale, and the remaining $43,991.65 of the
proceeds a non-taxable exchange. Petitioner must recognize 63.5
percent of the gain realized on her interest in the stock ($76,508.35
as a percentage of $120,500) 3245
242. Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).
243. See Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
818 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Hornback V.
United States, 298 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Jean C. Carrieres, 64 T.C. 959
(1975); Edith M. Gerlack, 55 T.C. 156 (1970); Robert K. Stephens, 38 T.C. 345
(1962); Robert S. Howard, 32 T.C. 1284 (1959); Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65
(1954); Vern G. Conner, 34 T.C.M. (CCI-) 1043 (1975); Royce L. Showalter, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 192 (1974); Maurine De Wolf Brown, 12 T.C.M. (CCI-) 948 (1953); Rev. Rul.
74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
244. 64 T.C. 959 (1975).
245. Id. at 967-68 (emphasis added).
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The rationale of Carrieres illuminates the Walz result by
acknowledging that taxpayer had realized her entire gain on the
transfer of the stock for George's share of community assets plus
non-community cash, but that she had recognized such gain only
in the ratio of separate cash received to total property received.
The Tax Court explained this result:
Usually ... gain from the sale or exchange of property is recog-
nized for tax purposes. Sec. 1002. However, the judge-made, well
settled law concerning the division of community property upon a
divorce makes exceptions to that general rule. In effect, a non-
statutory nonrecognition rule has been created.240
The court explained that equal "divisions" of community prop-
erty, whether a division of each asset or merely a division in value,
are within this "nonrecognition" principle, but that unequal di-
visions are taxable events, as are transfers by one spouse of his
entire community interest for the other's separate cash or other
separate property.2 4 7 The case at bar, noted the court, represented
neither a purchase with separate funds of all or virtually all of
the other spouse's community property, . . . nor an equal divi-
sion... without equalization payments in separate property. We
see no reason why the use of separate cash to purchase part of the
community should predude application of the nonrecognition
principle to the extent of the value of the community property
retained by the spouse. Otherwise there would be introduced a
"cliff effect" under which the use of even 51 of separate prop-
erty . . . would render entirely inapplicable the protection of the
nonstatutory recognition principle, and would frustrate the bene-
ficial policy underlying that principle. But on the other hand, the
mere fact that some community property goes to each party should
not blind us to the reality that a purchase and sale transaction,
rather than a true "division" occurs to the extent that separate
cash is used to redress an inequity in the division of the commu-
nity.... To the extent, therefore, that one party receives separate
cash or other separate property, rather than community assets, in
exchange for portions of his community property, ... gain, if any,
must be recognized thereon.2 48
The holding and implications of Carrieres can be illustrated
by a much-simplified example. Suppose H (husband) and W (wife)
246. Id. at 963 (footnotes omitted). Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213, is in
accord with Carrieres, and slightly extends it by disregarding a nominal amount of
boot involved in the transaction.
247. 64 T.C. at 964.
248. Id. at 965-66.
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own community (or jointly held) property consisting of Blackacre
(value 60X, basis $30X) and Whiteacre (value $40X, basis $1OX).
In a divorce settlement H takes sole title to Blackacre and W to
Whiteacre, and H pays W $10X of his separately owned cash or
other property to equalize the $20X of disparity in the relative
property values. Under Carrieres, W is viewed as conveying her
one-half interest in Blackacre in exchange for H's one-half interest
in Whiteacre, together with $10X of H's separate cash or other
property. W's gain is computed as follows:
Amount Realized ($20x value of /2 Whiteacre plus $lox cash) $30x
Less: Basis in /2 of Blackacre 15x
Realized Gain $15x
Recognized Gain (10/80) ($15x) $ 5X 249
Thus, the Tax Court seems to view W as exchanging two-thirds
of her interest in Blackacre for H's interest in Whiteacre, and one-
third of her interest in Blackacre for cash. Her gain from the
receipt of H's interest in Whiteacre is
Amount Realized (value /2 Whiteacre) $20x
Basis in two-thirds of interest in Blackacre (2/3) ($15x) lox
Realized but unrecognized gain $lox
Her gain from the receipt of cash from the boot is
Amount Realized $10x
Basis in one-third of interest in Blackacre (1/3) ($15x) 5x
Realized and recognized gain $ 5x
Accordingly, only one-third of W's interest in Blackacre has been
exchanged for separate cash of $10X, and $5X of W's basis in
Blackacre is allocable to the cash.
What is W's basis in Whiteacre? This was not an issue in
Carrieres, but the court nevertheless noted the pre-existing author-
ity that property acquired by non-taxable division keeps its com-
munity basis, while property acquired in a taxable exchange has
a fair market value basis. 250 This formula is accurate where the
249. The realized gain is recognized in the ratio of separate cash or other prop-
erty to total amount realized, that is, 1 to 3.
250. 64 T.C. at 964. See also notes 240 & 243 supra.
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exchange is either completely tax-free or completely taxable, but
requires refinement in the intermediate situation posed in order
to adjust for the $5X of basis in the cash received but not taxed.
This untaxed cash will have a basis of $5X, and accordingly the
basis in Whiteacre is reduced by the same amount. This result is
accomplished by the methodology of the code provisions with
respect to receipt of "boot" in otherwise non-taxable exchanges,
for example, section 358,251 which would require that the com-
munity basis in Whiteacre, $ lOX, be reduced to $5X to give W an
overall basis of $5X in Whiteacre and $10X in the separate cash
or other property received.5
Carrieres highlights a basic confusion which stems from Walz:
the court appears to use the terms "division" and "non-taxable
exchange" interchangeably. Although the terms appear inter-
changeable with respect to recognition of gain, each should lead
to a quite different result in computation of basis. Take the simple
example of community (or jointly held) property consisting of two
parcels of rental real estate, Blackacre (value $50X, basis $30X)
and Whiteacre (value $50X, basis $10X). In a true "division,"
whereby H and W become tenants in common of each parcel, each
would keep his or her historical interest in both value ($25X for
each parcel) and basis ($15X for Blackacre and $5X for White-
acre). A division by value, on the other hand, whereby H takes
Blackacre and W takes Whiteacre, is non-taxable under existing
authority and each parcel keeps its historical basis. Accordingly,
251. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358 (a), 1031 (d), 1033 (c), 1034(e).
252. Using the formula of I.R.C. § 358 (a), modified in order to use the com-
munity basis in the one-half of Whiteacre received ($5X) instead of W's basis in the
one-half of Blackacre she transferred ($15X), the basis in the one-half of Whiteacre
received would be computed as follows:
§ 358 (a) (1) (with the above noted substitution) $ 5x
§ 358 (a) (1) (A) (i) and (ii) (money received) -lox
§ 358 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (gain recognized) 5X
Basis in Whiteacre received $ 0
Basis in the retained V of Whiteacre 5x
Overall basis in Whiteacre $ 5X
§ 358 (a) (2) basis in the separate property received loX
Total overall basis 15X
Using the same formula for H, together with his cost basis under § 1012, his basis in
Blackacre would be:
Basis in Blackacre received, s15X (community basis)
plus $loX (cost basis) $ 25X
Basis in Blackacre retained 15X
Overall basis $ 40X
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H receives a $30X basis in Blackacre while W's basis in Whiteacre
is $10X. Thus, although the parcels are equal in market value, H
has acquired the parcel with the greater tax value by gaining $ 1OX
of basis at the expense of W, who has lost $10X of basis.2 53 This
distortion seems to arise from viewing the transaction as a true
"division," as if each party had always owned only the parcel
eventually received. The transaction is more properly viewed as a
sale or other disposition in which each party's gain is fully
realized but not recognized. Each party should be allowed to keep
the basis in the property exchanged as the basis for the property
received (substituted basis), rather than inheriting the property's
historical (carryover) basis. In the above example, each party's
overall basis in the parcel received would be $20X, a combina-
tion of the former basis each held in Blackacre ($15X) and in
Whiteacre ($5X).24
If, as in the prior example, Blackacre is worth $60X and
Whiteacre $40X, W receiving Whiteacre plus $10X of H's sepa-
rate cash, under Carrieres, W would recognize $5X of gain and
receive a basis in Whiteacre of $5X. Using the methodology of
"non-taxable exchange" rather than "division," her basis in White-
acre would be $15X.25 5
253. See Osceola H. Davenport, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856, 858 (1953), where the
Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the basis disparity required a
finding of taxable event.
254. The methodology of I.R.C. § 358(a) is applied literally to find the basis
of both H and W in the one-half interest received on the exchange-each keeps a substi-
tuted basis in the interest received (H $5X from Whiteacre and W $15X from Black-
acre), while retaining the original, or carryover, basis in the property retained (H
$15X from Blackacre and W M5x from Whiteacre). See generally Brickner, Basis:
Considerations in Planning a Nontaxable Division of Community Property, 42 TAxEs
560 (1964).
255. Under the I.R.C. § 358(a) methodology, W's basis in the one-half of
Whiteacre received would be:
§ 358 (a) (1) (substituted from Blackacre) $ 15X
§ 358 (a) (1) (A) (i) and (ii) (money received) -loX
§ 358 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (gain recognized) 5X
Basis in / Whiteacre received ' lOX
Basis in / Whiteacre retained 5X
Overall basis in Whiteacre $ 15X
H's basis in Blackacre would be:
Basis in Blackacre received, $5X (substituted from Whiteacre)
plus $1ox (cost) $ 15X
Basis in Blackacre retained 15X
Overall basis $ 30X
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It should be noted that the effect of using a "division" meth-
odology also raises a problem of negative basis. Using our original
example, we see that W's gain is computed with reference to her
basis in one-half of Blackacre, but her basis in Whiteacre is com-
puted with reference to the community basis in one-half of White-
acre. If, in the example, Whiteacre had a zero community basis,
the section 858 computation 25 6 would give her an overall basis in
Whiteacre of-$5X. Unlike the usual case of negative basis, how-
ever, here the $5X does not represent cash received without tax
cost.257 Rather, it represents the $5X of untaxed cash that was
offset by $5X of W's basis in Blackacre. Thus, the presence of a
negative basis is simply a side effect of treating the swap of Black-
acre for Whiteacre as a division rather than a non-taxable ex-
change. The latter treatment would use the basis in one-half
Blackacre both to compute W's realized and recognized gain,25 8
and also to compute her basis in the half of Whiteacre received.20 9
In this manner, W's basis in Whiteacre cannot fall below zero
because the same amount of basis is being used to compute both
gain on the exchange and basis in the property received. Thus,
even where the basis in Blackacre is zero, the computations for W
are
Amount Realized ($20x value of V Whiteacre plus $lOx cash) 30x
Less: Basis in 2 Blackacre 0
Realized Gain: 30x
Recognized Gain (10/30) ($30x) (ratio of boot to amount
realized) 1ox
Basis:200
Substituted basis from Y2 Blackacre 5 0
Money received -l ox
Gain recognized -1lOx
Basis in V2 Whiteacre received . 0
256. See note 252 supra and accompanying text.
257. For example, the typical section 357 (c) situation where property encum-
bered by a mortgage that exceeds taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property is placed
into a controlled corporation. Without section 857 (c), the effect is that the mortgage
debt is shifted to the corporation, while the transferor keeps any proceeds flowing from
the mortgage (because of depreciation or borrowing) without any economic or tax
cost for such proceeds. See Del Cotto, Section 357(c): Some Observations on Tax
Effects To The Cash Basis Transferor, 24 BurFALo L. Rav. 1 (1974).
258. See text accompanying note 249 supra.
259. See note 255 supra.
260. See id.
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Another way to eliminate the negative basis in Whiteacre is
to recognize the gain to the full extent of the boot so that no part
of the basis in Whiteacre has to be allocated to untaxed boot. Thus,
in the original example, $1OX instead of $5X of gain would be
taxed and W's basis in Whiteacre would be unaffected by untaxed
cash. This solution, however, addresses the wrong problem-the
problem of negative basis-which here is only a cosmetic problem.
The real problem is the basis distortion arising from the "divi-
sion" theory, and that is solved by an "exchange" approach, which
also eliminates any negative basis side effects.
Another problem raised by Carrieres is how to measure the
taxable gain. Under the formula of that case, realized gain was
taxed in the ratio of "boot" (separate cash or other property) re-
ceived to amount realized. Using our basic example where W re-
reived one-half of Whiteacre (value $20X) plus $10X of boot in
exchange for one-half of Blackacre (value $30X, basis to W $15X),
we saw that the $15X of realized gain was recognized only to the
extent of $5X. This departs from the statutory method of taxing
boot in tax-deferred exchanges, where the realized gain is recog-
nized to the full amount of the boot,6 and the boot receives a fair
market value basis.26 2 This method would recognize $10X of W's
realized gain (the amount of the separate cash, for example) and
there would be no non-recognized boot to reduce the carryover
basis in Whiteacre.
The Tax Court in Carrieres acknowledged the statutory
method, but thought limiting recognized gain to the proportion
of separate property received in the exchange was more consistent
with the nonrecognition principle for exchanges of community
property.28 As illustrated above, the Tax Court seems to view W
as exchanging two-thirds of her interest in Blackacre for H's share
of Whiteacre, and one-third of that interest for cash. Her gain
from receipt of Whiteacre is
Amount Realized (value of 2 Whiteacre) $20x
Basis in two-thirds of interest in Blackacre (2/3) ($15x) lox
Realized but unrecognized gain $lox
261. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351 (b), 356 (a), 1031 (b).
262. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358 (a) (2), 1031 (d).
263. 64 T.C. at 965-66.
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Her gain from receipt of the cash is
Amount Realized W1lx
Basis in one-third of interest in Blackacre (1/3) ($15x) 5x
Realized and recognized gain $ 5x
Accordingly, only one-third of W's interest in Blackacre has been
exchanged for separate cash of $10X, and $5X of W's basis is allo-
cable thereto, so only $5X of gain is recognized. Her basis in
Whiteacre is accordingly reduced by the basis so used (the same
amount as the untaxed cash).
As noted above, to recognize gain in an amount less than the
boot causes problems of basis distortion and a related negative
basis problem when W's basis in Whiteacre is computed on a
carryover rather than substituted basis method. Those problems
are resolved by using a substituted basis approach. However, a
further problem arises when W receives jointly held (or commu-
nity) cash as part of the division. For example, H and W own a
joint bank account of $40,000 and jointly own Blackacre, value
$60,000, basis $30,000. In a divorce settlement, W receives the full
bank account plus $10,000 of H's separate cash. Under Carrieres,
W has an amount realized of $30,000 and realized gain of $15,000,
which is recognized in the amount of $5,000 (ratio of boot, $10,000,
to amount realized, $30,000). Her basis under section 358 in
$20,000 of the joint account received will be less than $20,000,
whether computed on a carryover method (20- 10+5= 15) or by
use of a substituted basis (15-10+5 = 10). Since cash cannot have
a basis of less than 100 percent of its face amount, 24 it is necessary
to recognize more gain to justify the basis increase. Use of a carry-
over basis therefore requires that $10,000 of gain be recognized-
the full amount of the boot-thus preventing any allocation of
basis to the boot. W's basis will then be $20,000 (20-10+ 10) for
$20,000 of cash, the one-half interest she has received from H in
the joint bank account. She will retain her $20,000 basis in the
other one-half interest she has retained.
264. A full basis for cash is implied by section 362 (c) (2), which provides that
money contributions to corporate capital by non-shareholders keep 100 percent basis,
but basis of property acquired with such money, or other corporate assets, must be
reduced by the amount of the contribution. Full basis also is implied by the basis
substitution sections, such as sections 358(a) and 1031(d). The reduction of sub-
stituted basis for money received indicates that basis is first allocated to cash to prevent
it from having a basis of less than its face amount.
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As we have seen, however, this creates basis distortion by
giving W 40/70 of the overall pre-divorce joint basis (the $40,000
joint basis in the bank account) while H receives only 30/70 (the
joint basis of $30,000 in Blackacre). To prevent this distortion, W
should retain only a $15,000 basis (substituted from the one-half
of Blackacre conveyed to H) for the $20,000 joint cash received
from H, and also her $20,000 basis in her own half of the account.
Similarly, besides his $10,000 cost, H has a $20,000 substituted
basis in the one-half of Blackacre received from W, together with
a retained $15,000 basis in the other half. Each thus shares equally
in the pre-divorce overall basis, and the distortion is eliminated.
Elimination of basis distortion, however, aggravates the prob-
lem of basis for the $20,000 of joint cash W receives from H. Even
if the gain of $15,000 is recognized to the full extent of the boot
($10,000), the section 358 basis in $20,000 of joint cash is only
$15,000 (15-10+10) because the original substituted basis
($15,000) is less than the face value of the joint cash received
($20,000). This difference between substituted basis and the
amount of joint cash received must therefore be treated as addi-
tional recognized gain, even though it represents jointly held cash
rather than H's separate cash. So, the $15,000 of realized gain
should be taxable in full, and the basis in the cash received from
H will then be $20,000 in the joint cash (15-10+15) and $10,000
in the boot cash. In other words, W's basis in $30,000 of cash re-
ceived from H will be her substituted basis of $15,000 from the
one-half of Blackacre exchanged, plus the $15,000 of gain recog-
nized on the exchange.
To sum up the above discussion of Carrieres:
(1) A division by value of community or jointly held prop-
erty will be treated as a non-taxable exchange in which gain is
fully realized, but is recognized only in the ratio of boot (separate
cash or other property) received to the amount realized. The basis
in the property received should be equal to the basis in the prop-
erty transferred (substituted), increased by the gain recognized,
and allocated first to any separate cash received. The use of a sub-
stituted basis allows each party to retain an equal share of the
overall joint basis, and prevents the distortion that can be created
by use of a carryover basis. It also eliminates any negative basis
side effect.
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(2) The above result must be modified where one party re-
ceives jointly held cash as part of the division. The Carrieres tax-
ing ratio (boot to amount realized) may have to be adjusted so that
the substituted basis in the jointly held cash received, as computed
under a section 358 methodology, is at least equal to the jointly
held cash received. To accomplish this, realized gain must be rec-
ognized up to the full amount of boot received, less any excess of
original substituted basis over the amount of joint cash received
(but not below the ratio of boot to amount realized), or plus any
excess of joint cash received over original substituted basis.
Thus, if H and W own jointly a bank account of $20,000,
Whiteacre (value $20,000), and Blackacre (value $60,000, basis
$80,000), and W conveys her interest in Blackacre for H's interest
in the other assets plus $10,000 of H's separate cash, the $15,000
of realized gain need be recognized by W only up to $5,000 of boot
received since the section 358 basis in the $10,000 of joint cash re-
ceived will be $10,000 (15-10+5), and the basis in the one-half
of Whiteacre received will be zero. If, however, the joint bank ac-
count contained $30,000 and Whiteacre was worth $10,000 then
the $15,000 gain realized would have to be recognized in the full
amount of boot received, $10,000. The section 358 basis would
then be $15,000 (15-10+10), and it would be fully allocated to
the joint cash received, the one-half of Whiteacre received again
receiving a zero basis. If the joint bank account contained $35,000
and Whiteacre was worth $5,000, then $12,500 of gain would have
to be recognized, so that the section 358 basis would be $17,500
(15-10+12Y2), fully allocated to the $17,500 of joint cash re-
ceived.
Carrieres addresses a further problem concerning allocation
where a spouse conveys his interest in more than one community
asset and each asset has a different basis. Which of the assets should
be deemed "sold" and which "divided"? Assume, for example, that
H and W own community (or jointly held) property consisting of
Blackacre, value $40x, basis $10x,
Whiteacre, value $40x, basis $10x, and
Greenacre, value $20x, basis $20x.
In a divorce settlement, H takes sole title to both Blackacre and
Greenacre, while W takes Whiteacre and H pays W $10X of his
separate cash. If the parties do not allocate any assets to considera-
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tion received, then W's gain can be computed on an aggregate
approach:2 65
Amount Realized ( Whiteacre, value $20x, and $10x cash) $30x
Less: Basis in 2 Blackacre and Greenacre 15x
Realized Gain $15x
Recognized Gain (10/30) ($15x) $ 5x
Or, as Carrieres suggests, the parties may designate the considera-
tion received for each asset.266 Thus, W and H may agree to ex-
change W's interest in Blackacre for H's interest in Whiteacre, a
non-taxable exchange for both parties; and W would convey her
interest in Greenacre for $10X of cash, resulting in no gain to W
because of her basis offset of $I OX.
Another development with respect to community property is
illustrated by Estate of Daisy F. Christ,2 7O where a widow trans-
ferred her share of community property to a testamentary trust
created pursuant to her husband's will and holding his share of
community assets, in exchange for a life interest in all of the trust
assets. Although the issue was not whether a taxable event occurred
when she exchanged her remainder interest in her own one-half
interest in the community for a life estate in her husband's share
of the community, a finding of taxability would seem compelled
by the holding that she acquired the life interest in her husband's
share of the community by purchase. Accordingly, she could amor-
tize her cost basis for this interest against the income received
that is attributable to that portion of the life estate?66 The non-
taxable exchange theory explained in Carrieres has not been ex-
tended to an exchange of a remainder interest in community prop-
erty for a life estate in the same property.
265. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140, rejecting the aggregate approach when
a non-deductible loss may be present, or different assets may give rise to different
kinds of gain. See generally Rabinowitz, Allocating Boot in Section 351 Exchanges, 24
TAx L. REv. 337 (1969).
266. 64 T.C. at 966. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1012 (a) (1957).
267. 54 T.C. 493 (1970), aff'd on other grounds, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
268. Accord, Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); Kuhn v. United
States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1508 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See generally the references cited in
Kuhn v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1508 nn.1 & 2, 75-1512, n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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VI. SALE VS. RESERVED INTEREST: THE AB(ABC) TRANSACTION;
MARITAL SETTLEMENTS IN TRUST
Suppose that A has just purchased the fee in Blackacre for its
fair market value of $100,000. Blackacre is rental real estate that
is producing net annual ground rents of $10,000 a year. 0 A con-
veys the fee to B for $83,000, reserving to himself, however, the
first $20,000 of rents produced by Blackacre, $3,000 of such rents
being reserved as interest 70 Is A to be considered the owner of
a reserved term in Blackacre, with B owning the remainder in-
terest? If so, then B will not include in his income the $20,000
received by A, and he will have a cost basis in Blackacre of $83,000.
A, on the other hand, will include the $20,000 in his gross income
as rentals and not as proceeds from the sale of Blackacre. But if B
is considered to have purchased the entire fee in Blackacre for
$100,000 plus interest on the outstanding balance, then B must in-
dude the $20,000 rentals in his income, $17,000 being treated as
additional cost to B of Blackacre, and $3,000 as interest on a pur-
chase money loan from A. A, of course, will treat $17,000 as pro-
ceeds from the sale of Blackacre and $3,000 as interest. If A also
sells his right to the $20,000 to C for $17,000, resulting in a so-
called "ABC" transaction, the issue remains the same as to B-
that is, whether or not what has been sold to him is the entire fee,
or only the remainder interest.Y
In Thomas v. Perkins,2 72 the Supreme Court originally held
that A had not sold and B had not purchased the right to the
rental payments (in Perkins, oil production payments). The ra-
tionale for this holding was that A bore the full risk of non-pro-
duction of oil and therefore remained the owner of the oil. Ac-
cordingly, B could not be taxed on the payments received by A.
Shortly after Perkins, in Anderson v. Helvering,273 the Court found
269. An assumption is made that the prevailing annual interest rate for the use
of money is ten percent. The value of Blackacre is thus derived by the formula:
where V is the present value of property with a permanent net annual yield
(n) of $10,000 and the interest rate (i) is ten percent. See Joyce & Del Cotto, The
AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and
Carved-Out Income Interests, 31 TAx L. RaV. 121, 123 n.17 (1976).
270. A reserves $20,000 and not $17,000, in order to receive ten percent interest
on the outstanding balance ($17,000) over an estimated two-year period. See Joyce &
Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 126 n.25.
271. For an exhaustive discussion of the AB and ABC transactions, see Joyce &
Del Cotto, supra note 269, and authorities cited therein.
272. 801 U.S. 655 (1937). See also Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
273. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
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B taxable on the payments received by A since A had sold to B
the entire fee. Perkins was distinguished because there A's sole
source of recovery for the payments was the oil production (in our
example, rentals), whereas in Anderson A reserved the right to
payment not only from oil production but also from any proceeds
received by B on sale of the fee. The additional right was equated
by the Court to a personal guarantee from B that A would receive
the payments without regard to whether the property produced
oil. 7 4 Hence, since A could look to B's independent asset (that is,
B's interest in the remainder for which B had paid $50,000) for
recovery, he was not solely dependent on oil production for his
payments and the risks of the property producing oil fell on B. To
the extent that A was in fact paid from oil proceeds, the obligation
on B's independent asset was removed, so the payments to A were
B's income. 5
The AB issue again reached the Court in 1965 in Commis-
sioner v. Brown,276 where A (Clay Brown) conveyed the stock of
his lumber milling corporation to a tax-exempt charity (B) for
$5,000 down, payable from the corporate assets, and B's promise
to pay A $1.3 million solely out of the operating profits of the
business. B had no personal obligation to pay, but the obligation
was secured by a mortgage on the corporate assets. The issue was
whether A had sold his stock and could treat the proceeds as capi-
tal gain, or had retained an interest so that the proceeds were ordi-
nary income. Relying on Perkins and related cases, the Commis-
sioner argued there had been no shifting of risks from A to B, and
that, therefore, A had retained, not sold, the stock.-77 In a further
argument, the Commissioner contended that the $1.8 million
"purchase price" was presumptively in excess of the fair market
value of the assets and that the excess was to compensate A for
retaining the risk of loss. 278
274. Id. at 413.
275. See also Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U.S. 148 (1931), holding that the legatee
of a fixed-dollar annuity payable without regard to trust income was not an income
beneficiary of the trust.
276. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
277. The case was presented by the Commissioner and decided by the Court as if
A had sold the assets of the business, the price payable from the earnings of the assets.
The Court did not rely on the alternative analysis that a sale of stock for earnings from
assets is a sale or other disposition by analogy to I.R.C. § 331 (a) (1): "Amounts dis-
tributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in
exchange for the stock." This point is amplified in Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269,
at 135.
278. Petitioner's Brief at 30-38, Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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The Court disposed of the argument with respect to excessive
purchase price on the basis of the Tax Court's finding that the
price was within "reasonable limits based on the earnings and the
net worth of the company," and on the basis of the failure of the
Commissioner to make proof on this point .27  The Court gave
several responses to the Perkins argument.2 0 With respect to risk-
shifting, the Court first said that it "has not heretofore been con-
sidered an essential ingredient of a sale for tax purposes." '' But,
in distinguishing Perkins, the Court noted that A's right to receive
the income was secured by a mortgage on the assets conveyed, thus
invoking the rule of Anderson.2  Accordingly, Clay Brown can
be viewed as a case in which A has shifted the risk of income pay-
ments to B, who will lose his remainder interest in the assets should
the property fail to produce income.8 3
The lower courts, however, have not focused upon Clay
Brown's reliance upon Anderson v. Helvering and have largely
decided the AB issue without regard to the presence of risk shift-
ing from A to B through a mortgage or other security device. Some
courts have focused mainly upon the reasonableness of purchase
price, or price within a reasonable range, as controlling the sale
211issue. 84 Indeed, the Commissioner has highlighted the importance
279. 380 U.S. at 573.
280. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 136-38 for a full discussion of the
Court's reasoning on this point.
281. 380 U.S. at 574.
282. Id. at 577.
283. Presumably, the remainder would have been of no value to a non tax-exempt
buyer, since the mortgage burdened the full value of the assets. A's security, therefore,
could be viewed as worthless, putting the case outside of Anderson and leaving A with
a retained interest under Perkins. However, the remainder interest would rapidly
acquire value (as income payments were received by A), so that the worthless remainder
is only a temporary phenomenon.
Note also that the value of the remainder need not be equal to the amount of the
outstanding debt. Under Anderson (where a remainder purchased for $50,000 secured
a debt of $110,000), it seems only to be necessary that the remainder have some inde-
pendent value to B, perhaps only in the amount of the annual payments due to A, for
B to benefit by such payments. As stated by the Anderson Court:
In the interests of a workable rule, Thomas v. Perkins must not be extended
beyond the situation in which, as a matter of substance, without regard to
formalities of conveyancing, the reserved payments are to be derived solely
from the production of oil and gas.
310 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).
284. Boone v. United States, 470 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1972), and Raymond L.
Allen, 1975 T.C.M. (P-H) 75, 240, each found the price within a reasonable range and
held there was a sale. In Emanuel Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), afJ'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th
Cir. 1958), decided before Clay Brown, the court held there was no sale where the
purchase price was some four times fair market value. Aaron Kraut, 62 T.C. 420 (1974),
followed Kolkey on similar facts. Also, in Berenson v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 262 (2d
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of fair price by holding in Revenue Ruling 66-153215 that Clay
Brown will not be extended to cases in which the sales price ex-
ceeds the value of the asset sold.
In Bryant v. Commissioner,28 6 the Fifth Circuit, quoting from
Clay Brown that Perkins "does not have unlimited sweep, 287
found a sale despite absence of a security interest in A. The court
failed to note that Clay Brown used this language in discussing
the presence of the mortgage and in order to distinguish Perkins
from Anderson on that ground.288 Bryant stated three reasons for
finding a sale of the fee rather than only the remainder interest:
(1) the production payment was limited to a specific amount and
was part of a total figure that the seller desired for the fee; (2) the
duration of the payments was limited to a short term; (3) interest
was payable on the unpaid balance, indicating the production pay-
ment was B's debt to A.289 Under Perkins, however, these criteria
do not shift any risks of production from A to B, and hence Bryant
allows A sale treatment on an interest that is in fact reserved, while
taxing B on the amounts received by A.
In Alstores Realty Corp., 190 A owned real estate worth $1
million, and sold B a remainder interest therein for $750,000,
reserving to itself the occupancy of the premises for a 2/ 2-year
term. The Commissioner asserted that B had purchased the entire
fee for $1 million, and he charged B with rental income of
$250,000, the value of the 21 2-year term of A's occupancy. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, holding that B construc-
tively received $250,000 of rent by way of a reduction by that
amount in the price paid for the fee. In part, the Tax Court relied
on the form in which the transaction was cast: the use of a standard
form lease apparently indicated a sale of the fee and leaseback of
the term rather than a sale of the remainder only and reservation
by A of the term. The court also noted that B had the "risks and
burdens of ownership"2 91 because, under the lease, B bore the cost
Cir. 1974), the court found a sale up to the amount of a fair price to a non tax-exempt
buyer and a reserved interest for amounts received beyond that price (each payment
prorated in the ratio of fair price to total price).
285. 1966-1 C.B. 187.
286. 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968). See Bryant for a discussion of the pre-Clay
Brown AB cases.
287. Id. at 803.
288. 380 U.S. at 576-77.
289. 899 F.2d at 805-06.
290. 46 T.C. 363 (1966).
291. Id. at 372.
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of utilities and agreed to pay A 6 cents per square foot per
month (the fair rental value of the premises) 2 2 in the event A lost
occupancy because of act of God or the fault of B.218
A lstores appears to reach an improper result. Any suggestion
that a lessor-lessee relationship requires the lessor to be taxed on
the income value of the premises to the lessee should be rejected
out of hand. The lessee has the right to the revenues received by
him and the lessor will have rentals only in the amount he ac-
tually receives. In A lstores, B did not appear to receive the value
of the 2y-year term by purchase of the fee at a discount: the evi-
dence was dear that A did not wish to sell the term, and indeed
would not have agreed to a sale unless it could retain possession
until its new plant was ready for occupancy. 294 Thus, A appears
to have reserved the term, and whether this was done by reserva-
tion in the deed or in two interdependent transactions of sale and
leaseback should make no difference. B was able to purchase only
the remainder and assumed the risks of ownership of the 2Y2-year
term only to the extent that the terms of the lease shifted those
risks to him.
Of "key significance" 29 5 to the Tax Court on this point was
B's liability for A's loss of occupancy. This the court found incon-
sistent with a reserved term by A; rather, it was a
provision for reimbursement of prepaid rent in the event the
tenant is denied (or, during the last one-half year of the term,
elects abandonment of its right to . . . occupancy, the prepaid
rent being in the form of the value of the property received . . .
in excess of the 5750,000 cash paid therefor.298
Certainly, if B had guaranteed to A a return in the amount of the
rental value of the premises in all events, then B would have been
held under Anderson to be the owner of the term because he would
have borne the entire risk of the premises producing that amount.
But B's guarantee (except for the last six months) was a contingent
one, his risk being essentially limited to ouster due to acts of God.
Such risk is more properly disregarded. At most it should render
B taxable on an amount no greater than the cost of insurance pro-
tection against such risk.297
292. Id. at 368.
293. Id. at 372.
294. Id. at 366.
295. Id. at 372.
296. Id.
297. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 153-55.
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Nor does B's responsibility for utilities shift to him the risk
of the premises producing income to A. B's liability to pay the
utilities was absolute, and could not be affected by such production
or lack thereof. The utility payments are more properly treated as
part of B's cost for the remainder interest.2 19
The thrust of the post-Clay Brown cases appears to be that B
should be taxed on amounts received by A because that income is
purchasing for B an interest in the property beyond his remainder
interest. As stated in Bryant:
The new owner of the property derived a benefit from all the
income, including that later remitted to the seller, because with
that income he purchased an asset. The profits from the property
were ordinary income to him.2 99
The connection perceived between the income received by A
and the "benefit" to B is that B has, in effect, borrowed from A
the price of a credit purchase, to be repaid to A from the earnings
of the property. This is not true, however, either legally or eco-
nomically, where neither B nor any asset of his secures A's right
to income payments; there simply is no debt from B to A which
is being discharged by the income payments. It is true, neverthe-
less, that B has gain due to the increase in value of his remainder
interest as the payments to A bring the remainder closer in time
to being a fee interest.300 Such gain, however, is not presently taxed
by any statute, although the underlying theory for such a result is
embodied in the principles of section 1232, which taxes gain due
to "original issue discount" bonds.301
Clay Brown, then, where A was held to have sold rather than
reserved the fee, was only a temporary loss for the government.
The government probably proceeded against the transferor, A, in
that case because B, the transferee, could not be taxed on that in-
come owing to its exempt status.30 Where, however, B is not tax-
exempt, the government normally pursues B as a purchaser, as it
298. Producers Chemical Co., 50 T.C. 940 (1968); L.W. Brooks, 50 T.C. 927
(1968), rev'd, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,
418 U.S. 1 (1974), in which the Tax Court opinion in Producers Chemical Co. was
discussed with approval. See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 155.
299. 399 F.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
800. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 156.
301. See id. at 123-30, 156.
302. In 1969, Congress amended section 514, which treats the income to the
charity as unrelated business income and subjects to normal corporate tax rates the
rental income derived from "debt-financed property."
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did in Bryant and Alstores.303 The government is willing to give
B an increased cost for the property in order to prevent deferral
of ordinary income tax on the proceeds used to pay A. s04
The clearest evidence of the government's position is con-
tained in the materials leading to the enactment of section 636(b),
which provides:
A production payment retained on the sale of a mineral property
shall be treated, for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a pur-
chase money mortgage loan and shall not qualify as an economic
interest in mineral property. 05
The Treasury initially urged passage of this section in order to
correct what it viewed as disparate treatment between secured and
unsecured oil production payments, seeing no reason to treat the
secured transaction as a sale of the fee to B on credit, while treat-
ing the unsecured transaction as a non-sale.0 0 This argument even-
tually prevailed, the House analogizing the unsecured oil ABC
transaction to a purchase of real estate financed by a mortgage s0 7
Accordingly, under section 636(b), B, the buyer of a remainder in-
terest in mineral property, is treated as purchasing the entire in-
terest and must include as income the payments received by the
seller, A, which are considered as discharging B's debt to A. Such
treatment, as well as the Treasury's argument, which was adopted
by the House Committee, proceeds on the false premise that B has
an obligation to A that is being satisfied by the income payments,
despite the complete lack of such obligation. The distinction be-
tween Perkins and Anderson is ignored. 8
303. But see Kreusel v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 89,845 (D. Minn. 1963),
where the Commissioner failed in an attempt to treat the value of a retained life estate to
A as a part of the amount realized on the sale of the fee in a homestead. See also Evans
v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 798 (1958), where an attempt to treat as a reserved interest the
transfer of a life estate for B's promise to make annual payments was also unsuccessful.
304. Thus, A will be taxed on his full gain after basis offset and, if the govern-
ment is successful, B will also be taxed on the income received by A which exceeds
any depreciation deductions attributable to the added cost B acquires in the property.
Where the property sold is stock or unimproved farm land (as in Bryant), B com-
pletel$, loses the deferral effect of including no current income for payments to A and
reporting gain attributable to his lower basis only on disposition 5f the property, and
also loses the possibility of avoiding such gain entirely through the operation of section
1014 (stepped-up basis at death) or of the "fresh start" basis of section 1023.
305. I.R.C. § 636 (b).
306. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., SUMlMARY OF H.R. 13270, TAX REFORM ACr OF 1969 (PART 2) 256-60 (Comm.
Print 1969).
307. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 139-41 (1969).
308. Section 636 (b) was held not to violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment in Carr Staley, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Section 636(b) is also in direct conflict with the treatment of
the AB transaction in the area of gratuitous transfers. If there is
a gift or bequest of securities in trust to pay the income to A up
to $250,000 and then to convey the corpus to B, must B include
the income received by A? The rationale behind section 636(b)
and Bryant would seem to require such result-that is, B is pur-
chasing the full fee by the payments to A-but clearly B will not
be so taxed. The provisions of subchapter J309 tax only A, and the
government need not pursue B because section 273 (disallowance
of amortization deduction by A) prevents deferral loss of the in-
come tax to the government in cases of gifts and bequests. 10
The issue of sale or retained interest has also risen in the area
of transfers in settlement of marital and property rights. Suppose
H (husband) pursuant to a divorce settlement conveys appreciated
securities in trust, income to be paid to W (his wife) for her life,
remainder to the children of the marriage. In Preston Lea Spru-
ance,11 the Tax Court held that under Davis such a transfer is in
part a sale-to the wife and children to the extent the agreement
and subsequent decree released H from W's marital and property
claims and his duty of support to his children-and in part a gift-
to the extent the value of the securities conveyed exceeded the sup-
port rights of wife and children.3 12 Accordingly, H has realized an
amount equal to the rights discharged,31 3 and the trust has a basis
in the securities equal to the value of the rights released by the
wife and children plus a section 1015(a) carryover basis (stepped
up for gift tax under section 1015(d)) for the securities received
above such value. 4
309. I.R.C. §§ 641-692. See especially id. §§ 652, 662.
310. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 162-65.
311. 60 T.C. 141 (1973).
312. Although the wife's marital property rights and support rights are both
consideration received for purposes of computing the husband's amount realized on the
sale, only the support rights constitute such consideration under the gift tax. See Com-
missioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945);
Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); I.R.C. §§ 2512(b),
2043 (b); Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414. See also United States v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65, 69 n.6 (1962); Estate of H.B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 495 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 435
F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1971).
313. The amount was computed by the Commissioner under Treas. Reg. §
20.2031-7 (f) (1958).
314. A number of cases have found a taxable event to the husband in cir-
cumstances of this kind. See Estate of H.B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 495 (1969), af'd per
curiam, 435 F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1971) (transfer in trust, income to wife for her life and
remainder to her appointee or her estate, held part sale, part gift); E. Eugene King,
31 T.C. 108 (1958) (a legal life estate to wife and remainder to children held a sale
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Consistent with the idea of a taxable event to the husband
under Davis, in the Spruance situation there should be an ending
of any obligation of the husband with respect to the rights sur-
rendered by the wife. Thus, if the wife releases support rights for
an income interest in a trust, the transfer of assets to the trust is
an exchange taxable to the husband only if it fully discharges his
support obligation to his wife. If the support obligation survives
the transfer, then the husband has retained an interest under the
principle of Anderson v. Helvering, because the income payments
to the wife benefit the husband by satisfying his support obliga-
tion, and the transfer is not a taxable event. In Revenue Ruling
57-506,315 the wife was entitled to trust income and the husband
remained obligated to pay her any difference between such income
and a certain dollar amount. The husband's transfer to the trust
of appreciated property was held not to be a taxable event. In
Revenue Ruling 57-507,316 involving similar facts except that lia-
bility for payments beyond trust income could be discharged by
funding the trust with property of a stipulated value, it was held
that a transfer of property to the trust was a taxable event, since
to the extent of the value transferred there was a pro tanto dis-
charge of a money obligation.3 7 Revenue Ruling 59-47'18 recon-
ciled the above rulings on the ground that in the former the hus-
band's support obligation continued and the trust could only "act
as a conduit.., to the wife,"3 19 but it did not make clear whether
the husband's support obligation in either case had also ended
under local law. If the support obligation continues under local
law, 20 then the transferor remains the economic beneficiary of the
up to value of wife's support rights); Edna W. Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. 885 (1953)
(transfer in trust, income to wife for her life and remainder to children, held a sale
in the full value of property transferred without discussion of allocation between sale
and gift). See also Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 C.B. 511 (a transfer in trust, with the in-
come to wife for life for her support and the remainder to a charity, held a sale
of the life estate).
315. 1957-2 C.B. 65.
316. 1957-2 C.B. 511.
317. Id. at 512.
318. 1959-1 C.B. 198.
319. Id. at 199.
320. In E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108, 116 (1958), the court noted that any pur-
ported final release in a property settlement agreement of a duty to support minor
children would be ineffective under the applicable local law. McMains v. McMains, 15
N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1965), is to the same effect with respect
to support of a spouse. Compare Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940), with Douglas
v. Wilicuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). See generally Young, Separation and Divorce and the Tax
Laws: "Waltzes" and "Apache Dances," 22 TAx LAw. 551, 564-68 (1969).
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income payments and has reserved the life estate, preventing a
taxable event to the transferor.
In a taxable transfer, how is the transferor's basis to be allo-
cated between the sale and the gift? The problem is whether basis
should be allocated entirely to the sale (up to the amount realized),
or whether basis should be allocated ratably to both sale and gift
according to the fair market value of each. Where the transfer is
to a single transferee and the gift does not give rise to a charitable
contributions deduction, the cases and the regulations agree that
the entire basis of the transferor may be used to minimize gain on
the sale.83 1 Where the sale is to the wife and there is a gift of the
remainder interest to the children, a rule of basis apportionment
between sale and gift seems to be required. This was suggested by
the Tax Court in Spruance (transferee's basis is combination of
cost and carryover) and it has been so held in E. Eugene King22
and Revenue Ruling 57-507.2 Basis allocation for transfers which
are both sale and gift will be discussed later,324 but it should be
noted now that ratable allocation gives a more accurate measure
of both the taxable gain on the sale and the non-taxable gain for
the gift.
Consistent with allocation of basis to the transferor, as sug-
gested by Spruance, the transferee will have a composite basis con-
sisting of cost (sections 1012 and 1015(b)) plus carryover (section
1015(a)), increased by a portion of the gift tax paid (section
1015(d)). 8 2 In Spruance, however, the Tax Court stated in dicta
that under section 1015 the trust should have strictly a carry-
over basis and that the wife should have a cost basis in the
income interest, which she could amortize against income re-
ceived. 2 (6 Apparently, the court was concerned that a double
benefit would arise if the wife were able to amortize her cost while
321. See Elizabeth H. Potter, 38 T.C. 951 (1962); Reginald Fincke, 39 B.T.A. 510
(1939), acq. 1939-2 C.B. 12. See also Treas. keg. § 1.1001-1 (e) (1972). Where the gift
gives rise to a charitable contribution deduction, the basis must be apportioned under
section 1011 (b).
322. 31 T.C. 108, 116 (1958).
323. 1957-2 C.B. 511, 513. But see Edna W. Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. 885 (1953),
where full basis offset was allowed without discussion.
324. See text accompanying notes 399-418 infra.
325. Where the part gift-part sale is to a single transferee, Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4
(1973) provides that basis to the transferee is the greater of cost or carryover increased by
the amount of the gift tax paid. This will be discussed in connection with the discussion
of amount realized. See text accompanying note 416 infra.
326. 60 T.C. 141, 155 n.7 (1973). For authorities on W's right to amortize, see
Kuhn v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1508 nn.1 & 2, 75-1515 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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the trust also received a cost basis that could be used to offset its
gain on a sale. 27 Nevertheless, section 1015(b) does allow the trust
itself a fair market value basis for the assets acquired by purchase.
The same result would be obtained if the wife acquired the in-
come interest as a legal (non-trust) estate and then herself put it
into the trust. The trust's basis under section 1015(a) is the wife's
cost. Nevertheless, the basis of property in trust ought not to be
allowed to benefit the parties (trust and beneficiary) more than
once. This notion is implicit in the "uniform basis" rule of sec-
tion 1.1014-4(a)(1) of the Regulations, under which the basis of
property, as adjusted under section 1016, must be the same to all
parties, both trust and beneficiary. Consistent with this princi-
ple, sections 1.1014-4(a)(1), 1.1014-5(a)(1), and 1.1015-1(b) of the
Regulations require adjustments to basis for section 1016 items such
as losses incurred by the trust, which adjustments, under section
1.1014-5(a)(3) of the Regulations, also affect the basis of trust bene-
ficiaries in computing gain or loss on sale of their interests. Also,
the thrust of section 167(h) is to allow the depreciation deduction
only once, and to allow it to the income beneficiary absent a con-
trary provision in the trust instrument.3 28
On the other hand, section 1.1014-4(a)(1) of the Regulations
provides that gain or loss to a life tenant or remainderman on the
sale of his interest in the trust will not affect the basis of the trust
in trust assets. Accordingly, if the trust sells the trust assets at a
gain or loss, the same gain or loss is in effect taxed or deducted
twice. Applying this notion to the Spruance situation, the trust's
section 1015(b) basis arguably would not be reduced by the wife's
deductions for amortization, just as if she had sold her interest at
a loss. So applied, the Regulations are internally inconsistent in
allowing only the trust's basis adjustments to affect the adjusted
basis of all parties concerned, while disregarding, in calculating
327. 60 T.C. at 155 n.7. The "double benefit" mentioned is not completely
avoided by allowing the trust only a section 1015 basis. Thus, if H transfers prop-
erty worth 100X, basis $20X, and the value of W's purchased income interest is $50X,
under the approach of the Tax Court W's amortizable basis in the income interest is
$50X, and $20X is also the trust's basis in both the income and remainder interest (ignor-
ing any increase for gift tax). This still gives to the trust the $10X of the $20X used by
H as basis offset in the taxable sale to W, which should not be part of the carryover
basis under Section 1015.
328. In Kuhn v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1508 (S.D. Tex. 1975), section
167 (hi) was literally applied to allow an amortization deduction to the wife.
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the trust's basis, adjustments to the basis of trust beneficiaries. 329
Elimination of this inconsistency would remove the concern of the
Spruance court.
VII. SALE vs. LOAN: THE "CARVE-OUT" AND
RELATED TRANSACTIONS
The issue to be discussed here is whether a transaction is a
sale or disposition of property such that the proceeds received by
the transferor are to be treated as an amount realized under sec-
tion 100 1(a), or whether the proceeds are a non-taxable borrowing
against the security of the property. One context in which this issue
arises is the "carve-out" transaction, which is essentially the reverse
of the AB transaction. Instead of A being the owner of a fee who
conveys a remainder interest and reserves an income interest, B
can be viewed as owning the fee interest and conveying to A an
income interest while retaining the remainder. This has been'
termed the "BA" transaction, 330 and is illustrated by the facts of
Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner.3 31 The taxpayer (B) owned
shares of corporate stock and assigned to his son (A) all the divi-
dends to be paid on such stock in future years until the assignee
received $122,820. In the year the assignment was made, A gave B
$115,000, which B included in his income for that year, enabling
him to utilize a deduction for interest paid in that year. The de-
duction was not eligible to be carried forward to subsequent tax
years, and, absent the $115,000 income in the year of the assign-
ment, would have been lost. B did not include as income the divi-
dends received by A in later years. The Commissioner, however,
included A's receipts in B's income, treating the initial receipt by
B of the $115,000 as a loan from A, and the dividends paid to
A as discharging B's obligation to repay the borrowing, and hence
income to B when received by A. The Tax Court upheld the Com-
missioner under the assignment of income doctrine3 2 but was re-
versed by the Sixth Circuit, which held that the transaction was
a sale because the risks of ownership of the dividends passed to A,
329. The above regulations apply, of course, only to basis acquired from a de-
cedent or by gift, but there is no apparent reason why the principle of uniform basis
should not also reach trust property held at a cost basis.
830. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 168-82 for a full discussion of this
transaction.
831. 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1978).
332. Estate of Frank D. Stranahan, 1971 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,250.
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the son. 33 The assignment of income doctrine was held not to
apply to a transfer for full consideration. 34
The result and rationale of Stranahan are in complete accord
with the distinction between sale and reserved interest made by
Thomas v. Perkins and Anderson v. Helvering. Since A assumed
the entire risk of dividends being paid on the stock, B had ended
his ownership interest in such payments and had fully realized his
gain on receipt of the $115,000. That gain must be taxed in the
year of receipt since, under Perkins, B cannot be taxed on A's re-
ceipt of the dividends; there is no "debt" running from B to A
that is discharged by A's receipts. Nor, according to Stranahan, is
remoteness of risk relevant. The possibility that the dividends
would not be paid, however remote, was nevertheless a risk of
ownership borne by A.335
Suppose, however, that B had pledged his remainder interest
in the stock as security for payment of the dividends, or had per-
sonally guaranteed such payment in the absence of sufficient divi-
dends. Under Anderson v. Helvering, B would bear the risk of
dividend payments and the transaction would be treated as a loan
from A to B, with B taxable on the dividends received by A in dis-
charge of B's debt. 8O
The tax treatment of a production payment carved out of
mineral property is now controlled by section 636(a), which, in
general, treats the transaction as a loan irrespective of whether the
pay-out risks are assumed by A or retained by B. Such treatment
correlates to that under section 636(b) for the AB transaction, dis-
cussed above, 37 and again violates the principles of Perkins and
Anderson. 38
333. 472 F.2d at 870-71.
334. Id. The relationship of the assignment of income doctrine to sales of income
interests is more fully discussed in Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 176-79.
335. Id.
336. Stranahan, 272 F.2d at 871, suggests that such a case is J.A. Martin, 56 T.C.
1255, aff'd mem., 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Hydrometals, Inc., 1972
T.C.M. (P-H) 72-1317, 72-1319, aff'd per curiam, 485 F2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), in which
the court treats the transaction as a loan in an apparent application of the Anderson
principle. These cases are fully discussed in Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 173-76.
337. See text accompanying notes 305-08 supra.
338. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 269, at 179-82. It should be noted that prior
to such cases as Stranahan and Hydrometals, and the enactment of section 636 (a), when
the taxpayers involved apparently were not attempting to accelerate income in order to
utilize deductions, the Treasury position had been that such acceleration required inclu-
sion in income by the transferor of the proceeds received at the time of the assignment.
See G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 C.B. 66; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10.
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The more familiar context for the sale versus loan issue is
that of Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,39 where the
question was whether one who, without personal liability for re-
payment, borrows on the security of real property, realizes taxable
gain equal to the excess of the amount borrowed over the adjusted
basis in the property. The Second Circuit held that no part of the
property had been disposed of by the borrowing since there was
no change in possession, control, or right to the income therefrom.
Also, noted the court, "any increase in its value goes to him" (the
mortgagor) and "any decrease falls on him, until the value goes
below the amount of the lien."3 40 Hence, the mortgagee is not a
buyer but a lender; he is a creditor, even though the debtor has
no personal liability, because he has recourse to the land. 41
It has been argued that a borrowing on the security of a mort-
gage, without personal liability, should be a taxable event, on the
ground that absence of liability locks in the gain so that it cannot
be lost if the property drops in value.3 42 This argument overlooks
the fact, alluded to in the Woodsam opinion, that at the time of
the borrowing, and thereafter while the property holds its value,
it is the mortgagor who runs the risk of depreciation in value be-
cause of the mortgagee's security interest in the full value of the
property. Accordingly, the Woodsam result should be viewed
simply as an application of Anderson v. Helvering: the obligation
to repay is secured by an independent asset of the property owner-
the excess value of the property over the amount of the mortgage-
and therefore repayment is at the risk of the owner. The transac-
tion is therefore a loan on the security of the property and not a
taxable disposition of the property.
The same result follows where the transaction is cast in the
form of a sale-that is, a conveyance of legal title in exchange for
money-together with a leaseback of the property to the "seller,"
the lease containing an option to repurchase the property for an
amount approximately equal to the "sale" proceeds. In Helvering
389. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
340. Id. at 359.
341. Id.
342. Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property For More Than Cost With-
out Personal Liability (Contentions of Taxpayer's Counsel in a Pending Case), 6 TAx L.
REv. 319, 822, 825 (1951). See alsd Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane:
A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 69,
96-98 (1969).
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v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co.,2 48 such a transaction was held not to be
a disposition of the property. The deed was treated as a mortgage
given as security for a loan, and the rental payments under the
lease were found to be interest on the loan. The most important
factor in the court's decision was the fact that the value of the real
property involved was greatly in excess of the cash received, show-
ing clearly the intent of the owner to borrow on the security of the
land and not to sell it.344 Also, this excess value would have been
lost on failure to repay the money advanced. Hence, the "lessee"
could fail to exercise the "repurchase" option and repay the money
only at the risk of losing the excess value, his independent asset.
Accordingly, he is required to be treated as continuing owner of
the full fee in the property under the principle of Anderson v.
Helvering, and as having received the cash by way of loan rather
than sale. 45
343. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
344. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 32 B.T.A. 633, 637 (1935). The transaction was cast as
a sale because of the poor market conditions at that time for mortgage notes.
345. In accord with Lazarus on similar facts are Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ivey, 414 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1969) (ad.
vances to cotton farmer by selling agent were loans where agent had security for repay-
ment of advances); Blake, 8 T.C. 546 (1947); Commercial Credit Corporation, 1968
T.C.M. (P-H) 68-989; Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87. See also United National Cor-
poration, 33 B.T.A. 790 (1935) (proceeds received were an amount equal to full value
of property conveyed, but nevertheless held a loan on intent of parties) ; Rev. Rul. 234,
1953-2 C.B. 29 (advance from publisher to author were loans where there was personal
liability to repay). Compare the above authorities with Resthaven Memorial Cemetery,
Inc., 43 B.TA. 683 (1941) (conveyance of cemetery lots, buyer having option to require
repurchase by seller under conditions not within seller's control, held a completed sale),
and Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971-1 C.B. 223 (grant of an option to buy property is not a sale
or disposition thereof since none of the benefits and burdens of ownership passed to the





Section 1001(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
"[t]he amount realized from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of property (other than money) received." This formula
was originally enacted as section 202(c) of the Revenue Act of
1924346 in order to assure that property would be taken into
amount realized at its fair market value, and, to the extent of such
value, be treated as so much cash.3 47
The general formula of section 1001(b) is subject to a number
of limitations. The section itself provides that the amount realized
according to the general formula remains unaffected by any reim-
bursement to the seller for his payment of real property taxes
allocable to the purchaser under section 164(d). Section 164(d)
provides that such amount merely reduces the seller's deduction
under section 164(a) for real property taxes paid. It is not part of
the buyer's cost basis, since it represents an item deductible by
him under section 164(a). 48 On the other hand, section 1001(b)
requires the seller to include in his amount realized any amounts
representing real property taxes paid by the buyer and allocable to
the seller under section 164(d).349 This result follows from the
familiar principle that one realizes a benefit when one's debt is
discharged by a third person.3 50 Such amounts are part of the
buyer's cost basis.351
The amount realized is also affected by expenses of sale, in-
cluding attorney fees, brokerage commissions and advertising costs.
The Treasury Regulations treat such expenses as a downward
346. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202 (c), 43 Stat. 256 (now I.R.C. § 1001 (b)).
347. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 241, at 250; S. RF,. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1
(Part 2) C.B. 266, at 275.
348. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (b) (4) (1957). Section 164(d) reverses Magruder
v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1941), which held that a buyer was eligible for an increased
basis, not a deduction, for payment, according to the contract of sale, of property taxes
for which the seller was liable under local law.
349. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (b) (4), Ex. (2) (1957).
350. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
351. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (b) (4), Ex. (2) (1957).
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adjustment of the amount realized-as a reduction of the amount
received on the sale.352 Capitalization of such expenses has received
approval in the courts,3 53 although it is not entirely clear whether
the proper method of capitalization is a reduction of amount
realized or an increase of basis in the asset sold. Under section
1001(a) the net gain will be the same under either method. If,
however, the sale is an installment sale of mortgaged property
covered by section 453, where the excess of mortgage over basis
is a "payment" in the year of sale, the method used can make a
difference. 54
II. PROPERTY "OTHER THAN MONEY" RECEIVED
The benefit received from cancellation of a debt by a transfer
of property is an amount realized under section 1001(b). Thus, if
A owes to B money that is paid to B by C in consideration of a
transfer of property from A to C, the amount of the debt cancelled
by C's payment to B is an amount realized by A under the princi-
ple of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.5' The result is the
same if A pays B directly with the property. In Suisman v.
Eaton,3 56 the trustee of a testamentary trust transferred appreciated
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a) -2 (e) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1 (b) (4) (1956).
353. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Godfrey v. Commissioner,
335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965); Johnson v. United States,
149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945); Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Wash-
ington Market Co., 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932). There is a conflict of authority, however, where
such expense is incurred in corporate sales of property under section 337. The weight
of authority holds such expenses must be capitalized rather than deducted as a business
expense. See Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974); Lanrao, Inc.
v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970) ; United States
v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir.
1967). Contra, Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) (overruled
by Of Course, Inc.); United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244
(10th Cir. 1966).
354. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958). See Kirshenmann v. Commissioner, 488 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1973), which holds selling expenses are added to basis and do not affect
computation of amount realized or selling price under section 453. Hence, the downpay-
ment in that case did not exceed 30 percent of the selling price, as it would have if the
selling price had been reduced. Rev. Rul. 74-384, 1974-32 I.R.B. 10, states that the
Treasury will not follow Kirschenmann.
355. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). See generally 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 11.19 (1974 ed.).
356. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936); accord, United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir.
1962); Wilson v. Tomlinson, 306 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff,
168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Treas.
Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957); Rev. Rul. 66-207, 1966-2 C.B. 243. See text accompanying
notes 46-48 & 55-59 supra.
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securities in satisfaction of an obligation to pay a $50,000 legacy.
The court held that under section 100 1(b) the amount realized by
the trustee was the fair market value of the debt cancelled by the
transfer, $50,000. The same result obtains when an estate or trust
transfers property in satisfaction of a pecuniary marital deduction
bequest, whether the bequest is stated in terms of a fixed dollar
amount or in terms of a formula. 57
Where property is transferred for services rendered or to be
rendered to the transferor, there is an amount realized in the
value of such services, although the transferor may have no legal
obligation to make the transfer.a5 8 It has been settled by United
States v. Davis 59 that where a transfer of property pursuant to a
divorce property settlement or divorce decree constitutes a tax-
able event to the transferor,360 the transferor's amount realized is
the fair market value of the transferee's inchoate marital rights
surrendered (rights of inheritance and to a share of the marital
property upon divorce), and that such value can be determined by
assuming such rights to be equivalent in value to the property
transferred in exchange therefor. Davis supports the holdings of
International Freighting Corp.36 ' and its progeny, which measure
the amount realized from receipt of services by the value of the
property transferred in consideration therefor. It also denies any
implication arising from those cases that the finding of a taxable
event to the transferor depends on the availability of a deduction
for the value of the property transferred. 2
Under section 1001(b), the amount realized also includes the
fair market value of claims received by the seller of property from
the buyer as consideration for the transfer. In Warren Jones Co. v.
Commissioner,31 the taxpayer sold an apartment building for
$20,000 down and the buyer's promise, in a standard form real
estate contract, to pay $183,000, plus interest, over the following
357. Treas. Reg. § 1.10144(a) (3) (1957); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Rev.
Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 C.B. 325. See text accompanying notes 69-78 supra. Where, however,
the bequest is designed as a "minimum value" or "ratable sharing" provision in order
to comply with Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 682, there is a threshold question
of the extent to which the property transfer is a taxable event. See text accompanying
notes 99-121 supra.
358. International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
See text accompanying note 131 supra.
359. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
360. See text accompanying notes 158-61 supra.
361. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). See text accompanying note 131 supra.
362. See text accompanying notes 144-48 supra.
363. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
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15 years. Such contracts were regularly traded and the contract
received was found to have an undisputed fair market value of
$76,980. This value, held the Ninth Circuit, must be included
in the seller's amount realized for the year of the sale. It should
be noted that this entire area is fraught with complexities con-
cerning ability to value the claim received and the relationship
to section 1001(b) of "cash equivalency" notions.80 4
III. AMOUNT REALIZED ON DISPOSITION OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY
A. The Rule of Crane
Dispositions of property encumbered by liens such as mort-
gages raise perplexing problems concerning the definition of
amount realized. The seminal case in the area is Crane v. Com-
missioner.305 In Crane, the facts, somewhat simplified, were that
taxpayer inherited improved real estate subject to a mortgage
debt equal to its value, $255,000. After taking allowable deprecia-
tion deductions on the building in the amount of $25,000, tax-
payer sold the property, still subject to the mortgage, for $2,500
in cash. The taxpayer contended that only the cash received,
$2,500, was realized; the Commissioner contended that she realized
an additional $255,000, the amount of the existing mortgage.
Therefore, argued the Commissioner, her amount realized was
$257,500, her basis, adjusted for depreciation, was $230,000, and
her gain was $27,500.
The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner. The Court
first held that the taxpayer's original basis in the property was,
under section 1014(a), its fair market value, undiminished by the
existing mortgage. This holding is dubious, since the only "value"
acquired from the decedent by the taxpayer was the equity in the
property-zero. In order to acquire ownership of the value sub-
ject to the mortgage she necessarily had to amortize the mortgage,
which would give her a basis under section 1012, that is, a cost
basis. 300 The view that the basis should have been determined
364. These complexities are discussed in the section on deferred payment sales.
See text accompanying notes 561-606 infra.
865. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
366. See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. Rav. 159, 164 (1966); Del Cotto, Basis and
Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage
Financing, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 69, 73 (1969).
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under section 1012 is supported by the reasoning of the Court on
the basis question. According to the Court, the word "property,"
as used in section 1014, is to be given its "ordinary, everyday"
dictionary meaning.367 More to the point, the Court reasoned that
to allow only an equity basis would distort income because de-
preciation deductions would represent only a fraction of actual
physical exhaustion of the property.368 Furthermore, periodic
amortization of the mortgage would yield a shifting equity basis, in
turn creating an accounting burden and allowing the mortgagor
to control the timing of his depreciation deductions.86 9 The Court
also was concerned that if the taxpayer started with an equity
basis, but was allowed deductions on the full value of the prop-
erty, the adjusted basis could be reduced below zero. 70 These
expressed concerns about the relationship between basis and
depreciation support the view that the mortgage debt encumber-
ing the inherited property is includable in basis as part of its cost
under section 1012. Crane has been so interpreted by the Tax
Court in Manuel D. Mayerson,87 David F. Bolger3 72 and Black-
stone Theatre Co.3 3
Finding that taxpayer's basis was an amount that included the
mortgage, $255,000, the Court in Crane held that under section
1016 the basis was properly reduced for allowable depreciation.37 4
The Court then proceeded to the problem of whether the amount
of the mortgage was properly includable as part of the amount
realized on the sale of the property. The transferor conceded, and
the Court agreed, that if she had been personally liable on the
mortgage, and if the purchaser had assumed the liability, the
amount so assumed would be part of her amount realized under
the principles of United States v. Hendler3 7 and post-Hendler
decisionsY.76 But the Court went further and found that the mort-
367. 331 U.S. at 6.
368. Id. at 9.
369. Id. at 10.
370. Id. at 9-10.
371. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
372. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
373. 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
374. 331 U.S. at 11-12.
375. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
376. 331 U.S. at 13. The rationale of Hendler was that the transferee's assumption
and payment of the transferor's obligations was debt cancellation income to the trans-
feror. 303 U.S. at 566. However, in Walter F. Haass, 37 B.T.A. 948 (1938), the Board of
Tax Appeals construed Hendler to require only an assumption of the liability to give
the transferor an amount realized therefor, following the Board's holdings in the pre-
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gage was part of the transferor's amount realized, despite lack of
personal liability on the part of the transferor, and despite lack
of assumption of the mortgage by the transfereeY7
The Court reasoned that when the value of the property con-
veyed is greater than the amount of the mortgage encumbering it,
the lien represented by the mortgage is tantamount to personal
liability of the owner of the property because his property can be
taken fully to satisfy the lien. In effect, the mortgagee is simply
a preferred creditor of the owner. Therefore, on a transfer of the
property subject to the mortgage, the debt follows the property
into the hands of the transferee and the transferor has been re-
lieved of liability to the extent of the value of the encumbered
property. He therefore has realized the amount of the mortgage
as debt cancellation income.
It should be further noted that the same result follows even
where the transferor is personally liable for the mortgage debt,
despite the fact that the property is transferred merely "subject
to" the mortgage and the mortgage liability is not assumed by
the transferee. In such case the property itself, having a value at
least equal to the amount of the mortgage, becomes the principal
fund for payment of the mortgage and can be viewed as the prin-
cipal obligor. The transferor is only a surety who, even if he does
eventually pay the mortgage debt, is entitled to reimbursement
Hendler cases of Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936), and Estate of Theodore Ebert
Jr., 37 B.T.A. 186 (1936), which involved exchanges under the provisions that are now
sections 1031 (a) and (d). In agreeing with taxpayer's contention in Crane, the Court
cited Hendler, Haass, and Brons Hotel, Inc. 331 U.S. at 13.
377.
[W]e think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the
property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a
benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the boot. If a purchaser pays
boot, it is immaterial as to our problem whether the mortgagor is also to re-
ceive money from the purchaser to discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or
whether he is merely to transfer subject to the mortgage-it may make a dif-
ference to the purchaser and to the mortgagee, but not to the mortgagor. Or
put in another way, we are no more concerned with whether the mortgagor
is, strictly speaking, a debtor on the mortgage, than we are with whether the
benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a receipt of money or property. We are
rather concerned with the reality that an owner of property mortgaged at a
figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the
conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If
he transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and sub-
stantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an
equal amount had been assumed by another.
331 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 26
PART II-AMOUNT REALIZED
from the land.37 8 Loss of the primary obligation on the mortgage
is, under the Hendler line of cases 379 sufficient benefit to require
the amount of the mortgage to be included in the amount real-
ized.880
A second reason given by the Crane Court for including the
mortgage in amount realized is founded on the tax-benefit notion
that there has been a recovery of past depreciation deductions.
"Property" as used in section 1001(b), said the Court, must be
construed to be consistent with its meaning in the basis provisions
of the Code because "the functional relation of the two sections
requires that the word mean the same in one section that it does in
the other."381 This "functional relation" arises from inclusion of
the mortgage in the basis of the property for depreciation pur-
poses, thus necessitating an offsetting inclusion in amount realized
in order to make taxpayer account for gain that was untaxed
because of deductions in excess of taxpayer's actual economic
investment. This meaning is reinforced by the Court's statement
that "[t]he crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her
to exclude allowable [depreciation] deductions from considera-
tion in computing gain."3 2 Thus, in the above example, the $255,-
000 mortgage was initially included as cost basis, the basis was
adjusted to $230,000 by allowable depreciation, and the inclusion
of the $255,000 mortgage in amount realized will result in taxing
as gain the amount of past depreciation for which there was no
economic cost.
The amount of a mortgage will be included in the amount
realized even when it is not part of the cost of the encumbered
property. Thus, for example, if taxpayer borrows on the security
of the property subsequent to its acquisition and does not use the
borrowed funds to improve the property, on a later disposition of
the property the mortgage will be an amount realized. Since the
378. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 252, 258 (2d ed. 1970).
See Herff v. Rountree, 140 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 249 F.2d
958 (6th Cir. 1957); Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partner-
ships, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 100 (1972); Storke & Sears, Transfer of Mortgaged Property,
38 CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1953). See also I.R.C. § 752 (c) ("a liability to which property is
subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of the property, be considered as a
liability of the owner of the property'), and I.R.C. §§ 311 (c), 357 (c), which treat the
mortgage as an amount realized whether or not the transferee assumes it. Accord, Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.1031 (c), 1,1031 (d) -2 (1956).
379. See note 376 supra.
380. See Kent Homes, Inc., 55 T.C. 820, 829 (1971).
381. 331 U.S. at 12.
382. Id. at 15.
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mortgage is the "cost" of only the borrowed funds and not of the
property conveyed, it will give rise to no depreciation deductions
for such property. But on a disposition subject to the mortgage
there is nevertheless an amount realized under debt cancellation
notions in order to make taxpayer account for the past tax-free
borrowing,38 3 the liability for which has been effectively shifted
to the transferee.38 4
The principle of Crane-that the amount realized on a sale
includes any mortgage to which the property is subject, irrespec-
tive of the transferor's personal liability-is a rule followed by
both Congress and the courts 8 5 Indeed, the Code is explicit in so
treating the mortgage, whether the transferee assumes or merely
takes subject to it."36 The principle of Crane nevertheless has given
rise to numerous disputes where mortgaged property is transferred
in a transaction other than the usual sale. The application of this
principle has been disputed in cases involving property transferred
by gift or abandoned to the mortgagee.
383. See Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952);
text accompanying notes 339-41 supra.
384. First National Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969); Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1952); Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C.
682 (1943).
385. E.g., Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1965); Commissioner
v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954); Woodsam Associates, Inc., 198 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1952); Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947). But see Commissioner v. Bab-
cock, 259 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1958), holding that a mortgage discharged in an involuntary
condemnation proceeding was not part of the amount realized for purposes of section
1033, distinguishing Crane on the ground that there the conveyance was voluntary. Op-
posing this view are Fortee Properties, Inc. and Harsh Investment Co. v. United States,
323 F. Supp. 409 (D. Ore. 1970).
386. I.R.C. §§ 311 (c), 357 (c). See I.R.C. §§ 752 (c), (d); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1031 (c) -1
(1956), 1.1031 (d) -2 (1971). However, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has added to the
Code section 465, which provides generally that deductions with respect to certain activi-
ties may not exceed the amount the taxpayer has "at risk"--generally speaking, the
amount of money he has invested and the loans upon which he is personally liable.
I.R.C. § 465 (b). The activities to which the provision applies are limited to holding,
producing, or distributing motion picture films or video tapes; certain farming activities;
leasing of section 1245 property; and exploring for or exploiting oil and gas resources as
a trade or business or for production of income. Remaining possibilities for leveraged
shelters are in turn limited for all partners, whether general or limited, by an amend-
ment to section 704 (d) which imposes an "at risk" limitation on all partnership activi-
ties (except investing in real property) other than those already covered by section 465.
Section 704 (d) now precludes a partner's adjusted basis in the partnership interest from
including any liability with respect to which the partner has no personal liability. This
has a more limited effect than section 465 since it does not preclude the partnership itself
from utilizing a non-recourse generated loss against available partnership income. It
does, however, limit the amount of loss that can pass through to individual partners.
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B. Abandonment of Mortgaged Property
In Parker v. Delaney,31 7 taxpayer owned rental real estate
which he had depreciated on a cost basis that included the amount
of an unassumed mortgage. When the mortgage was in default, tax-
payer conveyed the property to the mortgagee in discharge of the
mortgage. He originally treated the amount of the mortgage as
an amount realized and reported a long-term capital gain. He then
applied for refund of the tax paid, contending that he realized
nothing by such conveyance. He further contended that abandon-
ment of mortgaged property by one not personally liable on the
debt is not a "sale or exchange" under the capital gain provisions
of the Code, and that accordingly there could be no capital gain. 8
The Second Circuit held that Crane required that the mortgage
be included in amount realized under section 1001(b), although
there was no "sale or exchange":
We are not concerned with the computation of the amount to be
taxed, that is, whether it was properly computed as a gain on the
sale or exchange of a capital asset or should have been computed
as ordinary gain .... Accordingly, it does not help appellant to
term the transaction an abandonment if it was nevertheless a dis-
position within the meaning of §111 [§1001 (a) ] upon which a gain
was realized .... In these circumstances, the unpaid amount of
the liens is carried forward... from the time of the acquisition to
the time of the disposition. They are treated as cost at the earlier
time and so must be treated as value at the later time. The re-
sult in the end is that the taxpayer accounts . . . for the gain
realized by his deductions for depreciation in excess of his own
investment.38 9
IV. GIFT OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY: PART GIFT-PART SALE
A. In General
Authority is abundant for the general proposition that a gift
of unencumbered property is not a taxable sale or other disposition
under section 1001(a).3 9 Where, however, the gift is of property
387. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
388. See, e.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941).
389. 186 F.2d at 459.
390. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Broderick, 104
F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952); Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954); Estate of Farrier, 15
T.C. 277 (1950); Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 C.B. 229; Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 C.B. 297;
L.O. 1118, 11-2 C.B. 148 (1923).
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subject to a mortgage or other debt or encumbrance, it appears
equally clear that to the extent of the debt there has been no
transfer by gift. The analysis in Crane indicates that up to the
amount of the mortgage or other debt there has been in fact a sale
of the property. The transferor has received benefit by way of
relief from debt as consideration for a transfer of property; the
transferee can acquire the value of such property, up to the amount
of the mortgage debt, only by paying the mortgage-that is, by
purchase. These results do not appear to depend on whether the
transferor has personal liability for the debt, or whether the debt
is assumed by the transferee. This follows from the holding of
Crane and the authorities interpreting it with respect to both cost
to the transferee and amount realized by the transferor.8 0 1
Although the cases decided in the part gift-part sale area are
not entirely clear-cut, they do, by and large, support the above
propositions. In Simon v. Commissioner,92 the conveyance of
mortgaged property as a contribution to the capital of a corpora-
tion was held a part sale in the amount of the mortgage, despite
transferor's lack of personal liability and non-assumption of the
debt by the transferee. The same result was reached on similar
facts in First National Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,0 8 where
the transferor's personal liability was not formally assumed by the
transferee. The court equated the transaction to a part sale-part
gift.'0 4 In Malone v. United States,85 the taxpayer conveyed
to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his grandchildren farm-
land with an adjusted basis of $13,650 and a fair market value of
$57,485, and the trust assumed the taxpayer's personal liability
for $32,000 in mortgages which arose from taxpayer's prior bor-
rowing on the value of the property. The court held that there
was a gift of only the equity in the property and a taxable sale
up to the amount of the mortgages so that such amount was real-
ized under section 1001(b). The Malone court, however, stressed
that there was an assumption by the transferee of the transferor's
personal liability, and did not need to reach the government's
contention that Crane applied regardless of such personal lia-
391. See text accompanying notes 365-84 supra.
392. 285 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 1960).
393. 404 F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969).
394. 404 F.2d at 1186.




bility.39 6 In Johnson v. Commissioner,39T the taxpayer borrowed
$200,000, signing a note without personal liability, and pledging
as security for the note shares of corporate stock having a fair
market value of $500,000 and in which he had a basis of $10,000.
He then transferred the shares to an irrevocable trust for the bene-
fit of his children, and the trustees substituted their note for the
$200,000 debt, apparently without assuming personal liability.
Taxpayer used $150,000 of the loan proceeds to pay the federal
gift tax on the gift of the $300,000 equity value of the stock. The
Sixth Circuit held that under Crane there had been a sale of the
stock for $200,000, producing a gain of $190,000. Similarly, Reve-
nue Ruling 70-626398 applied Crane to a transfer to a charity of
stock pledged to secure a prior borrowing by the transferor. The
amount of the debt was an amount realized on the part sale and
only the equity value was a charitable contribution.
B. Part Gift-Part Sale: Allocation of Transferor's Basis; Basis of
the Transferee
1. In general. Where a transfer is part gift and part sale, two
basic questions arise: First, how is the transferor's basis to be
allocated between the two types of transfers? Second, what is the
transferee's basis under section 1012 (cost) and under section 1015
(gift)?
This problem has been discussed briefly above with respect
to distributions by an estate in satisfaction of certain marital be-
quests8 99 for which section 1.661(a)-2(f)(3) of the Regulations
uses an allocated basis approach. It has also been discussed in con-
nection with hybrid transfers in settlement of marital and prop-
erty rights,00 for which the decided cases use an allocated basis
approach. The most detailed regulations dealing with the prob-
lem do not, however, use an allocated basis approach when the
transfer is not to a charity. Instead, they require that the trans-
feror's basis be applied first to the sale proceeds. 401
396. 326 F. Supp. at 113.
397. 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974).
398. 1970-2 C.B. 158.
399. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
400. See text accompanying notes 321-25 supra.
401. With respect to the transferor's basis allocation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e)
(1957). The transferee's basis is governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.10154 (1957), approved in
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waco v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,670 (W.D. Tex.
1968).
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Discussion of the problem can be facilitated by use of an ex-
ample from the Regulations concerning non-charitable gifts. Sup-
pose A transfers to his son for $60,000 property having an adjusted
basis to A of $30,000 and a fair market value of $90,000.402 In an
early ruling °0 the Treasury, using an allocated basis approach,
held that such a transaction would represent a sale of two-thirds of
the property (60/90) for $60,000, against which the transferor
could offset two-thirds of his basis, $20,000, resulting in a taxable
gain of $40,000 to the transferor. The remaining one-third of the
transferor's basis, $10,000, passed with the gift portion of the
transfer. Accordingly, the transferee's basis would be $60,000 (cost)
plus $10,000 (carryover under section 1015(a)), totalling $70,000,
together with the increase for gift tax allowed by section 1015 (d).404
Allocation of basis in this manner was rejected by the Board of Tax
Appeals in Reginald Fincke,40° where it held, in terms of the above
example, that the transferor's entire basis, $30,000, could be offset
against the sales proceeds, resulting in a gain to him of only $30,-
000. As a result of Fincke, the earlier ruling was revoked,406 and
the current regulations reflect the Fincke holding.407 The net result
to the transferor is that only $80,000 of gain is realized, whereas
if the basis were allocated the gain would be $40,000. Correspond-
ingly, the $80,000 gift carries none of the transferor's basis to the
transferee, since it was fully used in the sale.
Under section 1.1015-4(a) of the Regulations, the transferee's
basis is the greater of the transferee's cost or the transferor's basis,
plus, under section 1015(d), the increase for gift tax paid. The
examples in the regulation ignore the section 1015(d) increase
and find the transferee's basis to be $60,000, his cost. Although
the principle of this regulation appears to have no statutory war-
rant, it is in fact a proper application of section 1012 in conjunc-
tion with section 1015(a). Thus, the transferee has a basis of cost
in the amount paid, $60,000. His section 1015(a) basis is, however,
402. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e), Ex. (1) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (b), Ex.
(2) (1957).
403. I.T. 2681, XII-1 C.B. 93 (1933), revoked, I.T. 3335, 1939-2 C.B. 193.
404. Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the gift tax adjustment is limited to only
the portion of the gift tax attributable to the "net appreciation in value," that is,
$20,000, the difference between the donor's allocated basis of $10,000, and the fair market
value of the gift, $30,000. I.R.C. § 1015 (d) (6).
405. 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939).
406. I.T. 3335, 1939-2 C.B. 193.




zero, since the transferor fully utilized his basis on the sale and no
part of it is left to pass under section 1015(a). To this $60,000
basis the transferee is entitled to add the gift tax paid (section
1015(d)) in an amount no greater than the difference between
the transferor's basis and the value of the gift, here $30,000.401
The effect of the non-allocation rule of these regulations is to
decrease the transferor's gain from the sale by the portion of his
basis allocable to the gift, a result that is inconsistent with normal
allocation of basis principles. Certainly, if the transferor had sold
a fee interest in only two-thirds of the property, retaining one-
third, he could not allocate his entire basis to the portion sold.409
Similarly, if A sells two-thirds of the property to B for $60,000
and makes a gift to C of the remaining one-third, his gain on the
sale should be $40,000. B would have a cost basis of $60,000 and C
a carryover basis of $10,000 plus the increase for gift tax paid. The
above regulations would not appear to prevent this result, since
there is no "part sale-part gift" to a single transferee, but rather
two separate transfers, one wholly a sale and the other wholly a gift.
This conclusion is supported by the examples used in the above
regulations: in each, the transfer is of the entire property to a single
individual. There is no reason, however, why such allocation prin-
ciples should not be applied uniformly to all such transfers, with-
out regard to the number of transferees. The rule of the regula-
tions distorts the income of the transferor by allowing a basis off-
set for basis not attributable to the property sold. Such basis is
then denied to the transferee, resulting again in a distortion of
income by potentially increasing his taxable income in an amount
equal to such basis. The net result is that the transferor has effec-
tively realized gain upon which he avoids taxation, while shifting
the tax on such gain to the transferee, causing improper deferral
of taxation, income-shifting among related taxpayers, and possible
avoidance of the entire tax by way of a stepped-up basis under
section 1014 or the section 1023 "fresh start" provision upon the
death of the transferee.
408. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-5 (a) (1) (i) (1963). Since the gift tax rates never reach
100 percent of the value of the gift, the full amount of the gift tax cannot be added to
basis. For post-1976 gifts, only the gift tax attributable to the appreciation in the bestowed
property is allowed to increase basis. I.R.C. § 1015 (d) (6).
409. See, e.g., Fairfield Plaza, Inc., 39 T.C. 706 (1963) ; Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C.
704 (1959); Harlow N. Davock, 20 T.C. 1075 (1953); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6 (a) (1957);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (c) (1957).
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The allocated basis approach has been required by Congress
since its enactment in 1969 of section 1011(b). This section, how-
ever, applies only to bargain sales to charitable organizations. It
results in recognition of gain equal to the excess of the proceeds
received over the basis allocated to the sale. Congress intended this
recognition to be part of the price for a charitable-contribution
deduction for the gift portion of the transfer.410 Thus, in the above
example, if the transfer were to a charity, the transferor could use
only $20,000 of his basis to offset the $60,000 sale price, instead of
$30,000.
Although section 1011(b) uses the correct allocation prin-
ciple, its limited application gives rise to the argument that Con-
gress by inaction has approved the non-allocation rule of the above
regulations for non-charitable bargain sales. From the committee
reports, however, it appears that Congress was concerned only with
the effect of this rule in bargain sales to a charity and was not
weighing its merits with respect to non-charitable transfers.41
Thus, Congress' failure, when enacting section 101 (b), to extend
its reach beyond charitable contributions does not appear to repre-
sent approval of the non-allocation rule in the Regulations.
2. Conveyance of encumbered property. The non-allocated
basis approach of the Regulations was followed in both Johnson
and Malone. Using the facts of Johnson-a transfer of property
worth $500,000, having a basis of $10,000, and subject to a debt
of $200,000-what is the basis in the property to the trust-trans-
feree? Starting with the principles of Crane and Mayerson,412 the
transferee has a cost basis of $200,000 in the two-fifths of the stock
acquired for the debt. This is supported by section 1015(b), which
provides that a trust-transferee's basis in property acquired in an
event taxable to the transferor is the transferor's basis increased by
410. HR. REP. No. 91-415 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 55, 56 (1969).
411. The House Committee Report merely recognizes the existence of the non-
allocation principle in discussing the issue with respect to the charitable-contributions
deduction. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, supra note 410, at 54. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report rejected I.R.C. § 1011 (b) on the ground that it "would adversely affect
giving to charities, as 'bargain sales' have been a long-accepted form of making contribu-
tions of property to charities," S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969), thus
appearing to favor the non-allocation rule in order to encourage charitable giving. Again
there was no discussion of the overall merits of this principle. The Conference Commit-
tee accepted the House bill on this point and preserved I.R.C. § 1011 (b). H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 294 (1969).
412. See text accompanying notes 366-73 supra.
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his recognized gain. Since both Johnson413 and Malone414 allow the
transferor to use his full basis as an offset against the amount real-
ized on the sale, the basis of the trust in two-fifths of the stock is
$200,000 ($10,000, the transferor's basis, plus $190,000 gain recog-
nized to the transferor). The basis of the transferee in the gift por-
tion of the stock is the transferor's basis (section 1015(a)) plus the
increase for the gift tax paid (section 1015(d)). The carryover
under section 1015(a) is zero because the transferor has fully
utilized his basis on the sale; before the 1976 Tax Reform Act the
addition for gift tax would have been $150,000 (gift tax paid, but
no more than the $300,000 fair market value of the gift).415
The same result occurs if the transferee's basis is computed
under the part gift-part sale regulations.46 The transferee's basis
is the greater of cost or carryover, $200,000, plus the increase for
gift tax paid. This was the computation used in Johnson.1 7
Malone used a section 1015(b) analysis to reach the same result
for cost, but did not allude to the basis for the gift portion under
sections 1015(a) and 1015(d).418
C. "Net Gift" or "'Part Gift-Part Sale"?
Working with the basic facts of Johnson, assume one owns
Blackacre, value $500,000, basis $10,000, and wishes to make a gift
of the property minus the amount of any gift tax payable on the
gift. If the transferor borrows an amount sufficient to pay the gift
tax, his liability for the borrowing secured by a mortgage on the
property, and conveys the property subject to the mortgage, Crane
and Johnson tell us this is a part sale up to the amount of the
mortgage. If, instead, the property is transferred subject to the
transferee paying the gift tax, will the amount of the gift tax be
considered an amount realized to the transferor in a part sale?19
413. 495 F.2d at 1084-85.
414. 326 F. Supp. at 109, 113, 114. Use of the full basis in a "part sale," instead
of an allocated basis, is allowed by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1 (e) (1), (2) (1957).
415. See note 487 infra.
416. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1015-4, 1.1015-5 (1973).
417. 495 F.2d at 1085.
418. 326 F. Supp. at 113-14.
419. The value of the gift for gift tax purposes is reduced by the gift tax payable
on the transferred property, whether the transaction is viewed as a "net gift" (a gift of
the property net of the gift tax) or a part sale-part gift. Since the value of the gift and
the amount of the gift tax are interdependent, a calculation must be made to arrive at
the gift tax payable. Where only the federal gift tax is involved, the formula for such
calculation is provided by Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. 275, and Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1
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If not, has the transferor reserved an interest in the corpus of the
property equal in value to the amount of the gift tax? Or, alter-
natively, will the transferor be considered to have reserved an in-
come interest in the property transferred up to the amount of the
gift tax?
In the early cases the Commissioner did not press for sale
treatment at the time of the transfer, but rather attempted to have
the transferor taxed on the amounts paid by the transferee in dis-
charge of the debt.420 In Herff v. Rountree,421 property was trans-
ferred subject to a purchase-money mortgage equal to the full
value of the property. The mortgage was subsequently discharged
by the transferee, who had not assumed any personal liability
therefor. The Commissioner contended that the transferor was
taxable on the mortgage amortization payments because they dis-
charged his personal and primary liability on the mortgage.422
The court found for the taxpayer, holding that on a conveyance of
property subject to a mortgage, without assumption of liability
by the transferee, the property itself is the primary source for
satisfaction of the mortgage. Accordingly, the transferee and trans-
feror stand in the relationship of principal and surety to the extent
of the value of the property. The primary liability for the mort-
gage thus rests on the transferee, since the transferor would have
recourse to the property were he to pay the mortgage himself.
Therefore, the court held that the mortgage payments did not
satisfy taxpayer's primary liability and were not income to him.423
The result in Herff is supported by Edwards v. Greenwald,424
which held that payments in discharge of a mortgage could benefit
C.B. 310. Where a state gift tax is also payable, the method of calculation is illustrated
in Rev. Rul. 76-57, 1976-8 I.R.B. 16, and Rev. Rul. 76-49, 1976-7 I.R.B. 11. See also
Taussig, Kimball & Sprague, Iterated Equations for Vicious Circle Tax Problems: Manual
and Computer-Assisted Problems, 49 TAXES 538 (1971).
420. See, e.g., Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1954); Staley v. Com-
missioner, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1943); Herff v. Rountree, 140 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Tenn.
1956), appeal dismissed, 249 F.2d 958 (6th Cir. 1957).
421. 140 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 249 F.2d 958 (6th
Cir. 1957).
422. 140 F. Supp. at 204.
423. Because taxpayer retained a life estate in the property, he was found to be
the primary obligor, and taxable on the payments, in the ratio of the value of the re-
tained life estate to the value of the whole property. Id. at 206.
In accord with the general principle of Herff, see Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1954); Hays' Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950); cf.
Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 30 B.TA. 591 (1934), rev'd, 76 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1935),
rev'd per curiam, 296 U.S. 552 (1935), distinguished in Edwards v. Greenwald, supra.
424. 217 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1954).
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only the owner of the property-the transferee-by increasing its
equity value to him, and that this increase in value is of no eco-
nomic benefit to the transferor, who has conveyed all of his interest
in the property.425 Neither case, however, addresses the issue of
whether on the property conveyance itself the shifting of the pri-
mary obligation for the mortgage is an amount realized under
Crane.
In Staley v. Commissioner,426 taxpayer transferred shares of
stock to a trust for the benefit of his children, reserving the right
to $150,000 of trust income, which he needed to help defray the
gift tax incurred on the transfer. The taxpayer contended that
the transaction was a sale of $150,000 worth of the stock, but the
court held that it was a conveyance of the full interest in the stock
with a reserved income interest up to $150,000. Therefore, the
taxpayer was taxable on the $150,000 received from the trust as
ordinary income, without basis offset. A like result was reached in
Estate of Sheaffer v. Commissioner,427 where there was a gift trans-
fer to a trust and the trustee agreed to pay all gift taxes arising
from the transfer to the extent of the entire trust corpus and the
income therefrom. The trust paid the gift taxes before their due
date in the amount of $327,307.04-$188,607.04 from trust in-
come, and $138,700 from the proceeds of a loan obtained on the
security of trust assets. The court held that the taxpayer, under
section 677, must include as income the $188,607.04 of trust in-
come used to pay the gift taxes. The stated rationale for this hold-
ing was that the income payments discharged the transferor's pri-
mary obligation to pay gift taxes and therefore was, under section
677(a)(1), income distributed to him. The court noted428 that the
gift tax is the primary and personal liability of the donor,429 that
he must file a gift tax return430 and pay the tax,31 that the tax is a
lien on all gifts made for 10 years,432 and that if the tax is not paid
when due, the donee is personally liable for the tax to the extent
of the value of the gift.4"3 Since the tax was in fact paid before
425. Id. at 635.
426. 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
427. 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
428. 313 F.2d at 740-41.
429. I.R.C. § 2502 (d) ; Treas. Reg. § 25.2502-2 (1958).
430. I.R.C. § 6019.
431. Id. § 2502 (d).
432. Id. § 6324 (b).
433. Id.
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the donee-trust became independently liable therefor, the court
saw the payment as being for the primary benefit of the donor. 483
The court left open the question of the tax consequences where
the donee pays the tax after the due date, when both the donor
and donee are independently liable therefor.
In Estate of Annette S. Morgan435 the Commissioner con-
tinued to pursue the section 677 route in attempting to tax the
donor on payments made from income by a trust-donee in dis-
charge of a bank loan made to the trust to enable the trust to
pay gift taxes when due in the previous year. The Tax Court
held that the income payments did not benefit the donor, since his
liability for gift tax had disappeared in the previous year upon
payment of the gift taxes by the trust with the loan proceeds. 4 0 It
specifically rejected the argument that repayment of the loan was
merely an indirect use of trust'income to satisfy the donor's gift tax
liability.4 '7 No argument was made or considered, however, as to
whether use of the loan proceeds to pay the gift tax was a taxable
sale by the donor of his income rights under the trust instrument,
which made all of the property transferred subject to liability for
the gift tax.438
In Victor W. Krause,430 the trust-transferee accepted property
subject to the liability for gift taxes to the extent of the value of
the property transferred. In April 1964, the trustee paid the gift
tax of $134,381.65 with the proceeds of a bank loan received on
the security of the trust assets. The Commissioner assessed a tax on
the transferor under section 677 for the net trust income realized
for 1964, $14,000, and, broadening his attack, for an additional
amount, equal to the difference between the gift tax paid and such
income, as ordinary gain resulting from the sale of transferor's
income interest in the trust. The Tax Court upheld the Commis-
sioner only to the extent of the trust income realized prior to the
date of payment of the $8,400 gift tax, since this amount was
within section 677(a)(1).44 0 Income realized thereafter, although
434. Accord, Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 C.B. 328.
435. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd mem., 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1963).
436. Accord, Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 647 (1966).
437. 37 T.G. at 984-85.
438. See Note, Assumption of Indebtedness by a Donee-Income Tax Consequences,
17 STAN. L. Rav. 98, 116 (1964).
439. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).




in the same taxable year, was held to be outside of section 677
under the Morgan principle. The Tax Court also held there was
no sale of transferor's income interest, because of the retained
right to have gift taxes paid from any source, corpus or income.441
Here the Tax Court relied on the "net gift" doctrine of Richard
H. Turner.442
In Turner, the transferor made gift transfers both to trusts
and to individuals, the individual transferees agreeing to pay the
resulting gift tax liability, and the trustees likewise agreeing, but
only to the extent of trust assets. Abandoning the section 677 line
of attack, possibly because of the presence of non-trust donees, the
Commissioner asserted that the transfers were in part a sale, up to
the amount of gift tax paid by the transferee, and in part a gift.448
The Tax Court held, however, that there was no part sale, only
a "net" gift-the value of the property less the gift tax payable-
so there was no taxable event to the transferor.444 The rationale of
"net gift" was explained by analogy to Kreusel v. United States,45
where the value of a reserved life estate was held not to be part
of the amount realized on a sale of the remainder. The Turner
court seemed to be suggesting that the property transferred did
not include the amount necessary to pay the gift tax.
A second reason assigned by the Tax Court for rejecting the
part sale argument was the basis to the transferee which would
result under the part gift-part sale Regulations.446 Such basis would
consist of the amount of the gift tax, as cost under section 1012
and section 1.1015-4 of the Regulations. In addition, the basis
would include the same amount a second time, as credit for the
gift tax paid, under section 1015(d)(2). This was a "persuasive
indication" to the Tax Court that there was no part gift-part
sale.447 Similarly, in Estate of Kenneth W. Davis,4 8 the Tax Court
again found a non-taxable net gift. Turner was relied upon to re-
ject part sale-part gift treatment.
441. 56 T.C. at 1248.
442. 49 T.C. 356 (1968), afJ'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
443. The Commissioner conceded, on brief, that the trust transfers were not sales
because the trustees assumed no personal liability, 49 T.C. at 362-63, a distinction rejected
by the Tax Court, id. at 363.
444. Id. at 363.
445. 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 89,845 (D. Minn. 1963).
446. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-5 (1963).
447. 49 T.C. at 364.
448. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
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After Turner, the Tax Court was asked to decide the John-
son449 case, where the donor made a gift of corporate stock
worth $500,000, subject to a bank loan of $200,000, and used
$150,000 of the loan to discharge the gift tax liability. Finding the
Crane rationale squarely applicable, the Tax Court found a part
sale, up to the amount of the bank loans encumbering the stock.4 10
Turner was distinguished on various grounds: (1) the transfer
in Johnson was not subject to gift tax liability; (2) there was a
retained interest in Turner, but not in Johnson; and (3) the bank
loans in Johnson were not to be equated to the gift tax liability in
Turner since the loan proceeds exceeded the gift taxes due.451 On
appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Johnson tax-
payers again argued that to the extent of the gift tax liability,
their facts were indistinguishable in substance from Turner.
Admitting that Turner would be difficult to distinguish,4 2 the
Sixth Circuit found Turner had "no precedential value beyond
its peculiar fact situation" 453 in view of the Commissioner's con-
cession that there was no sale to the trustee-transferees because
they did not assume personal liability for the gift taxes. But
Turner was not expressly overruled, despite the fact that the same
court had affirmed the Tax Court decision in Turner. Neverthe-
less, the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit throughout the Johnson
opinion indicates its disapproval of Turner. The court found un-
important the labels of "part sale-part gift" and "net gift" and
found the substance of the transaction was that taxpayer had an
amount realized of $200,000 on the transfer under the theory of
Old Colony Trust Co.45 -the transferee's payment of the trans-
feror's obligation to pay the gift tax results in debt cancellation
income45,5-or Crane-the "shedding" of the $200,000 debt by
transfering the encumbered stock.5
When the Turner facts again reached the Tax Court in Edna
Bennett Hirst,45 7 it again found a net gift, noting that although
449. See text accompanying note 397 supra.
450. Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.
1974).
451. 59 T.C. at 812-13.
452. 495 F.2d at 1081-82.
453. Id. at 1086.
454. See text accompanying note 355 supra.
455. 495 F.2d at 1083.
456. Id.
457. 63 T.C. 307 (1974) (appealed by Commissioner to the Fourth Circuit).
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the Sixth Circuit in Johnson did not approve of Turner, it did
not overrule it.4 15 The Tax Court stated:
We recognize that there is much force to the Government's
position. The gift tax itself is imposed only upon the "net gift,"
i.e., upon the gross amount of the property transferred minus the
gift tax paid by the donee. In substance, a portion of the trans-
ferred property equal in value to the amount of the gift tax is not
treated as having been part of the gift. But surely that portion did
not vanish into thin air, and a strong argument can be advanced
for the conclusion that it was exchanged for the donee's payment
of the gift tax on the "net gift," a transaction that may result in
the realization of gain or loss depending upon the donor's basis in
the property. If the donor had sold that portion to an outsider
immediately prior to the gift of the remainder, and then used the
proceeds of the sale to pay the gift tax, the practical consequences
to the donor would have been the same as in Turner, except that
the donor would have been taxable on any gain realized on the
sale. However, in the absence of any clear-cut overruling of prior
law by a Court of Appeals, we are not prepared at this time to re-
examine an intricate and consistent pattern of decision that has
evolved over the years in this field, notwithstanding that there may
be much to be said in favor of a more "realistic" approach to the
problem. Things have gone too far by now to wipe the slate clean
and start all over again.459
The combined effect of the decisions of the Tax Court on the
net gift" transaction is to open the door for a transferor of prop-
erty completely to avoid any tax on the exchange gain arising from
the benefit received from payment of his gift tax by the transferee.
Moreover, if the gift tax is paid by the transferee before the trust
realizes income from the transferred property, the transferor will
also avoid the application to him of section 677.460
The question remains: To what extent does the distinction
between "net gift" and "part gift-part sale" have any reality? The
issue raised by this distinction is simply the familiar one of whether
a transferor has reserved an interest in property, or has completely
disposed of it in an event taxable under section 1001. This issue
has been discussed at length above, in the context of the AB and
ABC transactions.46 We saw that under the doctrine of Anderson
458. Id. at 314.
459. Id. at 315.
460. Literature explaining the strategies involved for net gifts and part gifts-part
sales is abundant. See, e.g., Note, Part Gift-Part Sale, Net Gift, And Gift Of Encumbered
Property: Specialized Strategies For Gifts Of Unique Property, 50 NoTRE DAME LAW. 880
(1975), and authorities cited therein.
461. See text accompanying notes 269-345 supra.
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v. Helvering,6 2 if A conveys Blackacre, fair market value $500,000,
to B for $300,000 cash plus a right to $200,000 (with interest on
the outstanding balance), to be paid from the income of Blackacre
and secured by a mortgage on the entire fee, A has engaged in a
taxable disposition of the entire fee and must include $500,000 in
his amount realized. Accordingly, the income used to pay A on the
principal of the outstanding debt is taxable to B as income from
the property, and is part of B's cost therein. It is not taxable to A
since he has reserved no interest in Blackacre.
The underlying rationale of this result is that A's security in-
terest, represented by the mortgage on the entire fee, shifts the
risks of payment to B so that B becomes owner of the entire fee.
Similarly, in Burnet v. Whitehouse,03 it was held that the legatee
of a fixed-dollar annuity payable without regard to trust income
was not an "income beneficiary" of the trust, since he bore no risks
with respect to the presence of income.
Turner and Johnson present basically the same issue in slightly
different garb-that of part sale-part gift, rather than full sale.
When A transfers property worth $500,000, the full value of which
is subject to a liability for $200,000, he has not made a "net gift,"
as held in Turner, because the only interest he has reserved in the
value of the property in excess of the amount of the gift is a security
interest. That the liability arises from a mortgage occasioned by
the transferor's past borrowing rather than from the lien for the
gift tax arising from the transfer itself should make no difference.
In both cases the transferor has the right to have his debt paid from
the full value of the property transferred, and this right is secured
by his right to reimbursement from the property should the trans-
feror in fact pay the liability. The primary risk of payment is
therefore on the transferee, up to the full value of the property,
whether or not the transferee assumes the liability.4 4 The trans-
feror has effectively sold the value of the property in the amount
of the debt, just as the transferor in Anderson v. Helvering sold
the value of Blackacre that was subject to his rights to the income
therefrom.
462. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
463. 283 U.S. 148 (1931).
464. See text accompanying notes 375-80 supra. See also Randall, Transferee Lia-
bility For Estate, Gift and Other Taxes, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON FrD. TAX 1017 (1960); Note,




Crane provides a like analysis. On a conveyance of mortgaged
property subject to the mortgage, the transferor has been effec-
tively relieved of the primary burden of the debt because the lien
of the mortgage can be satisfied in full from the property itself.465
The only factual difference between Crane and Anderson is that
in Anderson the transferor in effect took back a purchase money
mortgage so that the value of the fee would secure payment of a
debt to himself, while in Crane the value of the fee secured pay-
ment of the transferor's debt to another. The benefit received is
the same in both cases; and in both cases the benefit is an amount
realized under section 10 01 (b).
Johnson, as decided both in the Tax Court and in the Sixth
Circuit, comes to the proper result by applying the Crane doctrine
to the transfer of mortgaged property. The "shedding" of the
$200,000 debt by transfer of the encumbered stock gave the trans-
feror a debt cancellation benefit that was an amount realized under
Crane.4 0 And, as stated above, there is no apparent reason why an
identical result should not be reached in the Turner situation. A
transfer subject to liability for gift tax immediately creates donee
liability, in the nature of a lien upon the gift property,467 for the
tax, and, under the holding of Crane and Johnson, there is a
"shedding" of the liability and an amount realized in the amount
thereof.
The taxable event to the transferor is, then, the transfer of
property subject to a debt. At that time he has been divested of
his interest in the entire amount transferred and, contrary to
Turner, has no "reserved interest" therein. This result is sup-
ported by the holdings of Herff v. Rountree4 8 and Edwards v.
Greenwald,4 9 discussed above,470 which hold that the transferor is
not taxable on post-transfer payments made by the transferee in
discharge of the debt. Most important, the result under Crane and
465. See the discussion of the Crane and Hendler cases in text accompanying notes
375-80 supra.
466. 495 F.2d at 1083.
467. While the donor has personal liability for the tax under I.R.C. § 2502 (d), the
tax is also a lien on the gift property from the time of the transfer, even before the gift
tax is due. The donee acquires personal liability only if the tax is not paid when due.
I.R.C. § 6324(b); see Estate of Shaeffer v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.7
(6th Cir. 1974). See also note 464 supra.
468. 140 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 249 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.
1957).
469. 217 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1954).
470. See text accompanying notes 421-25 supra.
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Johnson aemonstrates the impropriety of the holdings in Estate
of Sheaffer v. Commissioner471 and Victor W. Krause,4 2 which tax
to the transferor, under section 677, the income produced by the
transferred property prior to payment of the gift tax. Under Crane,
the transferor is properly taxed on his debt cancellation benefit at
the time of the transfer; the income later produced by the prop-
erty is taxable only to the transferee. Such income is no more that
of the transferor than was the income used to pay the purchase
price to the transferor in Anderson v. Helvering4 73
This is not to say that there cannot be a transfer of property
subject to a reserved interest in either the income later produced
by the property or a portion of the corpus. In discussing the AB
transaction, 74 we saw that under Thomas v. Perkins475 a transfer
of property subject to a reserved right to a certain amount of fu-
ture income produced by the property is not a sale or disposition
of the income interest. The rationale for this holding is that where
the transferor receives no security interest in the property trans-
ferred, he is dependent entirely on production of income to re-
cover his economic interest in the property. Since he bears the full
risk of, and has no security against, non-production, the transferor
remains the owner of the income interest.
The extent to which the doctrine of Thomas v. Perkins can
apply in the "net gift" area is problematical. It appears to have no
application to the facts of Sheaffer, Morgan, Krause, Turner or
Johnson, in each of which the transferee either expressly assumed
personal liability for the gift tax or mortgage payable, or accepted
the transfer under an agreement or condition that made the value
of the entire property subject to the liability. The case coming
closest to Thomas v. Perkins is Staley v. Commissioner.470 There,
the transferor of property to a trust desired to pay his gift tax di-
rectly and reserved a right to $150,000 of trust income to assist him
in doing so. Without more, this appears to be squarely within
Thomas v. Perkins because the transferor was dependent solely on
trust income to recover his interest, having no security interest in
the trust corpus should the property fail to produce income. In-
471. 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
472. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
473. See text accompanying notes 273-75 supra.
474. See text accompanying notes 269-310 supra.
475. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
476. 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
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deed, Staley in effect followed Thomas v. Perkins, rejecting tax-
payer's argument that there was a part sale for $150,000 of income,
and taxing the income receipts to the transferor as ordinary income
without basis offset.
In all events, even if the transaction in Turner is to be treated
as a net gift where the transferor "reserves" title to the property
needed to pay the gift tax, if the transferee in fact discharges the
gift tax liability, the amount discharged should be an amount
realized to the transferor under the principle of Old Colony Trust
Co. Thus, if the transferee uses "reserved" trust corpus to pay the
gift tax, he is simply acting for the transferor, and there should
be a taxable sale of such corpus to the transferor at that time. If
the transferee uses his own funds or the proceeds of a loan to pay
the gift tax, then likewise there has been a "sale" of the reserved
interest by the transferor to the transferee. If the "reserved" in-
terest is only an income interest, then that is the interest sold by
the transferor.47 7
The Commissioner's arguments along these lines have been
specifically rejected by the Tax Court in Krause and Turner.47 8
Indeed, in Turner the parties agreed that the question was
whether payment of the gift taxes by the transferee was a taxable
477. If the gift tax is payable from the income or corpus of the property trans-
ferred in trust, as was the case in Estate of Sheaifer and Krause, then the interest "re-
served" by the transferor is in the corpus under the principle of Anderson v. Helvering
and Burnet v. Whitehouse, discussed in text accompanying notes 462 & 463 supra, be-
cause transferor's rights are not dependent solely on income. Accordingly, prior to dis-
charge of the gift tax by the transferee, the only income of the trust taxable to the
transferor should be that income allocable to an amount of corpus equal in value to the
gift tax liability, and this tax is imposed by section 673, which taxes to the grantor in-
come from a reserved interest in corpus. Section 677 has no application because the
transferor's rights are not dependent on income and the presence of income is a matter
of economic indifference to him. Therefore he does not receive "income" under section
677, despite the fact that it is, or may be, the source of payment of the gift tax. See
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U.S. 148 (1931).
Thus the transferor should not be taxed on the income earned by the entire trust corpus
prior to payment of the gift tax, as was done in Estate of Sheaffer and Krause, but only
on the income allocable to the "reserved" portion of the corpus.
On payment by the trust of the gift tax, as indicated in the text, there is a sale
of the transferor's interest. Also, if the trust has distributable net income allocable to
the trust distribution for the benefit of the transferor, the transferor will have further
ordinary income under section 662 (b) and a basis step-up for such amount, to be used
as basis offset on the exchange of his "reserved" interest for cancellation of his debt.
Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a) -2 (f) (3) (1956).
For a complete discussion of the multitude of problems lurking in this area, see
Del Cotto and Joyce, Taxation of the Trust Annuity: The Unitrust Under The Constitu-
tion and the Internal Revenue Code, 23 TAx L. REv. 325, 325-31 (1968).
478. See text accompanying notes 439-47 supra.
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event to the transferor.479 Although the Tax Court held against
the Commissioner even on that state of the facts, the Sixth Circuit
in Johnson accepted the Commissioner's argument as an alterna-
tive to the Crane analysis. In such circumstances, the gift tax paid
by the transferee is, under Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner,480 an amount realized by the transferor by way of debt can-
cellation income.
The Johnson-Turner conflict also affects the determination
of the basis of the transferee in the property received. Using a
composite of the Johnson-Turner facts-property worth $500,000,
in which the transferor has a basis of $10,000, transferred subject
to a gift tax liability of $200,000-under the Crane-Johnson reason-
ing the transferee's basis is the $200,000 cost (section 1012) plus
the addition for the gift tax paid (section 1015(d)). 81 It will be re-
called that this apparent duplication of the gift tax paid in the
transferee's basis was one of the reasons assigned by the Tax Court
in Turner for rejecting part sale treatment.4  This phenomenon,
however, is entirely due to the enactment of section 1015(d), which
was designed to implement the congressional view that the gift
tax paid should be treated as an additional "cost" of the donated
property.483 Section 1015(d) thus overlaps with section 1012 where
the donee pays the gift tax because, according to the Crane-John-
son rationale, such payment is in fact the cost of the property re-
ceived. Hence, in this situation section 1015(d) gives credit for the
same cost as does section 1012, and the duplication of cost in the
transferee's basis is a necessary consequence of both statutes giving
credit for the same "cost." The Turner reasoning on this point
fails to perceive that the duplication is mandated by statute and
in no way militates against a part sale result.
It should be noted, however, that Johnson does accept the
non-allocated basis approach of the part gift-part sale regulations,4 4
so that the transferor's gain in Johnson was $190,000 ($200,000
debt less full basis of $10,000) rather than the $196,000 that would
result from using an allocated basis approach (the basis offset would
be $4,000, two-fifths of the overall basis, because only two-fifths of
479. 49 T.C. at 357.
480. 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (1974).
481. See text accompanying notes 412-18 supra.
482. See text accompanying notes 446 & 447 supra.
483. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1958), 1958-3 C.B. 991.
484. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1 (e), 1.1015-4 (1957). These regulations are discussed
in text accompanying notes 401-08 supra.
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the property was sold). 85 Thus, the transferor is able to utilize the
$6,000 of basis allocable to the gift portion of the transfer against
the proceeds received for the portion of the property sold, thereby
reducing his taxable gain and depriving the transferee of that
amount as a carryover basis under section 1015(a).4s0
The Turner approach produces an even greater distortion
of the transferee's basis. Since the transferee has no "cost" under
the "net gift" approach of Turner, his basis will be only carry-
over (section 1015(a)) plus the increase for gift tax paid (section
1015(d)). Thus, his carryover basis should be $6,000 for the
$300,000 value of the property received by gift. The part gift-part
sale regulations would not seem to apply here, since under Turner
there has been no part sale. Accordingly, the transferor retains
$4,000 of his $10,000 basis in his "reserved" interest, and $6,000
of that basis passes to the transferee under section 1015(a) for the
gift of three-fifths of the property. The $200,000 gift tax paid will
be added to the carryover basis,4s 7 resulting in an overall basis to
the transferee of $206,000, as compared with the $400,000 basis
acquired under the Johnson approach.
V. AMOUNT REALIZED WHEN MORTGAGE EXCEEDS VALUE
OF ENCUMBERED PROPERTY
The general principle of Crane, that on a disposition of mort-
gaged property the amount realized includes the amount of the
mortgage because of the benefit attributable to relief from liability,
was hedged by a now famous dictum in footnote 37 of the opinion:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount
of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot
realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different
problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiv-
ing boot.4 88
485. See I.R.C. § 1011 (b), discussed in text accompanying notes 410 & 411 supra.
486. See text accompanying notes 399-418 supra.
487. For post-1976 gifts, the section 1015 (d) increase in basis is limited to the gift
tax allocable only to the appreciation in the property given. I.R.C. § 1015 (d) (6). In the
part gift-part sale situation presented by the Johnson facts, the amount of appreciation in
the gift portion of the property transferred should be considered to be $300,000 because
the transferor's basis was entirely used in the sale for $200,000. Hence the entire gift tax
of $200,000 is allocable to appreciation. But see section 1015 (b) (6) (B), which contains
a contrary implication. It appears to limit the appreciation in value to $294,000, the
excess of $300,000 over the transferor's allocable basis of $6,000. This limitation would
reduce the addition for gift tax to $194,200 (-94 x $200,000)
488. 331 U.S. at n.37.
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Thus, suppose one buys property having a fair market value of
$100,000 by taking it subject to an existing mortgage of $100,000.
He takes allowable depreciation deductions of $25,000, thereby
reducing his cost basis to $75,000, and then conveys the property,
subject to the $100,000 mortgage, when the property has a value
of only $75,000. If the transferor is not personally liable on the
mortgage, under footnote 37 his amount realized is only $75,000
since, according to the Crane dictum, he cannot benefit in any
amount greater than the value of the property subject to the mort-
gage. Accordingly, the $25,000 of benefit received by him from past
depreciation deductions for which he lacked any economic cost
would not be taxed as gain from an amount realized under section
1001(b).
This potential for tax avoidance has been explored by tax-
payers, but so far without success. In Parker v. Delaney,410 the tax-
payer abandoned mortgaged property to the mortgagee and re-
ceived no boot. His argument from footnote 37, that his amount
realized must be reduced because the outstanding mortgage ex-
ceeded the value of the property, was rejected by the First Circuit.
Noting the absence of boot, the court held that the Crane principle
nevertheless applies if the value of the property is at least equal
to the mortgage debt. Since there was no proof of such lesser value
of the property, footnote 37 was held not to apply.4 0 The same
argument was made by the taxpayer in Woodsam Associates, Inc.
v. Commissioner,9 1 involving a mortgage foreclosure sale. The
argument was later abandoned by the taxpayer and the Second
Circuit noted, "the petitioner has disclaimed reliance upon that
and, we think, advisedly so. Cf. Parker v. Delaney ....,,"402
In Parker v. Delaney and Woodsam Associates, Inc., the ap-
parent reluctance of both taxpayers and courts to push footnote 37
to the full extent of its logic may be explained, at least in part, by
the reduction-of-purchase-price doctrine. Thus, where mortgaged
property is conveyed back to a mortgagee-seller in full settlement
of a mortgage debt that exceeds the value of the property, the
courts are likely to find that there has been an agreement between
debtor and creditor to reduce the purchase price of the property.
Accordingly, there is a reduction in the mortgagor's amount real-
489. 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
490. 186 F.2d at 458.
491. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
492. Id. at 358 n.1.
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ized equal to the difference between the debt and the value of the
property, and a corresponding reduction in his adjusted basis for
the property. Thus in the preceding example, on conveyance of
the property back to the seller-mortgagee in discharge of the mort-
gage, the amount realized would be $75,000, but the transferor's
basis would be reduced to $50,000, resulting in a section 1001 gain
of $25,000, the amount of the past depreciation. This result is sup-
ported by Hirsch v. Commissioner,493 involving property that had
shrunk in value to $8,000 and which was encumbered by a purchase
money mortgage with an outstanding balance of $15,000. The
mortgage debt was settled by payment of $8,000 after the mort-
gagee refused to take the property itself in settlement. Because the
mortgagor was personally liable on the debt, the Commissioner
asserted there was $7,000 of debt-discharge income under the doc-
trine of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 494 "True," said the
Seventh Circuit, "this was a forgiveness of indebtedness, but, more
than that, it was in essence a reduction of purchase price" of
$7,000, with a corresponding basis reduction in the same amount. 95
The reduction-of-purchase-price response to footnote 37 is not
available, however, where the mortgagee is not the seller of the
burdened assets. In such case, if the mortgagor is solvent and is
personally liable on the mortgage, a conveyance of the mortgaged
property in full settlement of a mortgage debt greater in amount
than the value of the property produces debt-discharge income
under Kirby Lumber Co. Thus, in Denman Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Commissioner,4 6 discharge at a discount of a promissory note
secured by a mortgage on corporate assets, given to the United
States Government to secure a federal tax liability, was held to re-
sult in debt-discharge income. The application of the Hirsch doc-
493. 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
494. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
495. 115 F.2d at 658. Accord, Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1943); Helvering v. A.L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942); Ahrens Publishing
Co., 1 T.C. 345 (1942). See also Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934), where
satisfaction of a mortgage at a discount resulted in a reduction of basis rather than debt
discharge income because of lack of personal liability on the mortgage. This was so
although the property had not declined in value. The Treasury has ruled that such re-
duction in debt constitutes income where there is no decrease in the value of the
mortgaged property. I.T. 4018, 1950-2 C.B. 20, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 69-43,
1969-1 C.B. 310. For additional cases involving lack of personal liability, see Del Cotto,
Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects In
Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. Rxv. 69, 77 n.43 (1969). See genirally 2 MMRThNS,
LAw oF FEDERAL INcom TAXATION § 11.21 (1974 ed.).
496. 192 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1951), aff'g 14 T.C. 706 (1950).
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trine was specifically rejected by the Tax Court because the credi-
tor was not the seller of the encumbered assets and "in accepting
the compromise settlement was not in any way undertaking to re-
duce the purchase price of assets" acquired from another.407 Kirby
Lumber income was likewise found in Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth
Street Corp. v. Commissioner,4 8 involving a solvent mortgagor
having personal liability who had bought mortgage certificates at
a discount and had used them at face value to discharge the mort-
gage debt. The Hirsch doctrine was held to be limited to purchase-
money obligations that are compromised in negotiations with a
vendor-mortgagee, directly relating to the purchase price of the
property. It therefore did not reach the case where the debt was
held by someone other than the vendor.499 Therefore, there was
debt discharge income from satisfaction of a debt with property
having a value less than the face amount of the debt."'
The debt-discharge result of the above cases is a partial solu-
tion to the problems raised by footnote 37. Although the amount
realized on conveyance of property is limited to the value of the
property, the amount of the discount is taxed at ordinary income
rates under Kirby Lumber Co. In this manner, any depreciation
deductions in excess of economic investment are taxed. The solu-
tion is only partial, however, because it depends on the presence
of personal liability for the mortgage debt. Moreover, any resulting
debt-discharge income can be avoided if the debt discharge meets
the terms of section 108, although at the cost of a basis reduction
under section 1017. But, on a conveyance of mortgaged corporate
or business property, sections 108 and 1017 will yield the same
overall result as the reduction-of-purchase-price cases: a reduction
of amount realized with a corresponding reduction in basis, to pro-
duce exchange gain that will include the amount of past deprecia-
tion for which there was no economic cost.801
The challenge of footnote 37 is not completely raised, then,
unless (1) the mortgagor is not personally liable for the mortgage
debt, and (2) the purchase-price-reduction doctrine is avoided by
497. 14 T.C. 706, 715 (1950). But see Inter-City Television Film Corp., 43 T.C.
270 (1964) ; Sheraton Plaza Co., 39 T.C. 697 (1963).
498. 147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1944).
499. Id. at 456-57.
500. Id. at 457.
501. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1 (b) (5) (1956), which requires a basis reduction in




conveyance of the mortgaged property to one other than a vendor-
mortgagee. Both of these conditions were satisfied in Mendham
Corp.,5 0 2 where a non-recourse mortgage had resulted from a
borrowing on the value of the property subsequent to its acqui-
sition. Although part of the borrowed funds had been reinvested
in the property, a substantial part had been placed in a bank ac-
count. The property was eventually conveyed to the mortgagee by
the solvent mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding conducted when
the property had a value of $165,000 and the outstanding balance
of the mortgage debt was $325,000. The Commissioner found that
the amount realized on the foreclosure sale was the full $325,000
and computed taxable gain accordingly. The Tax Court agreed,
relying on Crane, but without any discussion of whether the
amount realized should be limited under footnote 37 to $165,000.
Similarly, in Lutz & Schramm Co. °,03 a non-purchase money
mortgage securing a mortgage debt of $300,000 had been satisfied
by conveyance to the mortgagee of the encumbered property, then
worth only $97,000. The full $300,000 face amount of the mort-
gage was included in the mortgagor's amount realized under sec-
tion 1001(b). Although this was a pre-Crane case, the Tax Court
noted the prior receipt of the mortgage loan of $300,000 as justifi-
cation for its holding. °4 But again, as in Mendham Corp., the prob-
lem raised by footnote 37 was not explored.
The Service has recently accepted the results of Mendham
Corp. and Lutz & Schramm Co. Revenue Ruling 76-111505 ad-
dressed a conveyance to a seller-mortgagee of property having a
value less than the amount of non-recourse debt encumbering it.
The ruling holds that the amount of debt is an amount realized
under section 1001. Although the ruling could have avoided the
whole issue raised by footnote 37 by relying on the reduction-of-
purchase-price doctrine, it chose instead to find an amount realized
equal to the full amount of the debt, regardless of the lesser fair
market value of the property. Still more recently, the Tax Court
itself has reaffirmed the rule of Mendham Corp. and Lutz &
Schramm Co., once again declining to resolve the footnote 37
issue.t
502. 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
503. 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
504. Id. at 689.
505. 1976-1 I.R.B. 12.
t Gavin S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977). Millar, on remand from the Third Circuit,
Millar v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 184 (1976), was decided after this article went to
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The reasoning in Mendham Corp., Lutz & Schramm, and
Revenue Ruling 76-111 does not support inclusion in the trans-
feror-mortgagor's amount realized under section 1001(b) of the
amount of non-recourse debt that exceeds the value of the encum-
bered property. Unquestionably, there has been realized a benefit
in the amount of such excess, but such benefit arises from past
depreciation of cost basis arising from the mortgage or from bor-
rowing on the value of the property. Both the depreciation and
the borrowing give the taxpayer untaxed cash that should in some
manner be included in his gross income. However, where the mort-
press. The case required the Tax Court directly to address the problem of what is the
amount realized on the foreclosure of a non-recourse mortgage greater in amount than
the value of the property securing it. Taxpayers had borrowed $500,000 from one
Jamison in return for non-recourse notes, payment of which was secured by the pledge
of shares of corporate stock owned by taxpayers. The borrowed funds were contributed
to the capital of the corporation, and the resulting basis acquired in the stock was
utilized by the shareholders to deduct the corporation's net operating losses under
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. When the corporation was on the verge of
bankruptcy, Jamison demanded payment on the notes and foreclosed on the debtors'
stock.
In a memorandum opinion, the Tax Court held that the debtors' amount realized
on the foreclosure sale included the full amount of the debt. 1975 T.C.M.(P-H)
75-542. Remanding on the issue of whether the Jamison advances were gifts or loans,
the Third Circuit was cognizant of the problem raised by footnote 37 of Crane, stating:
Since we have decided to remand this case, it is unnecessary for us to
address the petitioners' argument that Crane does not require the inclusion of
a discharged non-recourse obligation in the amount realized upon the disposi-
tion of property securing the same where, as here, the fair market value of
that property is not only less than the debt extinguished, but is, in fact,
zero. However, in view of the general importance of this issue to the tax bar
and the heavy emphasis placed on it by the parties . . . . we would expect
the Tax Court to directly address it if, upon remand, it determines the Jamison
advances constituted debt. Likewise, . . . we believe that some discussion of
petitioners' alternative contention concerning the so-called purchase money
exception to the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine would be appropriate.
540 F.2d at 187.
On remand, after finding that the advances were loans, the Tax Court reaffirmed
its original decision, holding that the amount realized on the foreclosure sale was the
amount of the debt despite the lower value of the stock surrendered, relying on its
prior decisions in Mendham Corp. and Lutz & Schramm Co. Footnote 37 was not men-
tioned, but the court did state its opinion that "the value of the stock was immaterial."
67 T.C. at 660. The court further stated that there was no reduction in the price of
property sold, and hence the purchase money exception to the cancellation of in-
debtedness doctrine did not apply. Id. at 661.
The Millar facts presented the classic footnote 37 problem: a non-recourse debt for
an amount which exceeds the value of the property securing it, and a disposition to
which the purchase-price-reduction doctrine is inapplicable. The Millar decision simply
follows the Tax Court's prior decisions, adding only that the value of the property
transferred is "immaterial." This supports the position taken by the I.R.S. in Revenue
Ruling 76-111. See text accompanying note 505 supra. Of course, the application of the
tax benefit rule to this situation was never reached by the Tax Court. See text accom-
panying notes 505-60 infra.
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gage can be satisfied only from the property, the excess amount is
not a benefit received because of relief'from the mortgage. There-
fore the excess should not be part of the amount realized from a
sale or other disposition of the property, since it is outside the
ambit of section 1001(b). And, absent personal liability for the
mortgage, the amount of such excess cannot be taxed as debt-
discharge income.
The appropriate remedy, therefore, would appear to lie in the
application of the tax benefit rule. The taxpayer has received the
benefit of the mortgage, either as cost basis giving him tax-free
cash through depreciation deductions or as a result of tax-free
borrowing on the value of the property. Therefore, transfer of the
property is the proper occasion to make him account for such past
tax benefit by including the excess of debt over property value in
his gross income as gain from past depreciation deductions or from
past tax-free borrowing.
Suppose, for example, that property worth $100,000 is ac-
quired by the taxpayer subject to a mortgage for $100,000 for
which he assumes no personal liability; that the allowable depre-
ciation to the taxpayer is $25,000; and that the property is disposed
of to a third-party who takes subject to the mortgage of $100,000
at a time when the undisputed value of the property is $90,000.
The amount realized on the transfer is $90,000, the only benefit
received by the transferor who had no personal liability on the
mortgage. Accordingly, $15,000 of gain will be realized on the
transfer. Should not $10,000, the balance of transferor's past de-
preciation, be includable as gross income under the tax benefit
rule? 05
The tax benefit rule is of administrative and judicial origin,
developed to deal with recovery of items that had been deducted
in a taxable year prior to the recovery, but had not resulted in a
reduction of taxable income. 0 7 There developed considerable con-
fusion in the courts, and a conflict between the Tax Court and the
Treasury Department, over the inclusion in income of such a re-
covery where the prior deduction had given no tax benefit °5 8 In
506. The issue would be the same if taxpayer had paid $10,000 on the mortgage
debt and later refinanced the mortgage to $100,000 in order to obtain a $10,000 loan on
the property. In effect, he has recovered his economic investment by the borrowing and
has $25,000 of depredation deductions supported by no economic investment.
507. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 129, 130-34 (1943).
508. See Plumb, supra note 507.
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1942, Congress stepped in to alleviate the confusion by enacting
the predecessor of section 111,1°0 which provides, in effect, that
gross income does not include a recovery of a bad debt, prior tax,
or delinquency amount the deduction of which did not result in
a tax benefit to the taxpayer. Why Congress limited section 111 to
these three items is unclear.5 10 In 1943, the Supreme Court rejected
an argument that the tax benefit rule was limited to the three
categories of recovery in section 111.'11 In Dobson v. Commis-
sioner,12 upholding the Tax Court's refusal to tax a recovery under
a state Blue Sky statute where the prior deduction resulted in no
tax benefit, the Court said Congress enacted section 111 to resolve
the conflict between the Tax Court and certain courts of appeals
in bad debt cases.5 13 "Congress," continued the Court, "would
hardly expect the courts to repeat the same error in another class
of cases .... "' The problem, noted the Court, was not limited
to recoveries of bad debts and losses, but "is also present in case
of refund of taxes or cancellation of expenses or interest previously
reported as accrued, adjustments of depreciation and depletion or
amortization, and other similar situations." ' Relying on Dobson,
the Treasury Regulations were amended in 1945 to apply the tax
benefit rule of section 111 to all items of recovery that gave no tax
benefit on deduction, with the exception of deductions for depre-
ciation, depletion and amortization. 1 6
The limitation of the Regulations-that the tax benefit rule of
section 111, as expanded by the regulations under Dobson, does not
apply to such items as amortization and depreciation-comports with
the statutory scheme. Section 1016(a)(2) requires that depreciation
deductions reduce basis to the extent of the amount "allowable,"
without regard to whether such deductions produce a tax benefit 1 7
Moreover, recoveries attributable to past depreciation deductions
509. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22 (b) (12), 56 Stat. 619 (now I.R.C. § 111).
510. See H.R. Rm. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1 J. SEID-
MAN, LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFIT TAX LAWS 1953-1939, at
1248-49 (1954).
511. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1943).
512. Id.
513. Id. at 506. See generally Plumb, supra note 507, at 133; Note, The Tax Benefit
Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure For the Inconsis-
tencies, 21 VAND. L. REv. 995, 1000 (1968).
514. 320 U.S. at 506.
515. Id. n.36.
516. T.D. 5454, 1945 C.B. 68 (now codified in Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (a) (1956)).
517. See I.R.C. § 1016 (a) (2). This section embodies a tax benefit principle for
"allowed" depreciation in excess of that which is "allowable."
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traditionally have been taxed as part of the amount realized in sale
or other disposition of the property. Between 1942 and 1963, such
depreciation recapture could be taxed as capital gain, generally
under the provisions of section 1231, despite the fact that the prior
depreciation deductions reduced ordinary income. Section 1245
was passed, effective in 1963, in order to tax such recapture as ordi-
nary income. 518 Section 1245 did not, however, reach recapture of
depreciation on real estate, because of fear of taxing market appre-
ciation in such property as ordinary income.5 19 When section 1250
was adopted in the next year to tax real estate depreciation recap-
ture, the factor of market appreciation was taken into account by
exempting from ordinary income treatment any depreciation up
to the depreciation allowable under the straight-line method for
property held more than one year.50 Furthermore, sections 1245
and 1250 require recapture of only the amount of depreciation
allowed if it is less than the amount allowable." 1
Thus, the statutory scheme is to tax recoveries of prior depre-
ciation deductions as ordinary income. Returning to the above
example, if property is transferred when it is worth $90,000 but
encumbered by a mortgage of $100,000 that gave rise to deprecia-
tion deductions of $25,000, will the $10,000 of past depreciation
that was not part of the amount realized be taxable under the
above statutes (disregarding, for the sake of simplification, the
limitations of section 1250 with respect to straight-line deprecia-
tion and applicable percentage)?5 22 Clearly not, since in all cases
the amount that is subject to the recapture provisions is the lower
of past depreciation or gain as computed under section 1001.rl
Therefore, the statutory recapture principles do not extend the
reach of section 1001(b) beyond the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred, $90,000. The maximum amount of past depre-
ciation subject to ordinary income tax under these sections thus
remains at $15,000. The question remains, therefore, whether the
518. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B.
405, 470-71; S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707,
801-02.
519. See H.R. RE. No. 1447, supra note 518, 1962-3 C.B. at 471.
520. I.R.C. § 1250(b) (1). See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), re-
printed in 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 125, 225-26; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2) G.B. 505, 636.
521. I.R.C. §§ 1245 (a) (2), 1250 (b) (3).
522. See I.R.C. §§ 1250 (a) (1) (C), (a) (2) (B).
523. See I.R.C. §8 1250 (a) (1) - (2), 1245 (a) (1) - (2); see also I.R.C. § 1252 (a) with
respect to dispositions of farmland.
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further $10,000 of past depreciation will be subject to tax under
the general principles of the judicially developed tax benefit rule
embodied in section 1.111 (a) of the Regulations.
The essential question is whether there has been a "recovery"
of any amount in excess of $15,000 of past depreciation deduc-
tions. And if there is no recovery of such excess on disposition of
the property, because there has been no receipt of money or other
benefit attributable to these excess deductions, should the excess
be taxable in any event on account of past benefit received?
These issues have been the subject of litigation in recent years,
primarily in the area of corporate taxation.5 24 Without attempting
to exhaust all of the corporate tax developments, this discussion
can profit from a brief review of the more pertinent authorities.
Nash v. United States"5 involved an accrual basis taxpayer that
had transferred its assets, including accounts receivable, to a con-
trolled corporation within the meaning of section 351. The Com-
missioner required the taxpayer to include in income the amount
of the bad debt reserve previously deducted under section 166(c)
with respect to the accounts receivable. The Commissioner relied
on the tax benefit rule, arguing that there had been a recovery of
an item of deduction that had produced a tax benefit in a prior
year.r 6 The Supreme Court held for the taxpayer, denying there
had been any "recovery" within the meaning of the tax benefit
rule, because taxpayer received stock equal to the net value of the
receivables (that is, net of the bad debt reserve) and so received
no benefit attributable to the past deduction. Since the accrual
basis taxpayer's adjusted basis in the receivables was equal to their
net value, this part of the holding seems simply to mean that there
was no gain to be taxed. The Court, also countered the Commis-
sioner's assertion that income arose with cessation of taxpayer's
"need" for the bad debt reserve, relying on the nonrecognition
provisions of section 351 to state that no gain should be recognized.
This seems to imply that section 351 overrides recognition of any
524. See generally O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition Of Income and the Overriding
Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27
TAx L. REv. 215 (1972); Note, Judicial Exceptions to Section 337: A Return to Court
Holding?, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 786 (1974).
525. 598 U.S. 1 (1970).
526. See Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 C.B. 139.
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tax benefit income present, a meaning that would considerably
narrow the holding of Nash.27
In Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 28 the Commis-
sioner again lost in an attempt to apply the tax benefit rule in
order to disallow deductions taken by a liquidated corporation for
the expense of planting a cotton crop and preparing land for the
raising of barley. The corporation's stock had been sold, and it was
liquidated to its new parent, under sections 332 and 334(b)(2),
prior to the harvesting of the cotton crop or the planting of the
barley crop. Thus, the selling shareholders had received the value
of the deducted expenses as part of the sales price of their stock,
and the purchaser acquired a stepped-up "cost" basis in the cor-
porate assets under section 334(b)(2). However, held the Ninth
Circuit, there was no recovery by the taxpayer corporation itself
of any of its previously deducted expenses and hence the tax bene-
fit rule did not apply.5 29
The Commissioner has had success in cases involving an un-
disputed recovery of the value of past-expensed items where the
question presented was whether the nonrecognition provisions of
section 337 precluded application of the tax benefit rule. In West
Seattle National Bank of Seattle v. Commissioner,"0 which con-
cerned a taxpayer that sold its accounts receivable at face value,
the Ninth Circuit held that gain from the recovery of the bad debt
reserve is not the kind of gain exempted by the provisions of sec-
tion 337, but rather is due to a faulty prediction that loss of value
would occur. When the prediction does not come to pass, the re-
covery is taxed as ordinary income "earned in the past which has
escaped taxation" because of the prior deduction. 3 Deductions
for depreciation were distinguished on the ground that they repre-
sent actual wear and tear.532
A like result occurred in Commissioner v. An'ders,533 where
amounts received in a section 337 sale of previously expensed
527. But see O'Hare, supra note 524, at 221; Citizen's Acceptance Corp. v. United
States, 462 F.2d 751 (Sd Cir. 1972). Citizen's Acceptance held that the recovery in a sec-
tion 337 sale of the entire amount of taxpayer's bad debt reserve resulted in income in
that amount. Nash was interpreted as holding there was no gain on the section 351 ex-
change, rather than holding that the provisions of a nonrecognition statute override the
tax benefit rule.
528. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
529. Id. at 839-40.
530. 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961).
531. Id. at 49.
532. Id.
533. 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969).
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linens were held to result in ordinary gain. The Tenth Circuit
relied upon the West Seattle National Bank case to find that sec-
tion 337 was subject to the tax benefit rule and, accordingly, that
the amount received for the expensed linens was not gain from the
sale of the linens, but rather a recoupment of the previous expense
deductions.34
In Anders, the taxpayer argued that the expense charges were
equivalent to depreciation, which is not subject to recapture under
the tax benefit rule. The taxpayer relied on Fribourg Navigation
Co. v. Commissioner,5 3 where the Supreme Court refused to
disallow depreciation deductions for the year an asset was sold,
though such depreciation was "recaptured" at capital gains rates.
Anders distinguished Fribourg Navigation on the same ground as
did West Seattle National Bank: depreciation allowances reflect
actual wear and tear, and there is no allowance for the full cost of
property on purchase as was allowed in the case of the linensY30
Fribourg Navigation itself also pointed out that gain might be the
result of market appreciation rather than recapture of past deduc-
tions for depreciation.5 37
The decisions in Anders and West Seattle National Bank
called attention to the basic purpose of section 337, which was to
give liquidating sales by a corporation equal treatment with non-
taxable (to the corporation) liquidations in kind under section
336, thus eliminating the double tax for pre-liquidation sales. 38
Reciting this purpose, the Treasury held in Revenue Ruling
74-396"' 9 that the tax benefit rule should apply to liquidations
under section 336 in order to assure that both section 337 (under
Anders) and section 336 are applied uniformly and without regard
to tax considerations.
The ruling addresses a case where X Corporation had fully
expensed at the time of purchase the cost of tools, dies and molds
having a useful life of one year or less, as allowed by section 1.162-3
of the Regulations. The stock of X Corporation was then purchased
534. Id. at 1287-89, followed in Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir.
1972); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Munter, 63 T.C.
663 (1975).
535. 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
536. 414 F.2d at 1288.
537. 383 U.S. at 286.
538. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in [1 9 54] U.S. COPE CONG.
AD. NEws 4896. See generally B. BITTER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOuE TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11.63, 11.64 (3d ed. 1971).
539. 1974-33 I.R.B. 10.
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by Y Corporation at a price in excess of the adjusted basis of X's
assets, and X was completely liquidated under section 332, Y re-
ceiving under section 334(b)(2) a basis in X's assets equal to the
cost to it of the X stock. Y allocated $75X of the purchase price
of the stock to the supplies, which amount did not exceed X's cost
therefor, and which had been deducted by X in the prior year
with full tax benefit. The ruling relies on Anders to hold that the
nonrecognition provision of section 336 did not protect X from
having $75X of tax benefit income on its liquidation. Since Anders
applied the tax benefit rule to section 337 sales, in light of the
legislative purpose of section 337, reasons the ruling, the tax benefit
rule also applies to a section 336 liquidation.
Without more, this reasoning appears to make the tail wag
the dog, since it is section 337 that is supposed to track section
336, and not vice versa. And there is considerable dispute as to
whether a sale under section 337, where the seller fully recovers
previously expensed cost up to the value of the assets sold, can be
so glibly transformed into a section 336 liquidating distribution,
where a corporation receives for the liquidated assets only its own
worthless stock.5 40 The ruling goes on, however, to state what is
apparently an alternative ground for its holding. For purposes of
the tax benefit rule, a "recovery" is defined as an event that is in-
consistent with a past deduction. Applying this rule to the facts,
the ruling states:
In the instant case, X's deductions in its prior taxable year for
the cost of incidental supplies were allowed under section 1.162-3
of the regulations on the assumption that the supplies would be
used although not necessarily entirely in the year of purchase.
However, because of the distribution of the supplies in the liquida-
tion, X was foreclosed from using all of the supplies, a situation
inconsistent with the reason for the prior deductions .... As such,
the prior deductions to the extent of 75x dollars allocated to the
supplies distributed in the liquidation are "recovered" for the pur-
pose of the tax benefit rule.541
Recognizing the conflict of this rule with Commissioner v. South
Lake Farms, Inc., the ruling also states:
In view of this position, the Internal Revenue Service considers
the interpretation of "recovery" in Commissioner v. South Lake
540. See Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963);
Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
541. 1974-33 I.R.B. 10.
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Farms, Inc.... to be erroneous. In that case the court concluded
that the tax-benefit rule did not apply to liquidations in which no
gain or loss is recognized to the liquidating corporation by virtue
of section 336. The court reasoned that since the liquidating cor-
poration did not receive or become entitled to receive money or
property equal to the amount previously spent and deducted, there
could be no "recovery."
Recovery, for purposes of the tax-benefit rule, however, does not
require that the taxpayer actually receive or become entitled to
receive money or property.542
This ruling clearly breaks new ground in its definition of
"recovery" for purposes of the tax benefit rule. It recently gained
support in Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc.,48 where, on
like facts, the Tax Court held that on a section 336 liquidation
the liquidating corporation has to include as income to the extent
of their fair market value the previously expensed cost of tires and
tubes. Nash v. United States was distinguished by the Tax Court
as a case in which there was no "recovery" because there was no
gain on the exchange of receivables for stock having a value equal
to the net value of the receivables. In Tennessee Carolina Trans-
portation, the Tax Court found a "recovery":
Service was permitted to expense the cost of the tires and tubes
which it purchased, on the assumption that their useful life would
be fully exhausted in its operations. Once Service had expensed
their cost, the tires and tubes were therefore deemed to have been
fully consumed in its operations for purposes of Federal income
taxation whatever their fair market value may have been. If, hav-
ing expensed the cost of the tires and tubes Service subsequently
treated them as property having a fair market value in a transac-
tion of consequence in the scheme of Federal income taxation, it
would therefore necessarily be deemed to have received tires and
tubes identical to them immediately prior to that transaction....
When Service was liquidated, among the property which it dis-
tributed to petitioner, its sole shareholder, were tires and tubes
having a fair market value of $36,394.67. Service had previously
expensed the cost of these items. It must therefore be deemed to
have received immediately prior to its liquidation, tires and tubes
equal in value to those which it distributed.
Service's receipt of tires and tubes which is deemed to have oc-
curred for purposes of Federal income taxation, was occasioned
by its distribution of property in liquidation. Section 336 provides
that a corporation shall not recognize gain or loss on the distribu-
542. Id.
543. 65 T.C. 440 (1975).
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don of property in liquidation. The receipt of the tires and tubes,
however, is an event of independent significance for purposes of
Federal income taxation and is therefore not subject to section 386.
We therefore hold that under the tax benefit rule Service had
to include in gross income on its liquidation the lesser of the fair
market value of the tires and tubes which it distributed or the
portion of their cost attributable to their useful life remaining at
the time of the distribution.544
Thus the Tax Court seems to view the distribution in liquidation
of the expensed supplies as involving a simultaneous receipt of
their value, giving rise to gain in the full amount of such value
because the corporation being liquidated has a zero adjusted basis
in them. Such reasoning is appropriately labeled a "fiction" by
Judge Tannenwald, who, in dissent, pointed out that in reality
the only thing received on the liquidating distribution was a re-
turn of the corporation's own stock, the value of which was nil.5 "
The holding of the majority is better supported by the cases it re-
lies on-Anders and its progeny. Although these cases involved
sales under section 337, their reasoning is basically that the gain
does not arise from any "recovery" on the sale of the previously
expensed assets. The tax benefit principle recaptures income offset
by a previous expense that in retrospect turns out to have been an
expense that was not incurred in the taxpayer's business. This re-
capture of the past expense in turn restores to the property its
original basis, offsetting any gain on the section 337 sale.Y46 Thus,
the sale is not necessary to the application of the tax benefit rule
except as it marks the end of taxpayer's need for prior expense
deductions, an occasion that is similarly identified by a section 336
liquidating distribution. There is no need, therefore, to find a
"recovery"; it is sufficient that a prior tax benefit was legitimately
received in anticipation of the property being fully used in the
taxpayer's business and that the property was not so used.
A similar analysis can be applied to the hypothetical taxpayer
who, on the sale of mortgaged property, is taxed on only $15,000
of his $25,000 depreciation deductions. The $10,000 of past depre-
ciation not recaptured as gain from the sale can be taxed because
it gave rise to tax benefit attributable to receipt of "advance credit"
544. Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted).
545. Id. at 450.
546. See Spitalny v. United States, 480 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v.
Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969); West Seattle Nat'l Bank of Seattle v. Commis-
sioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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for payment of the $100,000 mortgage and the consequent inclu-
sion of the mortgage in basis for depreciation. When the prop-
erty is disposed of, it becomes clear that the transferor will not
pay the amount of the mortgage in excess of his adjusted basis,
which amount supported previous depreciation deductions, and
therefore the prior tax benefit should be recaptured by the tax
benefit rule. Similar reasoning applies if the mortgage secures a
borrowing by taxpayer on any appreciation in the property. When
on conveyance of the property it becomes clear that the borrowing
will not be repaid, the tax benefit received from the prior tax-free
borrowing should be recaptured even though it does not arise from
the sale of property whose value has fallen below the amount of
a non-recourse mortgage.
This result is, of course, both disputable and disputed. 48
Nash is a major obstacle because it can be interpreted as requiring
a recovery in the year of sale. It can be distinguished, however, on
the ground that the section 351 transfer of the receivables would
give the transferee corporation a carryover basis in the receivables
equal to their net value 49 so that the income benefit received by
transferor's bad debt reserve deduction was subject to tax upon
recovery by the transferee corporation. Commissioner v. South
Lake Farms, Inc. is not, however, as readily distinguishable, since
the transferee acquired a fair market value basis in the transferred
assets and would not recover the past deductions of the transferor
through use or resale of the assets. But the viability of this case is
in doubt since it is still not acceptable to the Treasury50 and has
been questioned by the Tax Court.5 '
A further apparent obstacle to a tax benefit recapture of past
depreciation deductions is the notion that the tax benefit rule does
not apply to recovery of past deductions for depreciation. This rule
is stated in section 1.111-1(a) of the Regulations5 2 and is implied
in the detailed statutory scheme for taxing such recoveries, espe-
547. See Manual D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340, 352 (1966).
548. See the lengthy and well reasoned dissenting opinion of Judge Tannenwald
in Tennessee Carolina Transp. Co., 65 T.C. 440, 449 (1975).
549. I.R.C. § 362 (a).
550. Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106. The Commissioner had acquiesced in South
Lake Farms, Inc., see 1975-1 C.B. 2, but withdrew the acquiescence in Rev. Rul. 77-67,
1977-13 I.R.B. 6.
551. Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). But see 65 T.C. at 449 (Tannenwald,
J., dissenting).
552. See text accompanying notes 511-16 supra.
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cially sections 1281, 1245 and 1250.153 In addition, this principle
was accepted by the courts in West Seattle National Bank and
Anders."" Yet these cases were able to avoid the issue by distin-
guishing depreciation deductions from expense deductions, sug-
gesting that recapture of past depreciation deductions requires a
"recovery" within the meaning of the statutory scheme. In Ten-
nessee Carolina Transportation, Inc., the Tax Court was explicit:
"Our holding pertains solely to the distribution in liquidation of
property whose cost has been previously expensed. We point this
out to preclude inapposite analogies to distribution in liquidation
of fully depreciated property."55 If the property expensed in Ten-
nessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. had been depreciable prop-
erty, and hence subject to the provisions of section 1245, any appli-
cation of the common law tax benefit rule to such property would
indeed be inapposite, as well as unnecessary, since section 1245(a)
would have recaptured the past depreciation, up to the fair market
value of the property, on the liquidating distribution. 56 However,
the property involved in these expense cases was not mortgaged
property whose fair market value had fallen below the amount of
the mortgage. In the latter case, the statutory depreciation recap-
ture provisions simply were not designed to deal with the total of
past depreciation deductions, since they limit recapture to the ex-
cess of the property's fair market value (or amount realized) over
adjusted basis. Thus, where, as in our example, value falls below
the amount of the mortgage, there is no statutory scheme for re-
capture of depreciation beyond fair market value. Whether this is
an unintended gap in the statutory scheme or is present by design
is difficult to determine. Certainly Congress may have been aware
of the exact problem in the past, as evidenced by its enactment of
section 311(c) in 1954. The thrust of this provision is that on a
non-liquidating transfer of mortgaged property, gain beyond the
excess of fair market value over adjusted basis is not recognized to
a corporate transferor, unless the liability is assumed by the share-
553. See text accompanying notes 518-21 supra.
554. See text accompanying notes 530-50 supra.
555. 65 T.C. at 448 n.7. See also Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975) (Tan-
nenwald, J., concurring) ("Depreciation has been and continues to be sui generis and
the tension between the recovery of amounts previously deducted and the tax benefit rule
has not been considered of such character as to cause that rule to prevail.").
556. Both section 1245 and section 1250 override the nonrecognition principle of
section 336 by making any dsposition a taxable event if it is not within the exceptions
of sections 1245 (b) and 1250 (d). A liquidation under sections 332 and 334 (b) (2) is
not such an exception. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-1 (c) (2) (1965); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1250-1 (c) (2) (1971).
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holder. The committee reports do not, however, discuss this aspect
of section 311(c), 557 although it appears to derive directly from
footnote 37 of Crane. On the other hand, no such limitation was
provided for gain from the transfer of mortgaged property subject
to section 357(c), even though that provision was enacted at the
same time as section 311(c). Again, the committee reports do not
allude to the problem of a mortgage that exceeds the fair market
value of the property transferred. 58 Thus, it is difficult to know
whether this problem has been clearly perceived by Congress;
arguably, therefore, the common law tax benefit rule can be used
to fill the void in the statutory scheme for taxing recapture of past
benefits derived from transfer of mortgaged property." 9
Sections 1245 and 1250 do, however, support the proposition
that, at least within the limits of the fair market value of the prop-
erty, the tax benefit rule is not dependent upon a "recovery." Both
sections apply the recapture principle to dispositions, such as sec-
tion 336 liquidations, in which the transferor receives no consid-
eration for the property.56
VI. DEFERRED PAYMENT SALES
A. Introduction
When property is conveyed in exchange for the buyer's
promise to make deferred payments on the purchase price, the
question arises as to how to interpret the language of section
1001(b), that the amount realized includes "the fair market value
of property (other than money) received." Although the statutory
language appears straightforward and unambiguous, over the years
there has been substantial litigation over its meaning. One basic
problem is its application to different methods of accounting. As
to a cash basis taxpayer, for example, must the buyer's promise be
in such form as to be the "equivalent of cash," or is "fair market
value" for purposes of section 1001(b) to be determined without
regard to cash-equivalency notions? Another issue concerns the
557. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4228; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4884, 4885.
558. H.R. Re. No. 1337, supra note 557, at [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4267; S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 557, at [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4908.
559. See Adams, Exploring The Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv. 159, 169-70 (1966).
560. See note 556 supra.
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effect on determination of fair market value of a buyer making
his promise of payments contingent on the happening of some fu-
ture event, such as the buyer making profits. 56 '
B. The Legislative History of Section 1001(b)
Much of the confusion surrounding the meaning of section
1001(b) is removed by an examination of its legislative history. It
originated as section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which
provided that: "When property is exchanged for other property,
the property received in the exchange shall ... be treated as the
equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if
any . . ",62 The Treasury regulation promulgated under this
section seriously restricted its meaning by providing that the
property received would not be considered the equivalent of cash
unless it was readily marketable.563 Section 202(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1921m" adopted the position of this regulation by provid-
ing that on a property-for-property exchange, "no gain or loss shall
be recognized unless the property received in the exchange has a
readily realizable market value."'565 The committee reports indi-
cate that the 1921 change was intended to modify the "presump-
tion in favor of taxation" created by section 202(b) of the 1918
Act."66 The Treasury regulations interpreted this section by pro-
viding that "[p]roperty has a readily realizable market value
if it can be readily converted into an amount of cash or its equiva-
lent substantially equal to the fair value of the property."'567 Con-
gress soon did a turnabout, however, when it enacted section
202(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924,568 replacing the 1921 language
with the language that now appears in section 1001(b). The
Senate Finance Committee Report explains the 1924 change as
follows:
561. See generally Haley, The Application of Section 1001 to Deferred Payment
Sales of Property, 28 TAx LAW. 303 (1975); Krane, Income of the Cash Basis Tax-
payer: Tax Now Or Later?, 46 TAxEs 845 (1968); Note, "Open" Transactions in Federal
Income Taxation, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 62 (1969).
562. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202 (b), 43 Stat. 255 (now I.R.C. § 1001 (b)).
563. Treas. Reg. 45, § 1563 (1919). See Haley, supra note 561, at 304-05.
564. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202 (c), 42 Stat. 230.
565. See J. SEIDMAN, LiGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAws 1938-1961,
at 789 (1938).
566. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 12 (1921), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra note 565, at 790-91.
567. Treas. Reg. 62, § 1564 (1921); see Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524
F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1975); Haley, supra note 561, at 305.
568. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202 (c), 43 Stat. 255 (now I.R.C. § 1001 (b)).
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Great difficulty has been experienced in administering this provi-
sion. The question whether, in a given case, the property received
in exchange has a readily realizable market value is a most difficult
one, and the rulings on this question in given cases have been far
from satisfactory. Furthermore, the construction placed upon the
term by the department has restricted it to such an extent that the
limitation contained therein has been applied in comparatively few
cases. The provision can not be applied with accuracy or with
consistency.569
The House Report stated also that the 1924 change "embodies in
the law what is the correct construction of the existing law; that
is, that where income is realized in the form of property, the
measure of the income is the fair market value of the property at
the date of its receipt. '570
C. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation of Section 1001(b)
The Treasury regulations interpreting section 1001(b) pro-
vide that "[tihe fair market value of property is a question of fact,
but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be con-
sidered to have no fair market value."571 This provision is in gen-
eral accord with the intent of the 1924 Act, especially in not mak-
ing fair market value dependent upon receipt of cash or its equiva-
lent. Nevertheless, some courts, especially the Tax Court, have
been adamant in construing section 1001(b) as a "cash equivalent"
statute. Nina J. Ennis57" 2 involved a sale of real estate for a cash
down payment and the buyer's promise in a standard form land
contract to make deferred payments. The contract, although
assignable, was non-negotiable in form. Relying on a line of its
decisions going back to 1927, Ta the Tax Court held that the con-
tractual obligation was not part of the amount realized on the
sale, since it was not the equivalent of cash. For an obligation to
be the equivalent of cash, said the court, "the requirement has
always been that the obligation, like money, be freely and easily
569. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN,
supra note 565, at 687.
570. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN,
supra note 565, at 686.
571. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a) (1957). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (a) (2)
(1958), which contains a similar provision for deferred payment sales of property.
572. 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
573. Id. at 469, 470. See generally Haley, supra note 561, at 305-06; 2 MERTmNS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION §§ 11.05-.08 (1974 ed.).
[Vol. 26
PART I-AMOUNT REALIZED
negotiable so that it readily passes from hand to hand in com-
merce." '574 The dissent pointed out that a land contract "is a form
of .security interest similar to a mortgage and that both contracts
and mortgages are regularly sold and traded. ' 575 The same argu-
ment was made by the Commissioner when the identical contract
was presented to the Tax Court in Estate of Clarence W. Ennis.57'
The Commissioner further argued that the contract had a value
equal to 75 percent of the principal amount due. There was
testimony on behalf of the taxpayer, however, that the contract
was not saleable for more than 50 percent of its face value. The
Tax Court followed its holding in Nina J. Ennis, reiterating the
requirement of negotiability. The court did add that the contract
had no ascertainable fair market value.577
The Tax Court's requirement of negotiability seemed to have
ended in 1959 with its decision in Frank Cowden, Sr.,57 when it
required a cash basis taxpayer to include as income marketable
deferred obligations at their face amount less a four percent dis-
count. Although the obligations were not negotiable, they were
frequently traded at a normal discount rate. The Fifth Circuit
pointedly rejected the taxpayer's reliance on negotiability, stating
that such a test "is as unrealistic as it is formalistic, ' 57 9 and
continued:
We are convinced that if a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is
unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of a
kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a dis-
count not substantially greater than the generally prevailing pre-
mium for the use of money, such promise is the equivalent of cash
and taxable in like manner as cash .... 580
Thus the Fifth Circuit saw no requirement of negotiability,
but nevertheless appeared to require "cash equivalency." The Tax
Court, however, returned to negotiability as an essential ingre-
dient of cash equivalency. In Western Oaks Building Corp., s
574. 17 T.C. at 470.
575. Id. at 470-71.
576. 23 T.C. 799 (1955).
577. Id. at 802.
578. 32 T.C. 853 (1959), rev'd and remanded, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961), on
remand, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134 (1961). Accord, Haimovitz Realty Corp., 15 T.C.M.
(CCI) 85 (1956).
579. 289 F.2d at 24.
580. Id.
581. 49 T.C. 365 (1968).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
both cash and accrual method taxpayers had sold homes for
a cash down payment plus restricted savings accounts from which
the seller could withdraw one hundred dollars for every two
hundred dollars paid on the mortgage loan. The Tax Court
required the accrual method taxpayers to include as part of the
amount realized from the sales the face amount of the savings
accounts, analogizing such accounts to a note of the purchaser. 8 2
The cash method sellers, on the other hand, were found to have
no amount realized from the value of the savings accounts. The
court applied the rule of Nina J. Ennis, that the right to future pay-
ments was not, " ' like money, . . . freely and easily negotiable.' "3683
The Tax Court seemed to retreat from this position in Estate of
Lloyd G. Bell."s Decedent and his wife had transferred stock in
closely held corporations to their children in return for a promise
to pay them $1,000 a month for as long as either of the parents
should live. As security for the promise, the stock was placed in
escrow, and the agreement provided for a cognovit judgment
against the transferees in the event of default. The Tax Court
held that the transferors' investment in the contract was, under
section 72, the fair market value of the stock exchanged for the
annuity. The court went on to find that the transferors had sold
582. Id. at 372. In First Savings & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474 (1963), the Tax
Court stated that the face amount of an unconditional right to receive money must
be treated by an accrual method taxpayer as money received in the face amount of the
right. Id. at 487. The source of this rule is Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,
292 U.S. 182 (1934), where, on the sale of inventory for the buyer's promise to pay, an
accrual basis taxpayer was required to return as income the face amount of the promise,
even though in the same year the buyer was in financial straits. This rule was applied
to casual sales of non-inventory personal property by an accrual basis taxpayer in George
L. Castner, 30 T.C. 1061 (1958). For a full discussion of the treatment of accrual method
taxpayers under § 1001 (b), see 2 MaRTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11.05,
at 11-10 (1974 ed.); Haley, supra note 561, at 317-21; Stewart, Private Annuities-Revenue
Ruling 69-74 Partially Repudiated, Sub Silentio, by Treasury Regulation § 1.1011.2(c),
Example (8), 24 MERCFR L. REv. 585, 596-97 (1973).
583. 49 T.C. at 377. See Joseph Marcello, Jr., 43 T.C. 168, 180-81 (1964), where
promissory notes received on a sale of property were held to be part of the amount
realized to the extent of one-third of their face amount, distinguishing Nina J. Ennis
because the notes were negotiable in form. But see Joan E. Heller Trust, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 16683 (1965), where the Tax Court included non-negotiable contract rights to
deferred payments in amount realized at 50 percent of face value, rejecting the argu-
ment of taxpayers that a finding of fair market value under section 1001 (b) was con-
ditioned on negotiability. This decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 382 F.2d 675
(9th Cir. 1967). See also McCormac v. United States, 424 F.2d 607 (Ct. Cl. 1970),
where a purchase price payable from future earnings was held to have an ascertainable
fair market value, with no discussion of the cash equivalent doctrine.
584. 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
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a portion of the stock equal in value to the annuity,5 5 and that
such value was an amount realized in the year of the transfer.
The uniform holdings of prior cases, which did not regard an
individual's promise to pay a private annuity as an amount
realized,8 16 were distinguished as involving unsecured promises.81
The Tax Court also noted: "It would be manifestly inconsistent
to find that the annuity contract had a fair market value for pur-
poses of determining a taxpayer's cost or investment in the con-
tract under section 72(c), and yet to hold it had no determinable
value for purposes of section 1001.''51s Thus the Tax Court
equated actuarial value with ascertainable fair market value under
section 1001(b) although there was no evidence that the annuity
was in any way marketable, and if it was, at what rate of discount.
Also, as noted by Judge Simpson's dissent, such a holding ignored
the speculative life span of the annuitant and was in direct con-
flict with such cases as Nina J. Ennis, which required ready trans-
ferability in commerce.5 19
Six weeks after Bell's Estate, the Tax Court decided Warren
Jones Co., 90 which involved a taxpayer who sold an apartment
building for a total price of $153,000, receiving a cash down
payment of $20,000 plus a contractual promise to pay the balance
of $133,000 at the rate of $1,000 a month, with interest at 8 per-
cent on the declining balance. On full payment, the seller was to
deed the property to the buyer. The contract was non-negotiable
but freely assignable. The taxpayer reported the transaction under
the cost-recovery method of Nina J. Ennis and allocated the first
payments received to recovery of basis. The Commissioner con-
tended that the contract had an ascertainable fair market value,
was readily marketable, and was the equivalent of cash.
The Tax Court found that the contract was of a type regu-
larly marketed, and could have been sold for $117,980, an 11 per-
cent discount, subject to escrowing $41,000 of the proceeds as
security for the first $41,000 of payments due under the contract.
585. Determined pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2 (c) (1) (iii) (b) (3) (1957), which
invokes the valuation tables of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (f) (1958). See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-10 (f) (1970) for current tables.
586. Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949); Hill's Estate
v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); Frank C. Deering, 40 B.TA. 984 (1939);
J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
587. 60 T.C. at 475.
588. Id. at 476.
589. Id. at 476-78.
590. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Therefore, the net marketable value of the contract was $76,980.
Such a contract, the Tax Court noted, perhaps had no "fair mar-
ket value," because no one would willingly sell the contract at
such a high discount; nor was the contract "readily marketable,"
since the ease of marketability depended upon the "cheap selling
price."'591 Nor was the contract the "equivalent of cash":"9 2
Certainly respondent cannot treat an evidence of indebtedness as
the equivalent of cash simply because it can be sold at a small
fraction of its face value. Cf. Donald C. MacDonald .... In this
case, in round numbers, the results of respondent's position (ab-
sent an installment election) would be as follows: (1) Petitioner
would have to report all the gain in the year the contract was
made, and thus pay the tax before receiving the deferred payments
on the contract; (2) it would not have the deferred payments and,
if forced to sell the contract to pay the tax, it would also not have
access to the $41,000 set aside in the savings account (or escrow
account); (3) most importantly, the amount of petitioner's capital
gain resulting from this transaction would be permanently limited
to the difference between its basis ($62,000) and the "amount
realized" ($76,000) as determined by respondent; and additional
amounts received, as much as the difference between $76,000 and
$153,000, would be taxed as ordinary income. Since the transaction
would be closed in the year the property was sold, any additional
amounts would not be received in connection with the sale or ex-
change of a capital asset. Yet if the petitioner had eschewed the
deferred-payment sale and sold the property for a lump sum, its
capital gain would have amounted to the difference between basis
and at least $117,000 (allowing the buyer a very large price reduc-
tion) and it would have avoided having any ordinary income.5 93
The court then went on to reiterate the test set forth by the Fifth
Circuit in Cowden v. Commissioner,94 which held that for a con-
tract to be equivalent to cash, it must be marketable at a discount
"not substantially greater than the generally prevailing premium
for the use of money."5 5
The majority opinion elicited four dissents. Judge Quealy
rejected outright the cash equivalence test and called for applica-
tion of section 1001(b) according to its terms-that a contract
with an ascertainable fair market value is an amount realized in
591. 60 T.C. 668 n.3.
592. Id. at 668.
593. Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
594. See text accompanying note 580 supra.
595. 60 T.C. at 668.
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the amount of such value. 96 Judge Tannenwald viewed the
amount of the discount as irrelevant in view of the ready market-
ability of the contract:
To me, there are several elements to be taken into account in
determining whether a transaction should be considered as being
"open" or "closed," i.e., whether a taxpayer should be entitled to
use the deferred-payment or cost-recovery method of reporting in-
come therefrom. Among these, the "marketability" of the property
involved is important, albeit not conclusive. In using this word, I
do not mean that it is enough if the facts show that the property
could be sold to a third party .... Rather, marketability implies
a recognizable group of prospective buyers so -that it can be said
that the property is of a type that "commonly change[s] hands in
commerce." . . . In the usual case, a determination that the prop-
erty has a fair market value will be determinative of its market-
ability. But this is not always the case, e.g., where property is ex-
changed for an annuity. . . . In this case, however, there is no
need to dwell upon any distinction between fair market value and
marketability because the facts clearly reveal that there was a
market in the Seattle area for the obligations of the purchasers
which the petitioner received. Indeed, I have great difficulty in
reconciling the majority decision herein that the transaction re-
mained "open," which essentially rests on a finding of no fair
market value in spite of evidence of marketability, with this
Court's very recent decision in Bell that 'the transaction therein
was "closed" because the contract had a fair market value even
though the evidence indicated that it was not marketable.
That the obligations of the purchasers were not evidenced by a
note or mortgage or by a negotiable instrument or that they could
be sold only at a substantial discount does not require a decision
in petitioner's favor. These are simply elements which enter into
a determination of marketability .... Particularly with reference
to the discount element, the majority decision, in my opinion,
escalates one guideline out of several into a governing criterion.
In so doing, it ignores prior decisions of this Court where the
presence of a substantial discount did not preclude a finding that
the obligations involved were marketable. 597
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court was reversed
and the undisputed fair market value of the contract, $76,980,
was held to be property under section 1001(b). 98 The court of
appeals relied mainly on the legislative history of section 1001(b),
as outlined above, suggesting that the Tax Court had applied the
596. Id. at 673-74.
597. Id. at 671-72 (citations omitted).
598. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1975).
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"readily realizable market value" test of the 1921 Revenue Act, a
test which the Ninth Circuit thought had been discarded and criti-
cized by Congress with the enactment of the present language of sec-
tion 1001 (b) in the 1924 Revenue Act 00 Moreover, the court found
that the provisions of section 453 (installment method of report-
ing) were enacted specifically to provide relief for the inclusion
under section 1001(b) of the fair market value of deferred pay-
ments. This was "persuasive evidence" that section 1001(b) means
what it says.600 Also, the Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ment that property is not within section 1001(b) unless it is of the
type described in section 453(b)(3) (highly liquid debt instru-
ments). Such a construction of section 1001(b), said the court,
would substantially nullify section 453 for cash basis taxpayers,
who would have no amount realized for the value of the contract
and could use a cost-recovery (open-transaction) method of report-
ing without having to elect installment reporting under section
453.601 The court also reconciled its holding with Cowden's
cash-equivalency definition by finding that in that case the Fifth
Circuit used the language adopted by the Tax Court in Warren
Jones Co. principally as a description of the obligation involved
in Cowden, rather than as a limitation on section 1001(b)."02
Under the Tax Court's holding in Warren Jones Co., the
taxpayer was allowed to treat the transaction as "open" under the
doctrine of Burnet v. Logan.10 Thus the taxpayer's reporting of
gain from the sale was deferred until his actual receipts on the
principal amount due under the contract exceeded his adjusted
basis in the property sold.604 According to the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, the fair market value of the contract was an amount realized
in the year of the sale, and gain was reportable prior to the receipt
of payments under the contract.605 Any principal amounts eventu-
599. 524 F.2d at 791-92.
600. Id. at 792-93.
601. Id. at 793.
602. Id. at 794 n.9.
603. See text accompanying notes 607-09 infra.
604. 60 T.C. at 665-66, 670. Since the taxpayer also received stated interest of
8 percent on the declining principal balance, there would be no amount taxable as
"unstated interest" under section 483. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (d) (2) (1975).
605. The amount realized was $76,980, which exceeded taxpayer's unadjusted
basis of $62,000. 60 T.C. at 664, 667-68. The taxpayer made an alternative election of
installment reporting, however, so as to obtain the deferral benefits of section 453.
See 524 F.2d at 794.
If the gain had been recognized in the year of sale, taxpayer's basis in the con-
tract (the amount realized on the sale) would have been an offset against future
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ally collected in excess of the amount realized on the sale would
not be exchange gain since the transaction was closed in the year
of sale and such excess amounts would not arise from the sale."0 8
VII. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS As AMOUNT REALIZED:
THE RULE OF Burnet v. Logan
Burnet v. Logan6 0 7 involved a taxpayer who had sold shares
of corporate stock in 1916 for a specified amount of cash and the
right to a royalty of 60 cents for each ton mined from an iron ore
mine owned by a subsidiary of the buyer. The Commissioner con-
tended that the obligation to pay 60 cents a ton had an ascertain-
able fair market value, and that this value was an amount realized
in the year of the sale. Indeed, part of the right to royalties had
been valued for estate tax purposes in the estate of taxpayer's
mother, who died in 1917, and left part of her own royalty rights
to the taxpayer. The tax years before the Court were 1918, 1919
and 1920. Prior to 1921, the total of the cash payments received
principal payments received until such basis was recovered. Because of the 8 percent
stated interest, presumably none of the principal payments would have been allocated
to interest. See Treas. Reg § 1.483-1 (d) (2) (1975). For a contrary rule where there is
unstated interest present in the form of discount income, see Ehlers v. Vinal, 382 F.2d
58 (8th Cir. 1967); General Ins. Agency, Inc., 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 656 (1967), afl'd,
401 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1968), where a ratable portion of unstated interest was allocated to
payments received. But cf. Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1961); Wingate E.
Underhill, 45 T.C. 489 (1966) (refusing to tax unstated interest where recovery of
basis and a major portion of the interest is speculative). See generally Midgley,
Federal Income Taxation of Private Annuitants, 40 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 679, 684-87
(1972); Stewart, Private Annuities-Revenue Ruling 69-74 Partially Repudiated, Sub
Silentio, by Treasury Regulation § 1-1011-2(c), Example (8), 24 MERCER L. REv. 585,
607-11 (1973).
606. 60 T.C. at 668. See text accompanying notes 607-30 infra. However, it is difficult
to understand why the $41,000 of value attributable to the amount "escrowed" as
security against the buyer's failing to pay the first $41,000 due under the contract
should be viewed by the Tax Court as ordinary income when it is eventually received.
See 60 T.C. at 668. Arguably, this amount should be viewed as arising from the sale.
Although excluded from amount realized in the year of sale because it was contingent
on future events, it nevertheless arises from the sale under the open-transaction
doctrine of Burnet v. Logan. It is not a bar to open-end reporting of a contingent
sum that there has also been received a sum capable of valuation as an amount realized
in the year of sale. See Steen v. United States, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975), which
held that the contingent sum was taxable in the year of receipt as capital gain arising from
the sale of a capital asset under the open-transaction doctrine of Burnet v. Logan,
and that the discounted value of the non-contingent installment payments was an
amount realized in the prior year of sale. Id. at 1404-05. See also Gralapp v. United States,
458 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972), where the Commissioner so treated a like transaction
and was upheld, although the court was deciding another issue (the availability of
section 453 installment reporting was denied for an "open-end" transaction) .
607. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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by the taxpayer was less than her basis in the shares sold and in
the interest acquired from her mother.
The Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals-that it was impossible to value
the right to royalties with fair certainty, and that taxpayer was
entitled to a return of her basis before any gain could be recog-
nized. 08 The Court continued:
Nor does the situation demand that an effort be made to place
according to the best available data some approximate value upon
the contract for future payments. This probably was necessary in
order to assess the mother's estate. As annual payments on account
of extracted ore come in they can be readily apportioned first as
return of capital and later as profits. The liability for income tax
ultimately can be fairly determined without resort to mere esti-
mates, assumptions and speculation. When the profit, if any, is
actually realized, the taxpayer will be required to respond. The
consideration for the sale was $2,200,000.00 in cash and the promise
of future money payments wholly contingent upon facts and cir-
cumstances not possible to fortell with anything like fair certainty.
The promise was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no
ascertainable fair market value. The transaction was not a closed
one. Respondent might never recoup her capital investment from
payments only conditionally promised. Prior to 1921 all receipts
from the sale of her shares amounted to less than their value on
March 1, 1913. She properly demanded the return of her capital
investment before assessment of any taxable profit based on con-
jecture.609
Under the open-transaction doctrine of Burnet v. Logan,
how are the cash proceeds received to be taxed after basis has been
fully recovered? In Commissioner v. Carter 10 the shareholder of
a corporation received a liquidating distribution of the corporate
assets, including rights to oil brokerage contracts that had no
ascertainable fair market value. The value of other assets received
exceeded her basis in her stock, and such excess had been reported
as capital gain. The Commissioner contended that the gain from
commissions received under the contracts in later years was ordi-
nary income, analogous to interest or rent. 1' The Second Circuit
608. Id. at 412.
609. Id. at 412-13. This statement of the Court is now subject to the provisions
of section 483, which taxes as unstated interest a portion of each payment received.
See I.R.C. § 483 (d); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1 (e) (1)- (2), and (3), Ex. (5) (1966).
610. 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
611. Id. at 913.
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rejected this argument and expanded the principle of Burnet v.
Logan, holding that the gain arose from the prior sale or exchange
and hence was capital gain. 612
If the brokerage contracts in Carter were found to have an
ascertainable fair market value on receipt, that value would have
been an amount realized in the year the stock was sold, and the
transaction would have been closed. The seller's basis in his claim
would be the value included as the amount realized on the sale;
payments thereafter received in excess of such value would be
ordinary income, since such payments would not arise from the
"closed" sale, but rather from collection of the claim.613
The significant tax differences arising from the distinction
between open and closed transactions have prompted considerable
dispute over the reach of Burnet v. Logan. In Stephen H.
Dorsey,1 4 the Tax Court found no ascertainable fair market value
for the right to future royalties from the sale or lease of automatic
pinsetting machines by American Machine 8c Foundry Company
(AMF). The court took great care to enumerate the uncertainties
and contingencies involved:
(1) The then "unsavory past reputation of bowling and its
unknown future potential."
(2) Uncertainty as to acceptability of a new product by bowl-
ing proprietors and marketability of the product.
(3) Problems such as patent infringement suits and competi-
tion from other manufacturers.
(4) AMF's control over pricing, marketing, and other man-
agement decisions, which could have resulted in no payments of
royalties to taxpayers." 5
Accordingly, the Tax Court followed Burnet v. Logan, finding
that the right to royalties was "wholly contingent upon facts and
circumstances not possible to foretell with anything like fair cer-
tainty."616
612. Accord, Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); Stephen H. Dorsey,
49 T.C. 606 (1968); George J. Lentz, 28 T.C. 1157 (1957). This holding is now subject
to the provisions of section 483 of the Code. See note 609 supra.
613. See, e.g., Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1969); Chamberlin v.
Commissioner, 286 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1960); Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235
(4th Cir. 1952); Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C.
376 (1955).
614. 49 T.C. 606 (1968).
615. Id. at 629-30.
616. Id. at 629.
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In the course of its opinion, the Tax Court enumerated cer-
tain categories of cases that clearly fall outside the Burnet v. Logan
principle:61 7
(1) Where "there was an established industry with sufficient
criteria for ascertaining fair market value." 18
(2) Where the taxpayer has offered insufficient proof of lack
of ascertainable fair market value. 1 9
(3) Where the taxpayer himself initially valued the rights to
future payments by including them as an amount realized and
later took a contrary position. 20
(4) "[C]ases which involve March 1, 1913, values . . . where
the problem was such that there had to be an immediate determi-
nation of value without awaiting future experience. 0 2'
In Revenue Ruling 58-402, 622 the Commissioner attempted
to limit the Burnet v. Logan rule to cases of clear uncertainty
about value. The ruling restates the rule of section 1.1001(a) of the
Regulations, that for purposes of section 100 1(b), "only in rare and
extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair mar-
ket value." 623 The ruling goes on to assert that Burnet v. Logan
"did not decide that contracts for indefinite payments generally
have no ascertainable value," but only that the "many uncertain-
ties" present in that case required return of basis before any gain
could be found.024 Such cases as Commissioner v. Carter and
Westover v. Smith62 are not authority for the application of the
Logan principle, suggests the ruling, because the courts neither
considered nor adjudicated the question of ascertainable value.027
Noting the different tax consequences of open and closed trans-
actions, the ruling states the concern of the government:
617. Id. at 630-32.
618. Id. at 630 (citing Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Pat
O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955)).
619. Id. at 631 (citing, inter alia, Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 850
(7th Cir. 1960)).
620. Id. at 631 (citing, inter alia, Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800 (3d
Cir. 1969); Estate of Marsack v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1961)).
621. Id. at 632 (citing Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931); Commissioner v.
Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187 (1955)).
622. 1958-2 C.B. 15.
623. Id. at 16.
624. Id.
625. 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
626. 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
627. 1958-2 C.B. at 16.
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[I]t is necessary .... in order to prevent escape from ordinary in-
come tax by converting income payments into capital gains, to
ascertain the value of property in the prior sale or exchange and
to close the transaction, except in rare and extraordinary cases.
Othenvise, the ordinary income tax on -the income collected from
the contract or claim after the sale or exchange is converted into a
tax on capital gains.628
The dissenting judges in Stephen H. Dorsey529 would have
gone even further in limiting the application of the Logan rule.
Judge Simpson, noting that the open transaction creates infinite
capital gain, argued that Logan was decided prior to the enactment
of the capital gains provisions so that the case involved only a ques-
tion of timing. Since all gain would be reported as ordinary income
when received, there was no necessity in Logan to find an ascer-
tainable fair market value in order to prevent conversion of
ordinary income into capital gains. With the presence of the tax
preference for capital gains, argued Judge Simpson, it becomes
necessary to find a fair market value in order to limit the amount
taxable as capital gain. As was noted in Logan, the need to value
in order to limit capital gains is similar to the need to value
for estate tax purposes. Therefore, continued Judge Simpson,
Logan should be confined to cases involving a question of timing,
or to cases where income is all of the same kind, whenever
received.610
Given the present distinction between open and closed trans-
actions, what this argument seems to mean is that Logan should
be restricted to sales of property which give rise to no capital gain.
It is only in such cases that timing alone is affected by the Logan
principle.
VIII. THE OPEN-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE AND
THE PRIVATE ANNUITY
Suppose that A, a cash basis taxpayer, owns securities having a
fair market value of $50,000, in which his basis is $20,000. On
December 31, 1975, he transfers the securities to B, an individual,
for B's promise to pay, beginning January 2, 1976, $6,000 a year
628. Id. at 17. For post-1963 transactions this concern will be somewhat miti-
gated by the provisions of section 483, which tax a portion of even contingent pay-
ments where unstated interest is present. See note 609 supra.
629. 49 T.C. 606 (1968).
630. Id. at 634-35.
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to A, for A's lifetime. Assume further that A's life expectancy on
January 2, 1976, is 10 years, 31 and that the present value of the
annuity is $50,000.683
The income tax consequences to A, the transferor-annuitant,
for 1975, the year of the transfer, and for each year thereafter, have
been the subject of considerable dispute.38 Where, as in the above
example, the transferee is an individual and his promise to pay the
annuity is unsecured, the courts have uniformly taken the position
that a private annuity agreement is itself an "open transaction.0 84
In J. Darsie Lloyd,3 5 the Board of Tax Appeals held that under
the terms of section 1001(b) the promise to pay an annuity had
no fair market value to a cash basis taxpayer because of the uncer-
tainty of payment by an individual who, unlike an insurance
company or bank, is not subject to regulation and supervision 8
Thus, the petitioner was entitled to recover his basis in the securi-
ties transferred before having to report any gain.637 In Lloyd, no
part of the cash payments actually received by the taxpayer in the
year of the agreement was taxable as an annuity, because at that
time the law excluded from income all amounts received by an
annuitant until he recovered the consideration paid.638
631. See Tleas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Table I (1956).
632. See Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(e) (1) (iii) (b) (3) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
10(f) (1970) (updating Treas. Reg. § 20.2031.7(f) (1958)); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1
C.B. 43. Use of these regulations was approved in Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313
(4th Cir. 1968), and Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469, 474 (197).
633. See generally Ellis, Income, Gift and Estate Tax Rules of Private Annuities:
How They Work, 38 J. TAX. 234 (1973); Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Pay-
ment, 30 TAx L. Rxv. 469, 576 (1975); Midgley, supra note 605; Note, Private Annui-
ties: Revenue Ruling 69-74-Its Significance, Effect, and Validity, 23 VAND. L. REV.
675 (1970).
634. The basis of the transferee in the property received is determined under
familiar principles of cost, with adjustments necessitated by death of the transferor
or sale of the property by the transferee. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352, discussed
in Ellis, supra note 633; Ellis, Private Annuities, 195-2nd TAx MNGM'T (BNA) A18-A22
(1972); Fair, McKinster & Zisman, The Private Annuity, 40 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 338, 843-47
(1968); Mancina, The Private Annuity, 43 TA vs 255 (1965). See also Dix v. Commis-
sioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968), holding that the cost of the property received is
properly determined under the private annuity tables of the Regulations (see note
632 supra), precluding use of the higher basis provided by commercial annuity tables.
635. 3 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
636. Id. at 905. For criticism and comment on this position, see Fair, McKinster &
Zisman, supra note 634, at 339 n.3; Mancina, supra note 634, at 258-59; Note, supra
note 633, at 688 n.77.
637. 33 B.T.A. at 905.
638. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213 (b) (2), 44 Stat. 24.
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In Frank C. Deering,63 9 a like result obtained for the annuity
exchange, the Board of Tax Appeals relying on Lloyd to find the
transferee-promissor was not "a sound insurance company," and
also relying on Burnet v. Logan.640 Since the transfer occurred
on December 30, 1935, and during 1935 the taxpayer received no
payments under the contract, the Board did not have to determine
the tax consequences of receipt of payments.641 It should be noted,
however, that in the Revenue Act of 1934, Congress changed the
law to provide that annuity payments were taxable to the extent
of three percent of the consideration paid for the annuity until the
excluded amounts equalled the consideration paid, at which time
the payments received were taxed in full as ordinary income.642
This rule remained in effect until the enactment of section 72 in
the 1954 Code.6 43
In Hill's Estate v. Maloney6 44 the annuity exchange was held
to be an open transaction under Burnet v. Logan, because of the
contingency that the promissor could not make the annuity pay-
ments.6 45 The court further held that annuity payments later
received which exceeded the transferor's basis in the property
transferred were taxable as capital gain, and also were taxable as
ordinary income up to three percent of the consideration paid
under then section 22(b)(2)." 6
In Commissioner v. Kann's Estate,6 47 the annuity exchange
was again held not to give rise to an amount realized under section
1001(b). The Third Circuit stated:
The petitioner would have us change ... a salutory rule of law
established.., in the Lloyd case ... that where both the annui-
tant's life span and the obligor's ability to pay are uncertain no
fair market value should be ascribed to the contract .... [T]he
Tax Court has held in the instant case, as in -the past, that where
obligors are individuals, whether rich or poor, their obligations to
pay in the future do not possess such standing as to come within
639. 40 B.T.A. 984 (1939).
640. Id. at 986.
641. Id. at 987. Deering was followed on like facts and reasoning in Bella Hommel,
7 T.C. 992 (1946).
642. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22 (b) (2), 48 Stat. 687.
643. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22 (b) (2), 53 Stat. 10.
644. 58 F. Supp. 1964 (D.N.J. 1944).
645. Id. at 171-72.
646. Id. at 173-75. This double taxation of the same amounts has not been pursued
by the Government. See Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43,
discussed in text accompanying notes 670-84 infra.
647. 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
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the purview of the statute, that such obligations possess no value
by way of ordinary business.... Like the Tax Court we think that
there is little to be gained by giving up the principle, now well
established, that an agreement by an individual to pay a life an-
nuity to another has no "fair market value" for purpose of com-
puting capital gain.648
Kann's Estate cited two uncertainties, the obligor's ability
to pay and the annuitant's life span. The latter would of course
also apply to a purchase of a commercial annuity and is rejected
implicitly by the reasoning of prior cases and expressly by the
holding in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell,6 49 which-held that a transfer for
a secured private annuity is a closed transaction, notwithstanding
the uncertainty as to the ultimate amount payable. 01 The critical
factor that makes the private annuity exchange an open transac-
tion is the individual's unsecured promise to pay. Such a promise
is distinguishable from the promise contained in a commercial
annuity, which is more certain of payment because the issuer can
spread the risk of payment among many lives on an actuarial basis.
Such issuers are also regulated and required to maintain reserve
assets. The probability of the annuity being paid is therefore of
sufficient certainty to prevent open treatment on an annuity ex-
change, while the isolated annuity promise of an individual, rich
or poor, is considered highly speculative in value.
The valuation problem has caused the courts to apply the
principle of Burnet v. Logan. Although Logan did analogize the
situation before it to annuity payments,651 it must be remembered
that the Court had in mind the pre-1934 law whereunder all annu-
ity payments were first reported as recovery of cost. This method of
taxing commercial annuity payments has since been modified, and
the question remains whether Logan properly controls the private
annuity.65 2 The courts have equated the uncertainty of annuity
payments with the contingency of payout in the Logan case. The
same result would probably be reached for a non-marketable annu-
ity under the approach of the Ninth Circuit in Warren Jones Co.
648. Id. at 359.
649. 60 T.C. 469 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 584-89 supra.
650. Id. at 476. Estate of Bell was distinguished in Fehrs Finance Co. v. Com-
missioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), which applied the general principle of open
transaction to an annuity exchange where the annuity was unsecured.
651. 283 U.S. 404, 414 (1931).
652. See generally Midgley, supra note 605, at 683-87.
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v. Commissioner,65 which looks to the value of the annuity in an
available market.654
More recently, in Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner,655 the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's656 holding that the pre-
Bell private annuity decisions controlled taxation of an annuity
promise received from a family corporation. The precise issue to
be determined was the basis of the corporation in stock of a cor-
poration related to it under section 304, which it had received
as consideration for the annuity promise. On a sale of the stock,
the corporation's basis was found to be zero, a carryover from the
transferors-annuitants under section 362(a)(2). The court reasoned
as follows:
(1) The annuity exchange was not a capital gains redemption
under section 302(b), but rather was a dividend-equivalent transac-
tion governed by section 301(c) because the transferor's stockhold-
ings in both corporations were essentially the same before and after
the transaction.
(2) The annuity exchange was not itself a distribution under
section 301 because:
a) The corporate-promissor was a new corporation with
insubstantial assets and no history of financial responsibility.
657
Thus, the annuitants "did not receive anything ...which thy
could have disposed of even at a substantial discount. 65
b) Leaving aside the question of the corporation's ability
to make the annuity payments, under Lloyd, Kann's Estate and
Hill's Estate, the receipt of the annuity promise was not a taxable
event to the annuitants. 59
(3) Therefore, in the year of the annuity exchange, the trans-
ferors-annuitants recognized no gain under section 301(c)(8)(A)
(which would have applied to any distribution because of lack of
.any earnings and profits in the corporation) that could be used to
step-up the transferee's basis under section 362(a).
653. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 590-602
Supra.
654. See Warren Jones Co., 60 T.C. 663, 671-72 (1973) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
655. 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973).
656. 58 T.C. 174 (1972).
657. Id. at 191.
658. Id.
659. Id. at 192.
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(4) Estate of Bell was distinguishable because there the annu-
ity promise was secured. Also, the corporate obligors in Bell were
"clearly viable corporations with several years of operating his-
tory. '660
Fehrs Finance indicates that the Tax Court is continuing to
rely on the Logan principle of prior decisions, even where the
annuity obligor is a closely held corporation. It also introduces
into the private annuity analysis a discussion of marketability, the
approach used in Warren Jones Co. to find whether there was an
amount realized. This approach was also suggested by the Eighth
Circuit in distinguishing Estate of Bell.6"
Prior to 1954, the position of the Treasury on the unsecured
private annuity was in accord with that of the courts. Following
Revenue Ruling 239,662 issued under the 1939 Code, the private
annuity transaction in the above example would have been treated
as an open exchange under Lloyd, Kann's Estate and Hill's Estate.
Of the subsequent annuity payments of $6,000 a year, $1,500
would have been taxed as ordinary income-that is, three percent
of $50,000, the fair market value of the property transferred. The
excluded portion ($4,500) would have been treated as recovery of
the $20,000 basis in the property transferred. After basis had been
fully recovered, the excluded portion would have been taxed as
capital gain, up to $30,000 (excess of fair market value of annuity
over basis of property transferred), and thereafter the entire $6,000
would have been taxed as ordinary income. These results comply
fully with the basis-recovery requirement of Burnet v. Logan, as
modified by the requirement of section 22(b)(2) of the 1939 Code
that a portion of the payments be returnable as interest on the in-
vestment.6 3 With the enactment of section 72 of the 1954 Code,
however, the method of taxing annuities was changed in two basic
respects. First, section 72(b) excludes from gross income an amount
that bears the same ratio to the annuity payment as the investment
in the contract bears to the expected return. Under the reasoning
of Revenue Ruling 239, the investment in the contract is the fair
660. 487 F.2d at 190.
661. See also Fehrs Finance Co., 58 T.C. 174, 196 (Tannenwald, J., concurring),
which notes that the holding of Fehrs as to basis may not apply to annuity promises
of individuals, citing Rev. Rul. 55-119 and Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th
Cir. 1968), discussed in note 634.
662. 1953-2 C.B. 53.
663. See H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in J. SEIDAIAN, IEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws 1938-1861, at 295-96 (1938).
[Vol. 26
PART I-AMOUNT REALIZED
market value of the property transferred, $50,000. The expected
return is $60,000,664 resulting in an "exclusion ratio" of five-sixths.
Thus, for the four years 1976 through 1979, the ruling would in-
dude $1,000 a year as ordinary income and exclude $5,000 a year
as recovery of basis. For six years thereafter, the ruling would in-
clude both $1,000 as ordinary income and $5,000 a year as capital
gain. After the capital gain has been fully taxed, the ruling would
apply section 72(b), as it did section 22(b)(2) of the 1939 Code.
Unlike section 22(b)(2), however, which would then tax the entire
annuity as ordinary income, section 72(b) continues the exclusion
ratio for the life of the annuity despite the fact that there has been
a tax-free recovery of cost. The purpose of this change was to
relieve the hardship on annuitants who otherwise would have
been forced to make a downward adjustment in living standard
when the annuity income became fully taxable. 65 The result in
the above example would be to exclude five-sixths of the $6,000
annuity payment even after the tenth year of payments.
Apparently fearing this result for private annuity transactions,
the Treasury sought legislation in 1954 to reverse the result of the
court decisions in the private annuity area, and to make the an-
nuity exchange a taxable exchange, with the fair market value of
the annuity contract as the amount realized on the exchange.666
Although the Senate found that the "objective of clarifying the
uncertainty of court decisions is praiseworthy," it nevertheless
rejected the legislation as creating surrounding uncertainties. 667
In 1963, the Treasury again sought such legislation, and again
failed in the attempt.66 8 At about the same time, the Treasury be-
gan to issue rulings in an apparent attempt to limit the application
of Revenue Ruling 239 to isolated annuity contracts that do not
involve a family trust. 69 The Treasury's ruling position for private
664. See I.R.C. § 72 (c) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1956).
665. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Navs 4640, 4641.
666. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1241, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4428.
667. S. REP. No. 1632, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1954] U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEvs 4749.
668. Ellis, Private Annuities, supra note 634, at A-4, A-10.
669. Revenue Ruling 62-136, 1962-2 C.B. 12, held that an annuity contract issued
by "an organization, such as a corporation, trust, fund or foundation (other than a
commercial insurance company), which, from time to time, issues annuity contracts"
would not be protected by the open-transaction doctrine. (For special valuation tables
for such annuities, see Revenue Ruling 72-438, 1972-2 C.B. 38, which also discusses the
prior pertinent rulings bearing on such valuation. For a criticism of Revenue Ruling
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annuity contracts of individuals was finalized in Revenue Ruling
69-74,670 which stated that Revenue Ruling 239 is not applicable
under section 72(b) of the 1954 Code. Under Revenue Ruling
69-74, our hypothetical annuity transaction is treated as follows:
(1) The annuity exchange itself is not a taxable event.
(2) The annuity payments received beginning in 1976 are
taxable under section 72 of the 1954 Code. For purposes of sec-
tion 72, the investment in the contract is $20,000, the transferor's
basis in the property transferred. Therefore, the exclusion ratio
under section 72 is two-sixths, and for the life of the annuitant,
of every $6,000 annuity payment, $2,000 is excluded.
(3) For the first ten years, of the $4,000 includable portion of
the annuity payment $8,000 is reportable as capital gain and
$1,000 is reportable as ordinary income. Thereafter the entire
$4,000 is ordinary income.
There are two basic differences between Revenue Ruling
69-74 and Revenue Ruling 239 as applied under section 72. First,
Revenue Ruling 69-74 allows basis recovery ratably over the life
expectancy of the annuitant and at the same time taxes the gain
ratably, while Revenue Ruling 239 taxes no gain (other than in-
terest) until basis is fully recovered. In this respect, Revenue Rul-
ing 69-74 taxes the non-interest portion of the annuity payment
like an installment sale under section 453. Second, at the end of
the annuitant's life expectancy, the exclusion ratio is two-sixths
under Revenue Ruling 69-74, while it is five-sixths under Revenue
Ruling 289.
The first difference raises the problem of taxing gain before
there is full basis recovery. Since Revenue Ruling 69-74 does not
62-136, see Mancina, supra note 634, at 259-61.) Revenue Ruling 68-183, 1968-1 C.B.
308, held that where the transferee is a trust created by the transferor and the sole
source of annuity payments is the trust income and corpus, the transaction would be
treated as a reserved life income interest rather than a sale, resulting in taxation to
the grantor of the entire trust income under section 671. The Ninth Circuit came to
the same result as Revenue Ruling 68-183 in Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824
(9th Cir. 1975), where the trust corpus consisted of a non-assignable note and the
only source for the annuity payments was the interest on the note. See also Mark Bixby,
58 T.C. 757 (1972) ; May T. Hrobon, 41 T.C. 476 (1964). But cf. text accompanying notes
462-75 supra.
A private annuity arrangement effected through redemption of stock by a con-
trolled corporation can also result in ordinary dividend income, without basis offset, if
the requirements of section 302 (b) are not met. See the discussion of Fehrs Finance
Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973) (section 304 case), in text accom-
panying notes 655-60 supra.
670. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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treat the annuity exchange itself as a taxable event, the problem
does not arise until annuity payments begin and gain is taxed
prior to full basis recovery. Without more, such treatment makes
the ruling appear to be internally confused because it appears to
concede the applicability of the open-transaction doctrine to the
exchange, but ignores the basis-recovery requirement of that doc-
trine. The language of the ruling, however, eliminates this confu-
sion. Although the exchange is viewed as giving rise to "gain real-
ized," 67'1 the gain is recognized ratably over the annuitant's life
expectancy. Thus, the theory underlying the ruling appears to be
that the annuity exchange could be taxed, but it is not, and the
tax on the gain realized is imposed on only the actual payments
made. This construction is supported by the ruling's complete lack
of any mention of, or allusion to, the court decisions requiring
open treatment. Revenue Ruling 239, on the other hand, expressly
relied on Lloyd, Kann's Estate and Hill's Estate to find no taxable
gain (other than interest) both on the exchange and for as long as
it took the annuity payments to equal the basis in the property ex-
changed. So viewed, Revenue Ruling 69-74 is a direct challenge
to the uniform court decisions dealing with unsecured private an-
nuities and represents an attempt to achieve a result that has been
rejected by both the courts and the Congress. 2
Nor is such an attempt justified by the reasoning of Revenue
Ruling 69-74 that because the gain was not taxed on the exchange,
the "investment in the contract" for purposes of section 72 is the
basis in the property transferred . 3 There is apparent logic to this
position since it conforms to statutory basis provisions for prop-
erty acquired in a non-taxable exchange. 74 It does conflict,
however, with the authorities interpreting the statutory language
under both the 1939 and 1954 Codes, which have treated the fair
market value of the property exchanged as the consideration paid
for the annuity.(7 5 These authorities do not, however, resolve the
question raised by Revenue Ruling 69-74 because, with the excep-
tion of Estate of Bell, they addressed annuities subject to the 1939
671. Id.
672. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1241, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4428.
673. 1969-1 C.B. at 44.
674. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031 (d), 1033 (c), 358, 362 (a), (b). See generally Midgley,
supra note 605, at 697.
675. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973), and authorities cited therein;
Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53.
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Code, and, under Hill's Estate and Revenue Ruling 239, cost re-
covery before taxation of gain was conceded (except as to taxation
of the interest element in the annuity payment). Even in Estate
of Bell, a 1954 Code case, the issue was not present since there
the annuity exchange itself was held a taxable event because of the
presence of security for the annuity promise.
More important, the basic issue is the timing of taxation of
the gain, and whether the investment in the contract is viewed as
two-sixths (substituted basis) or five-sixths (fair market value), the
question remains whether basis recovery should be allowed before
any gain is taxed. This issue is not addressed by the definition of
"investment in the contract" in section 72(c) 670 and is properly re-
solved as a question of open or closed transaction. If it is to be
closed, as Revenue Ruling 69-74 implies, then the gain can be
taxed on the exchange and there should be no taxpayer objection
to deferred ratable taxation. If, however, the transaction is to re-
main open, then the basis recovery approach of Revenue Ruling
239 offers the proper resolution of the issue.
The second difference between the two rulings concerns the
amount of the exclusion ratio after taxation of the gain. After the
gain has been taxed, it seems clear that the taxpayer's investment
in the contract is his basis plus his recognized gain-the fair mar-
ket value of the property transferred, plus the amount of gain
taxed. This is simply another application of the rule of Philadel-
phia Park Amusement Co. v. United States6 77 that basis should re-
flect "tax cost." Revenue Ruling 69-74 contradicts this principle,
however, by treating only the basis in the property transferred as
the cost of the annuity, even after the full capital gain has been
taxed. Thus, in the above example, the exclusion ratio is two-
sixths instead of five-sixths. There is no apparent logic to this posi-
tion. Under section 22(b)(2) of the 1939 Code, the full $6,000
annuity payment would have been includable in income because
the exclusion disappeared after tax-free recovery of cost. This was
changed, as discussed above, by section 72(b) of the 1954 Code;
thus, the exclusion for cost continues even after it has been re-
covered through annuity payments. Therefore, cost should reflect
tax cost, and the exclusion ratio after taxation of the capital gain
should be five-sixths.
676. But see Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469, 478-80 (1973) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting).
677. 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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The position of Revenue Ruling 69-74-that the exclusion
ratio remains at two-sixths after the capital gain is fully taxed-has
not been reviewed in any decided case. It was, however, specifically
rejected by the dissenting judges in Estate of Lloyd G. Bell.678 It
furthermore is contradicted, if not overruled, 679 by the promulga-
tion in 1972 of Example 8 of section 1.1011-2(c) of the Regula-
tions. Although this regulation was promulgated to illustrate the
operation of the basis allocation principles of section 1011(b) on
bargain sales to a charity, Example 8 goes far beyond computing
the part-sale gain for an annuity, and outlines the tax consequences
over the entire life of the annuitant. Consistent with Revenue
Ruling 69-74, it treats the gain as recognized and ratably taxable
over the annuitant's life expectancy, during which time the basis
in the transferred property is also excluded ratably. It departs from
the ruling, however, by including the annuitant's tax cost in the
cost of the annuity, so that in the above fact situation the exclu-
sion ratio would be five-sixths even after cost is fully recovered.
Arguably, Example 8 is distinguishable from the ruling be-
cause its hypothetical transferee is a church and the annuity it
speaks of is therefore valued under section 1.101-2(e)(1)(iii)(b)(2)
of the Regulations,8 0 so that the annuity is being treated as a com-
mercial annuity. This conclusion is supported by treatment of the
gain from the annuity exchange as recognized, despite the fact that
such gain is not taxed until the annuity payments are received.
These distinctions do not, however, undercut the basic inconsis-
tency of Example 8 and Revenue Ruling 69-74 with respect to the
section 72(b) exclusion ratio after the gain has been fully taxed.
At that time, whether the annuity be a commercial or a private
annuity, the exclusion ratio should be based on full cost, includ-
ing tax cost.
The approach of the Treasury has been to tax the private an-
nuity under the statutory provisions governing annuities generally.
678. 60 T.C. 469, 478 (1973). The dissenting opinion of Judge Simpson does,
however, adopt the rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-74 for the years prior to full
taxation of the capital gain, thus accepting that ruling's taxation of gain before full
basis is recovered. 60 T.C. 469, 478-79.
679. See generally Stewart, supra note 605, at 613-17.
680. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2 (e) (iii) (b) (2) (1975) applies to non-commercial annui-
ties paid by an organization regularly engaged in issuing annuity contracts. Issuance of
such annuities is treated as taxable by, and the amount realized is -valued under, Rev.
Rul. 62-216, 1962-2 C.B. 30, Rev. Rul. 62-137, 1962-2 C.B. 28, and Rev. Rul. 62-136,
1962-2 C.B. 12. See note 669 supra.
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Thus, just as Revenue Ruling 239 applied sections 22(b)(2) of the
1939 Code, Revenue Ruling 69-74 and Example 8 apply section 72
of the 1954 Code. There is another approach, however, that disre-
gards section 72 and simply uses the open-transaction approach
combined with section 483. This approach would tax as ordinary
interest income the unstated interest present in each annuity pay-
ment. Such an approach indeed may be compelled by the fact that
section 72 has no application where the "expected return," re-
quired under section 72(b) to be found for the annuity, cannot be
valued under the open-transaction doctrine. This argument is sup-
ported by cases that hold that the installment-sale provisions of
section 453 cannot be elected when the total contract price in-
cludes payments incapable of valuation, thus preventing install-
ment reporting of payments made in the "gain ratio" of gross profit
to contract price as required by section 453(a)(1).08' Likewise, when
the expected return cannot be valued under section 72(b), the "ex-
clusion ratio" cannot be computed for purposes of applying the
annuity rules of section 72.682
Such treatment of the private annuity transaction does not
conflict with those cases that hold that the transaction is an open
exchange. Furthermore, it substitutes the ascending-interest-on-
the-outstanding-balance approach (for indefinite payments) of sec-
tion 483683 for the prorated, level-interest income under section 72.
Thus, each annuity payment is part interest, even while basis is
being recovered. The overall result is similar to that reached under
Revenue Ruling 239, and differs from Revenue Ruling 69-74
in that no capital gain is taxed until the principal payments equal
the basis in the property transferred. This represents a distinct dis-
advantage to the government.
However, after full recovery of basis by the annuitant, the
annuity payments received are entirely attributable to the previous
open exchange and are, therefore, taxed as gain plus section 483
681. Steen v. United States, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975); Gralapp v. United
States, 458 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972).
682. Where section 72 applies, section 483 is prevented from applying by section
453 (f) (5). A finding that section 72 does not apply to the private annuity will trigger
the application of section 483.
683. See section 483 (d) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1 (e) (1)- (2), and (3), Ex. (5)
(1966), which apply the unstated interest rates as each contingent payment is
received, with interest computed from the date the contract obligation was incurred
to the date of the payment. These regulations have been updated, to increase the
unstated interest rate from 5 to 7 percent, by T.D. 7394, 1976-5 I.R.B. 7, 8-11 (1976).
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interest arising from such exchange. Since there is no exclusion
ratio applied under section 72, and since basis has been fully re-
covered free of tax, the full annuity payment is taxed as exchange
gain plus interest for however many years received.6 4 This result
is, of course, favorable to the government, but it will arise only in
the case of the long-lived annuitant who survives beyond the time
needed to recover principal payments equal to his cost plus the
appreciation in the property transferred. The further advantage
to the government is that, with the passage of time, the capital-
gain increment in the annuity payments diminishes, while the sec-
tion 483 unstated interest increases.
684. See text accompanying notes 607-30 supra.

